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This research examines middle-managers’ construing of exploratory and exploitative 
innovation projects in two large US high-tech companies.  The theoretical basis for this 
research is that of organizational ambidexterity and agency theory.  Answering a call from 
multiple researchers, this research focuses on ambidexterity at the individual level. 
The research follows a phenomenological paradigm with its focus on individual experiences 
as evidence, and constructivism as epistemological stance.  It is based on a case study design, 
with data collection completed in two stages, using Repertory Grid Technique in stage 1 and 
Key Informant Interviews in stage 2. 
Emergent findings indicate that a) prior experience type (exploitative/exploratory) and 
function (Engineering / Product management) are the key leading indicators of differences in 
the construing of project success; b) there is mostly alignment in how managers from 
different levels construe what is important for exploratory and exploitative innovation 
projects; c) there is a difference in the extent to which managers apply approaches to these 
two types of project; and d) managers rarely apply exploratory-innovation specific 
approaches even when merited. 
The emergent root cause for lack of exploratory innovation specific approaches appears to be 
a result of inertia, and of the expectations of the extant corporate culture.  A model is 
developed to indicate how a change can be introduced in an organization to address this 
finding. 
This research contributes to study of ambidexterity, managerial sensemaking, and project 
management by offering an insight into how managers from the Product Management and 
Engineering functions think about project success.  It offers possible explanations for the lack 
of distinction between exploration and exploitation when it comes to selection of approaches 
and metrics; it presents implications to practice and makes recommendations for improving 













“Life can only be understood backwards; 
but it must be lived forwards.” 
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Glossary of Terms 
Term Description 
Ambidexterity An organisational ability to explore and exploit at the same 
time (Raisch et al., 2009). 
Agency theory Describes discrepancy in expectations between principals and 
agents and proposes behaviour-based and outcome-based 
contracts to address said discrepancy (see Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Holmström, 1989). 
Agile Methodology Software development methodology that emphasizes frequent 
and incremental delivery of highest customer value (see 
Owens & Fernandez, 2014). 
Balanced Scorecard A planning and execution framework that companies use to 
communicate their plans, align the goals across the 
organisation, and prioritise and track project outcomes 
(Montgomery & Perry, 2011). 
Construing A process of interpreting events and ascribing meaning to 




Kelly’s somewhat idiosyncratic expression of his 
philosophical position grounded in the belief that “all of our 
present interpretations of the universe are subject to revision 
and replacement […and] there are always some alternative 
constructions available to choose among in dealing with the 
world.” (Kelly, 1963, p. 15). 
Constructivism Constructivism is an epistemology that postulates that 
knowledge of reality is a result of meanings ascribed by 
individuals as they explain events in a way that is useful to 
them (Raskin, 2002); knowledge as an invention consistent 




Constructionism Constructionism is an epistemology that postulates that we 
invent beliefs based on social relationships, cultural contexts, 
linguistics and communication patterns (Raskin, 2002); 
knowledge as a social agreement about what counts as 
knowledge and as evidence. 
Corporate 
Entrepreneurship 
Term used to describe entrepreneurial activities in established 
companies. 
Corporate Venture “an entrepreneurial initiative that originated within the 
corporate structure (or within an existing business of the 
corporation) and was intended from its inception as a new 
business for the corporation” (Kuratko, Covin, & Garrett, 
2009, p. 460). 
Deliberate Strategy A strategy formation process, whereby the realized strategy is 
also the intended strategy (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985).  
Disruptive Innovation Innovative product or service that eventually displaces 
established products often disrupting incumbents’ market 
positions (Christensen, 1997). 
Dynamic Capabilities Dynamic capabilities are those that help companies address 
high demand current needs and anticipate future needs (Teece 
et al., 2016). 
Emergent Strategy A strategy formation process, whereby strategic patterns are 
realized despite the absence of specific intentions (Mintzberg 
& Waters, 1985). 
Exploitation Company’s activity focused on increasing efficiency and 
productivity while minimizing risk (March, 1991). 
Exploration Company’s activity focused on innovation through discovery 




Exploitative Innovation Exploitative innovation refers to incremental improvement of 
core businesses.  May also be referred to as sustaining or 
incremental. 
Exploratory Innovation Exploratory innovation refers to introduction of new products.  
May also be referred to as disruptive or radical. 
Innovation Accounting Set of metrics appropriate for early stage exploratory 
innovation projects, when traditional revenue-based metrics 
do not apply (Ries, 2017). 
LHTC Large High-Tech Corporation, typically larger than 2,500 
employees (see Chandy & Tellis 2000). 
Intrapreneurship Term used to describe entrepreneurial activities in established 
companies.  Also known as Corporate Entrepreneurship. 
Metrics “Quantitative measures used to assess progress, uncover 
problems, and provide a basis for improving a process or 
product” (Kossiakoff et al., 2011, p. 400). 
Middle Managers Managers throughout the organisational hierarchy from a 
lowest level supervisor to a Vice President but excluding an 
executive management team (Harding et al., 2014, p. 1214). 
Personal Construct 
Theory 
A theory of personality and cognition developed by George 
Kelly (see Kelly, 1995, 1996).  
Principal-Agent Problem A problem that arises from relationships such as employer-
employee, and manager-subordinate, where principal is the 
former and the agent is the latter, and agents may not act in 
the interest of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Principal Component 
Analysis 
A technique used to calculate the cognitive complexity of a 





Repertory Grid Technique An interview technique designed to elicit participants’ 
constructs with respect to an issue being investigated (Bell, R. 
in Fransella, 2003). 
Sensemaking "The process through which individuals work to understand 
novel, unexpected, or confusing events" (Maitlis & 
Christianson, 2014, p. 59). 
Start-up Accelerator A program for a cohort of early-stage start-ups.  Participating 
start-ups receive mentorship, possibly a seed funding, and are 
guided towards a successful product launch. 
Waterfall Methodology An approach to software development and delivery, typically 
associated with a rigid sequence of activities: requirements, 
design, implementation, and quality assurance, followed by a 






This chapter describes what this study is set to achieve, including the organisational context 
and the rationale for the choice of the topic.  A brief overview of the methodology sets the 
context for the chosen epistemology, methods and techniques, and introduces the case 
companies.  The significance of this topic is clearly stated, specifically how it contributes to 
the business practice in addition to evolving the literature on ambidexterity, by studying how 
individual managers think about exploitative and exploratory projects with respect to 
practices involved in managing them and metrics used to measure outcomes of these projects.  
The chapter concludes with the thesis outline. 
 
1.1. Research Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this study is to learn how middle managers in two case companies construe 
exploitative and exploratory innovation projects with respect to metrics used to measure the 
expected outcomes and techniques used to manage these projects towards the desired 
outcomes.  Metrics in this context are “quantitative measures used to assess progress, 
uncover problems, and provide a basis for improving a process or product” (Kossiakoff et 
al., 2011, p. 400). 
To meet this aim, the following objectives have been set: 
1. to establish how middle managers construe exploitative and exploratory innovation 
projects; 
2. to examine differences in construing and choices of approaches between the two 
middle management levels: strategic and tactical.  
3. to examine differences in construing and choices of approaches between the two 









1.2.1. Organisational Context and Rationale for the Aim 
Company A is a multinational Fortune 1000 company founded in the late 80s and 
headquartered in the USA with multiple major sites in the US, UK, Ireland, India, and China.  
It provides productivity and networking solutions mainly to large enterprises in industries 
such as Financial and Healthcare.  Over the course of its existence, Company A has 
organically developed and released several new products, but the majority of new product 
innovation it introduced to the market was acquisition based.  With mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) still being a prominent portion of its innovation strategy, Company A is looking to 
capitalise on its capabilities and intellectual property to extend its offerings organically 
through new product development.  In the past decade, Company A has both established and 
dismantled various structures aimed at ramping up its innovation pace.  These included a 
venture arm focused on investments in select start-ups, and the internal ‘Labs’ organisation 
primarily focused on R&D activities.  At the moment the company is rebuilding its grassroots 
innovation muscle to boost the pace of organic new product development, sustain its 
leadership in a fairly mature market, and expand the addressable market by solving existing 
and new problems relying on recent technological advances. 
The topic of corporate innovation has been a subject of the author’s professional passion for 
the past several years.  While working for Company A, the author has helped design and 
implement an initiative to help the company’s employees start new businesses with at least 
$1M annual revenue each, inside or outside the company.  This included a series of 
grassroots initiatives to educate employees on how to turn raw innovation ideas into business 
concepts, pitch them to executives, and eventually launch new products.  Being in a 
leadership position in the B2B software product organisation has exposed the author to a 
variety of projects.  Some projects could have been characterised as incremental feature 
development, while others were aimed at new product development.   
It became apparent to the author that new product development has different characteristics 
than incremental feature development, mainly in terms of risk and uncertainty.  Yet the 
approach taken by management at all levels to the development of new products did not seem 
all that different from that which was applied to the development of new features for existing 
products.  Additionally, Company A was in a transition to become more outcome driven 




to be indiscriminate of a project type, most likely to be appropriate to incremental innovation 
than to a new product development.  The topic of differences between the two distinct types 
of project and the different approaches they demanded with respect to project management, 
goal setting, and metric selection became of interest to the author and prompted this research.   
Organisational ambidexterity (Raisch et al., 2009) is a strategy helping organisations to make 
distinction between the two types of project and be more deliberate about (a) balancing the 
investments between the two, and (b) applying the appropriate techniques for each, became 
of interest to the author.   
 
1.2.2. Rationale for Objectives 
There is a strong relationship between cognition and action (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014), 
action and strategy (Narayanan et al., 2011), and strategy and performance (Thomas et al., 
1993).  Therefore, it is of clear significance to understand how managers construe the 
exploitative and exploratory projects and what approaches they associate with these projects. 
The importance of metrics comes from the fact that metrics impact the behaviours of 
individuals and groups by aligning goals and actions with a company’s objectives (see 
Hauser, & Zettelmeyer, 1997).  Frameworks such as Balanced Scorecard (Mongomery & 
Perry, 2011) and Rhythm (Thean, 2014) became popular among practitioners for setting and 
tracking metrics and have proven to lead to superior performance in a number of sectors 
(Davis & Albright, 2004; Thean et al., 2017). 
Incumbent firms have to innovate to survive in an environment where technological advances 
allow small and nimble start-ups to solve customer problems in novel and less expensive 
ways (Christensen, 1997).  It’s not just any innovation that is important, but what some 
scholars call disruptive innovation (Christensen, 1997) and radical innovation (Leifer et al., 
2000), that a firm has to come up with occasionally to maintain its competitive advantage, 
lead the market, or create entirely new markets for its products.  Conversely, incremental 
innovation is typically aimed at defending the core business, addressing the current customer 
needs, and is not enough to address the new and emerging customer needs, eventually leading 
to loss of market leadership (Christensen, 1997; Leifer et al., 2000; March, 1991). 
Projects aimed at the creation of radical and disruptive innovations are called exploratory 




aimed at the creation of incremental innovation.  Succeeding with exploratory innovation is 
tough – there are many ways to fail and success is rarely predictable (Christensen, 1997; 
Leifer et. al, 2000; Tushman, 1997).  This is due to the fact that exploratory projects carry 
higher uncertainty than exploitative projects.  
While both the top leadership team and the rank-and-file employees are often interested in 
pursuing projects that may lead to disruptive innovations, the initiatives often get blocked at 
the middle-management level, as middle managers are often risk-averse, and may be 
concerned, among other things, about the possible adverse effects to their careers should the 
project fail (Dutton et al., 1997; Reynolds, 2017; Sharma, 1999). The risks inherent in 
exploratory projects, and the misalignment between the interests of top management and 
those of middle-management present a classic principal-agent problem (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Holmström, 1989).  The discussion on risk aversion of the middle-management layer of the 
organisation is framed in context of the agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Holmström, 1989).  
See the glossary for definitions of the principal-agent problem and the agency theory, as well 
as the discussion in section 2.2.4.3. 
Even when an exploratory innovation project has commenced, there are many pitfalls in the 
intrapreneur’s journey (see glossary for intrapreneur), and the results are highly unpredictable 
(Leifer et al., 2000).  To increase the chances of success, companies should apply start-up 
like approaches (Cagan, 2017; Ries, 2017; Teece, 2016) with respect to execution and 
organisation, and set innovation-appropriate goals and metrics.   
 
1.2.2.1. Start-up approaches 
Lean Startup principles (see Blank, 2015; Ries, 2011, 2017) can help intrapreneurs stay on 
the right course through experimentation and rigorous testing of a solution’s desirability, 
feasibility, and viability (Cagan, 2017).  However, if managers resort to the project toolkit 
used for traditional projects, they may deliver something that customers won’t need or won’t 
be ready to pay for, inevitably leading to a project’s failure (Cagan, 2017).  This is 
exacerbated in large mature firms, where the typical experience of managers is with 
exploitative innovation projects requiring traditional project management techniques.   
One of the techniques used to increase the chances of success of exploratory projects, is 




team resembles a small, fast moving start-up and does not have to adhere to the firm’s 
policies and procedures as they move the project forward.  For example, in a multiple-case 
study of exploratory innovation projects in large corporations, Edison et al. (2018) showed 
that permission to break rules at CallBook, and autonomy to make decisions and pivot at both 
CallBook and CallTech were key enablers of the innovation projects’ success.  
 
1.2.2.2. Goals and Metrics  
The process of setting goals in itself is proven to increase a firm’s performance (Bhatti et al., 
2014; Davis & Albright, 2004; Kasie & Belay, 2013).  Setting goals which are aligned with 
the objectives of an organisation (see Muller et al., 2005), with the metrics appropriate for the 
situation is proven to increase performance even more (Bhatti et al., 2014; Kasie & Belay, 
2013).  
It has been claimed by several scholars and practitioners that exploratory innovation projects 
require a different set of leadership and management techniques (see Cagan 2017; Baghai et 
al., 2000; Leifer et al., 2000; Teece, Peteraf, & Leih, 2016).  Therefore, it is critical that goals 
and metrics for achieving these goals are set in a manner appropriate for these projects. 
Goals and metrics setting are heavily dependent on managers’ perceptions of project 
outcomes, and those perceptions differ from manager to manager, and depend on managers’ 
prior experiences (Mcleod & Macdonell, 2010; Nooteboom, 2009; Pankratz & Basten, 2014).  
Hence, it is important to understand the construing (Kelly, 1966) of the situation by middle 
managers as it pertains to the project at hand, and the action these managers deem as 
appropriate as a result.   
While traditional projects may include metrics around cost, scope, schedule, revenues, and 
even customer satisfaction, the exploratory innovation projects have to focus on addressing 
the risks around uncertainty with respect to desirability, feasibility, and viability.  
Consequently, customer and user traction metrics (ones that measure customer sign-ups, new 
users, returning users, and active users, as an example), sometimes referred to as Innovation 
Accounting (Ries, 2017), are more appropriate for these projects.   
In companies where managers are mostly involved in traditional, exploitative innovation 
projects and traditional metrics are typically set, it is interesting to explore how these 




metrics for these projects.  This is even more interesting to explore in companies that attempt 
ambidextrous behaviours as they balance the investment in exploitative and exploratory 
innovation projects, as in those companies, managers are likely to be switching context 
between the exploitation and the exploration.  The literature on organisational ambidexterity 
(ability to exploit and explore at the same time) is highly relevant here (March, 1991; 
O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008; Raisch et al., 2009) and will set the context for the study as one 
of the main theoretical frameworks.  Ambidexterity is considered to be aligned with the 
dynamic capabilities of the firm.  While it is the ordinary capabilities that help companies 
exploit as they optimise their business operations, it is the dynamic capabilities that help 
organisations achieve their strategic goals and evolve and transform – themselves and the 
markets they operate in (Teece et al., 2016). 
This study takes a broad view of the middle management layer – from a first line supervisor 
to a Vice President, excluding only an executive management team (see Harding et al., 2014, 
p. 1214), and will be discussed in more detail in section 2.2.  This presents a unique 
opportunity to look at the various levels (Manager, Senior Manager, Director, VP) and the 
two functions: Engineering and Product Management, and determine any differences in how 
people at the various levels and functions construe the exploratory projects at hand, and how 
they chose techniques and metrics for those projects.  
 
1.3. Methodology Overview 
Perceptions the managers have about project outcomes differ from manager to manager and 
depend on managers’ prior experiences (Mcleod & Macdonell, 2010; Nooteboom, 2009; 
Pankratz & Basten, 2014).  With managers’ perceptions being the focus of the study, a 
paradigm with constructivism as the underlying epistemology has been adopted.  This 
research is set in the context of Personal Construct Theory (see Kelly, 1955).  Kelly 
introduced the term ‘Constructive alternativism’ (see glossary) which deals with how people 
construe events and ascribe meaning to them (Kelly, 1955, 1966).  Kelly has argued that 
different individuals ascribe different meanings to same events based on their own past 
history and experience of such events and that different forms of action are an outcome of 
these differences in construing. 
Researchers looking to study perceptions, or personal constructs of people regarding a 




al., 2004; Jankowicz, 2004) is a particular interviewing technique that allows a researcher to 
elicit personal constructs on a particular issue from participants.   
RGT (originally known as Role Construct Repertory Test) was developed by George Kelly, 
who presented the Personal Construct Theory (PCT) to the world of psychology in 1955.   
A two-stage exploratory study was used to examine the construing of managers as they 
ascribe meaning to exploitative and exploratory innovation projects and their outcomes in the 
context of ambidexterity.  Choice of approaches can be seen as actions that follow this 
construing of different project types.   
In stage 1, the RGT technique was used to collect data that represents managers’ construing 
of exploitative and exploratory projects from managers who led both type of projects.  For the 
purpose of analysis, the managers were stratified into two groups: strategic (VPs, Sr.  
Directors) and tactical (Managers, Directors).  A content analysis was performed on these 
constructs to compare how construing of projects by managers in the strategic group differed 
from that of managers in the tactical group.   
In stage 2, a triangulation study was conducted to examine the findings of stage 1. 
Two companies were selected to ensure that purposive sampling will result in a sufficient 
number of interviewees at different levels, to explore how differences in perceptions may 
map to the various middle management levels in the organisation. 
Company A is the author’s employer, where the author has a leadership position in the 
Product Management organisation and has led multiple innovation efforts.  The author was 
fortunate to also gain access to Company B for this study.  Both companies are multi-national 
high-tech corporations based in the US, founded almost 30 years ago, employ just under 
10,000 employees each, and have revenues of around $3 billion each annually.  Both 
companies are in a B2B market sell enterprise software and introduce new products to the 
market among a stream of incremental innovations.   
 
1.4. Significance 
This research draws on literature from three main realms: organisational ambidexterity, 
project management, and decision making, to extend findings of research made in the context 




contribution to the literature on organisational ambidexterity is closing the gap on how 
middle managers construe exploratory innovation projects, and what approaches do they 
associate with these projects, as opposed to traditional projects.  Such knowledge will 
contribute to the field of organisational theory, as individuals’ sensemaking is considered key 
in understanding their actions and organisational change over time (Weick et al., 2005). 
The research on traditional project management appears to be more mature than research on 
management of exploratory innovation projects and includes literature on project success 
perceptions.  It can be argued, that a similar research on exploratory innovation in the context 
of ambidexterity has not yet achieved a similar depth of maturity.  For example, a 
comprehensive literature review by Davis (2014), who focused on perceptions of project 
success, did not include sources on topics of innovation, ambidexterity, and corporate 
entrepreneurship.  Similarly, a research by Pankratz & Basten (2013, 2017), who focused on 
managers’ perceptions of project success does not seem to be replicated in the context of 
ambidexterity.  This incomplete understanding may lead to inadequate techniques, metrics, 
and incentives around project outcomes, and to difficulty in choosing the most appropriate 
model of innovation metrics.  It is also possible that middle-managers, especially the ones 
who have not led exploratory projects in the past, do not understand what exploratory 
projects entail, and the uncertainty and ambiguity inherent in these projects, and therefore 
missing the fact that these projects need to be managed differently (see Baghai, 2000).  Ren 
& Guo (2011) found that in some organisations exploratory projects are presented as 
exploitative to top management to get attention.  While they do not make this connection, it’s 
sensible to assume that when a project is presented to senior management as exploitative, the 
expectations for project outcomes will be set accordingly.  This may set the project up for 
failure because inappropriate expectations and metrics will measure its success.  Ultimately, 
the choice of metrics that are not appropriate in particular circumstances may lead to 
suboptimal performance (see Locke et al., 2002).  
The body of literature on ambidexterity is consistently growing, yet there is still much to be 
discovered (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008).  With evidence that ambidexterity leads to 
increased company sales growth performance (He and Wong, 2004), it is important to 
understand the antecedents of successful pursuit and achievement of organisational 
ambidexterity.  One of such antecedents is success metrics for outcomes of exploratory 
innovation projects.  Project success has been a popular research topic for decades (Ika, 




groups of employees (Agarwal & Rathod, 2006; Davis, 2014; Fowler & Walsh, 1999; 
Pankratz & Basten, 2014; Pankratz & Basten, 2017).   
In view of the above, understanding the managers’ construing should be of interest to 
practitioners.  It is hoped that practitioners in organisations pursuing organisational 
ambidexterity will know what to look for in terms of middle managers’ understanding of 
what it means to undertake an exploratory project.  Additionally, they might be able to assess 
the metrics system in place and adjust it to reflect the differences between exploitative and 
exploratory projects.  While the research is set in context of mature corporations in the high-
tech industry, it is sensible to assume that the findings will be of interest to practitioners in 
other industries and in companies of smaller sizes. 
 
1.5. Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2 reviews and integrates several literature fields and sets the research in the context 
of ambidexterity and the Personal Construct Theory as the main theoretical frameworks.   
Chapter 3 introduces the research question, aims and objectives of the research, and gives a 
detailed account of methodology, including the epistemological stance, the method and 
techniques, and the sampling approach. 
Chapter 4 presents the pilot study report. 
Chapter 5 presents the main study findings. 
Chapter 6 discusses the findings, implications for theory and for professional practice, and 





2. Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
The purpose of a literature review is to integrate relevant thinking and research on the topic 
of a thesis, while offering a critical analysis of contending positions in extant literature and 
constructing an argument in support of research questions (see Merriam, 1998; Ritchie et al., 
2014; Yin, 2017).   
The review starts by introducing the topic of innovation and clarifying its definition in 
context of this thesis.  Since the focus of this research is on innovation in large corporations, 
several relevant organisational designs are reviewed, such as corporate entrepreneurship and 
organisational ambidexterity.  Antecedents of these designs and their impacts on a company’s 
performance are discussed.   
Middle managers’ role is discussed with respect to innovation in general and ambidexterity in 
particular.  The agency problem is presented as the central antecedent of the failed innovation 
initiatives, and various approaches to address the agency problem are discussed. 
The overview of project outcomes and metrics follows and makes the distinction between 
traditional projects and innovation projects in the context of ambidexterity. 
Finally, the psychology of managerial decision making is discussed, and Personal Construct 
Theory is introduced as the basis for the methodological justification for this thesis. 
These themes are integrated in the literature synthesis presented at the end of the chapter, and 
the research questions, aim, and objectives are clearly positioned in the context of themes 
reviewed. 





Figure 1. Literature Review chapter map. 
 
2.2. Innovation in Large Corporations 
2.2.1. Innovation 
The definition of the term innovation has evolved over the past four decades.  Early on, these 
definitions were overly centred on the business unit coming up with the new ideas and 
implementing them.  No regard was given in these definitions to whether an innovation was 
new to the market (e.g. Damanpour, 1991; Damanpour, 1996; Tushman & Nadler, 1986; Van 
de Ven, 1986).  Recently, these definitions evolved to underscore the value of innovations to 
markets adopting these innovations (e.g. Chang et al., 2012; Leifer et al., 2000; Poe & White, 
2010), and to emphasise the importance of addressing customer and market needs (e.g. 
Greenhalgh & Rogers, 2010; Lockwood, 2009).  The definition that in the author’s opinion is 
the most appropriate in the context of this thesis is well articulated by Greenhalgh & Rogers 
(2010):  
"A product innovation is the act of bringing something new to the marketplace that 
improves the range and quality of products on offer [and] an increased value […] 
added for the firm and also benefits to consumers and other firms" (Greenhalgh & 
Rogers, 2010, p.3). 
In the 1980s, mature companies saw a decline in capacity for new product innovation, due to 
the emphasis on quality and restructuring to bring down costs, while focusing on incremental 




opportunities created by advances in disruptive technologies, new business models, shifts in 
consumer behaviour, and cross-sector convergence (Macmillan & Prakash, 2017). 
 
2.2.1.1. Types of Innovation 
Greenhalgh & Rogers (2010) and Tushman & Nadler (1986) describe two types of 
innovation: product innovation and process innovation.  Product innovation is about what a 
firm produces and can be incremental (added features or extensions to an existing product), 
synthetic (combination of existing components), or discontinuous (significant new 
technologies or product ideas).  Process innovation on the other hand, is about how a firm 
goes about producing its products and services.   
In his seminal work, Christensen (1997) introduced two types of innovation: sustaining and 
disruptive.  In his view, sustaining innovation is focused on maintaining the current products 
and extending them with new functionality, while disruptive innovation is focused on 
introducing new products and services to the market, solving new problems, or solving 
existing problems in radically new ways.  Leifer et al. (2000) have found that most leaders 
understand that distinction and realise that in order to survive they need to infuse disruptive 
innovation into the market, but at the same time few are able to execute on that realisation 
(see discussion in chapter 2.2.1.3 on antecedents of innovation failure and success). 
Loewe et al. (2001) describe five types of innovation: (1) The Cauldron: most entrepreneurial 
in nature among the five, it capitalises on entrepreneurial spirit of the management team that 
challenges assumptions and reinvents business models; (2) The Spiral Staircase: continuous 
innovation within the core business inevitably leads to significant change to the business; (3) 
The Fertile Field: where managers find new ways to leverage company’s competencies; (4) 
The PacMan: where companies invest in start-ups that proved market demand for their 
innovation; (5) The Explorer: a truly grassroots innovation, where the company is plunging 
into the unknown and anticipates a long and iterative project.  Loewe et al. (2001) claim that 
choice of approach depends on where the company anticipates the biggest opportunities to be.  
Jacobs & Heracleous (2005) relied on this taxonomy in development of a conceptual model 
for strategic innovation.   
Different types of innovation require different strategies, different leadership, and different 




1997, 2013; Leifer et al., 2000; Loewe et al., 2001).  For example, Leifer et al. (2000, p. 8) 
specify managerial capabilities such as uncertainty-mapping, and ability to follow a learning 
plan as critical for an exploratory project’s success.  McKenzie et al. (2009) claim that as 
managers advance in their careers and a strategic decision making is required in conditions of 
uncertainty (also typical for grassroots, exploratory innovation), the reliance on past 
experiences becomes detrimental, and more non-conventional thinking is required for these 
managers to succeed.  Chapter 2.4 will discuss this topic in more detail.   
Innovation does not always come in the form of a new product development.  According to 
Macmillan & Prakash (2017), mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and corporate venturing (CV) 
are increasingly playing a bigger role in the overall innovation strategy.  In 2016, companies 
have invested four times the funds into M&A driven innovation ($291B) vs. 2012 ($72B).  In 
some sectors, like IoT and Robotics, M&A has constituted as high as 98% of investment vs. 
2% investment in corporate venture funds (CVF).  In other sectors like 'Digital and Social' 
and AI, the ratio is ~73% in M&A and ~27% is CVF.  In other sectors M&A still constitutes 
more than 50% of investment vs. CVF. 
 
2.2.1.2. Disruptive, Radical, Discontinuous, and Exploratory Innovation 
Innovation that brings new products to the market, while leveraging new technologies to 
solve problems in better and cheaper ways, and at times creates entirely new markets while 
doing it, is critical to a company’s survival (Bower & Christensen, 1995; Christensen, 1997, 
2013; Christensen, Raynor, & McDonald, 2015; Leifer et al., 2000).  However, an additional 
classification is helpful to distinguish various types of new product development. 
Disruptive Innovation 
The theory of disruption (Bower & Christensen, 1995; Christensen, 1997) describes a 
business environment where start-ups leverage new technologies to solve problems for the 
low-end of the market, and as the quality of their offerings increases, they go up-market and 
eventually gain mainstream adoption, therefore disrupting the established market leadership 
position of the incumbent (typically large and mature) firms.   
Disruption theory became increasingly popular in academia, management practice, and 
consulting services since its introduction in 1995, and at times was seen as a silver-bullet 




established firms (Christensen, Raynor, & McDonald, 2015).  Unfortunately, this led to abuse 
of the term ‘Disruptive Innovation’, and a subsequent misunderstanding of its meaning 
(Christensen, Raynor, & McDonald, 2015).  In essence, the term was being used liberally to 
refer to any new product development whether it followed the disruptive cycle or not. 
Radical Innovation 
Introduction of a new business or new product lines to the market based on new technologies 
by mature firms has been referred to as radical innovation (Ahuja, 2001; Leifer et al., 2000).  
Chandy & Tellis (1998) makes even further distinction, claiming that innovation is radical 
only if it has both a high degree of technology newness and a high degree of customer need 
fulfilment (see Table 1 below). 
 
Table 1. Radical Innovation. Source: Chandy & Tellis (1998) 
            
 
Ahuja et al. (2001) claim that organisations fall into several traps that prevent them from 
coming up with radical innovation.  Mature firms tend to favour solutions that are familiar, 
mature, and relatively close to existing solutions, as these clearly lead to immediate benefits 
to the firm but tend to prevent break-through inventions that are key to firm's future 
performance.  They suggest that by experimenting with technologies that are novel, emerging 
or pioneering, firms can avoid these traps. 
While disruptive innovation is a process that follows a particular lifecycle as described above, 
radical innovation (Chang et al., 2012; Leifer et al., 2000) is a term used to distinguish an 
innovation activity aimed at new product development as opposed to incremental innovation 
whether in the context of a disruption scenario or in the context of normal course of business.  
Leifer et al. (2000) have acknowledged that radical innovation is synonymous to the 
exploratory innovation term used in the context of ambidexterity literature (see March, 1991; 




competencies to succeed with radical innovation.  Chang et al. (2012) emphasise that radical 
innovation is one that is new to a market rather than new to a firm.  See section 2.2.3 on 
discussion about organisational ambidexterity.  
Discontinuous Innovation 
Discontinuous innovation (Tushman & Nadler, 1986) is not used as often in innovation 
literature, yet is truly synonymous (see Chang et al., 2012) to the definition of radical 
innovation by Leifer et al. (2000).  
The term exploratory innovation is used most prominently in the remainder of this thesis to 
denote an innovation activity aimed at the development of new products or new businesses.  
This often involves new technologies, and characterised by uncertainties around desirability, 
feasibility, and viability of those new businesses and new products.  At times these 
exploratory innovation projects may lead to radical innovations, and at times they may 
disrupt the incumbents, but at all times they have been initiated to explore new product 
innovation consistent with the definition by Greenhalgh & Rogers (2010, p.3) as presented in 
section 2.2.1 above. 
 
2.2.1.3. Antecedents of Innovation Success and Failure 
With innovation being an important organisational capability, researchers have been working 
on assessment models and innovation capability maturity models (e.g Gatignon et al., 2002; 
Saunila & Ukko, 2012; Sun et al., 2012) to help practitioners understand their organisation’s 
current state of innovation capability and determine areas for improvement.  
Determinants such as strategy, culture, support mechanisms, and innovation encouraging 
behaviour are responsible for either inhibiting creativity and innovation or promoting them 
(Büschgens et al., 2013; Cooper, 2019; Cooper et al., 2004; Hisrich & Kearney, 2004; 
Martins & Terblanche, 2003).  
Barney (1986, p.657) offered a definition of culture as “a complex set of values, beliefs, 
assumptions, and symbols that define the way in which a firm conducts its business”.  He 
argued, that a distinctive culture can be a source of competitive advantage to a firm, a claim 
corroborated by Saffold (1988).   Saffold (1988) expresses a commonly held view that the 
strength of a culture depends in part on the extent to which members share the underlying 




assumptions, beliefs, and values held by the organization (Barney, 1986; Schein, 2004), 
Büschgens et al. (2013) conducted a meta-analysis of literature on organizational culture 
impact on innovation.  They found that while there are various different cultures that support 
innovation, hierarchical cultures are impeding innovation, while developmental cultures 
promote it.  Developmental culture is one where individuals and teams give preference to 
growth and flexibility (Büschgens et al., 2013).  Büschgens et al. (2013) offer additional 
cultural antecedents of innovation: 
1. Organizational learning – an ability of an organization to adapt to changing 
conditions.  
2. Organizational flexibility – encouragement and support for deviations from 
established processes.    
3. A tolerance for risk – related to “organizational flexibility” mentioned above, 
indicates an organization’s willingness to deal with uncertainty. 
Büschgens et al. (2013) claim that cultures fostering results-orientation and adherence to 
extant rules and procedures, may be detrimental to innovation. 
Naranjo-Valencia et al. (2011) have found that hierarchical cultures promote imitation, while 
adhocracies (cultures emphasizing growth, learning, and flexibility) promote innovation.  
Their findings are corroborated by Tian et al. (2018).  Innovation is also supported by 
organizational cultures that promote and reward risk taking (Antoncic, 2003; Deal & 
Kennedy, 1982; Tian et al., 2018).  Cooper et al. (2004) argued that organizational culture is 
one of the strongest drivers of new product development performance. 
In a worldwide survey of small and large corporations, Quinn (1985) found multiple barriers 
to innovation including, among others: short time horizons, excessive rationalism, excessive 
bureaucracy, and inappropriate incentives.  One common trait he found among the successful 
companies was the ability to recognise that early on in a project’s life excessive planning is 
detrimental to the project, and some level of chaos will happen and is welcome.  These 
successful companies set goals, select the right people, and define critical milestones, taking 
more of a venture capitalist investment approach.  Quinn (1985) calls this ‘chaos with 
guidelines’.     
Capital markets lead to a risk-averse culture in large corporations: exploratory innovation is 




corroborates Holmström’s point and describes the various challenges for exploratory 
innovation in large corporations.  These include risk aversion, inertia, overwhelming volume 
of ideas, experienced leaders who might seem to be the most appropriate to lead innovation 
efforts are often also the ones with higher risk-aversion, and staffing: taking resources away 
from current commitments.  Assink (2006) supports these views and claims that high risk and 
uncertainty about market success, track record of high rate of failure inhibit organisational 
adoption of ideas, and mismanagement of innovation projects leads to failed innovation 
efforts.    
Recently, approaches like the Lean Startup (Ries, 2011, 2017) have brought more 
predictability, speed, and clarity of feedback to exploratory innovation to address high 
uncertainty and risk typically associated with exploratory innovation (Cooper, 2019).  In 
particular, the Lean Startup approach allows entrepreneurs to deflect some of the perceived 
pre-requisites of new innovation success, such as insistence on having product requirements 
fully defined at the outset (e.g. Cooper, 1999).  The iterative development approach, featuring 
experimentation and intensive customer interaction, has shown an evidence of being both 
feasible and viable in achieving results (Cooper, 2019).   
Since the Lean Startup approach to exploratory product development was introduced in 2011 
by Ries, large corporations have tried to adopt it to drive their radical innovation efforts with 
various degrees of success (Innovation Leader, 2016; Ries, 2017).  Edison et al. (2018) have 
recently looked at several large firms and their experience with applying the Lean Startup 
approach to new product development.  They reported several enabling and inhibiting factors 
for internal ventures adopting that approach.  Among the enabling factors were (p. 81): 
1. Explicit strategy of innovation; 
2. Top management support and permission to break rules; 
3. Having a project champion; 
4. Access to internal networks and external networks (customers, partners); 
5. Coaching, mentoring, training; 
6. Cross functional teams with autonomy in decision making, including the ability to 




In a survey of 117 large Taiwanese manufacturing firms, Chang et al. (2012) looked at share 
of sales and share of profits generated by radical innovations as a measure of radical 
innovations’ long-term performance.  They found four capabilities that were significantly and 
positively correlated with the radical innovations’ performance: openness capability, 
integration capability, autonomy capability, and experimentation capability. Autonomy and 
experimentation in particular are some key innovation capabilities corroborated by other 
authors (e.g. Cagan, 2017; Owens & Fernandez, 2014; Ries, 2017).  
Exploratory innovation projects often don’t have the same legitimacy as exploitative 
innovation projects do in the eye of an organisation, and that legitimacy is important, because 
that what leads to resource allocation to a project (Leifer et al., 2000).  
And so, given the high uncertainty associated with innovation programs and projects, it 
would appear that risk aversion can negatively influence the culture and support mechanism 
in an organisation, inhibiting the success of innovation programmes and projects.  However, 
new approaches, such as the Lean Startup, can help manage the inherent risks in innovation 
programmes and projects and give legitimacy to them in the eyes of the organisation. 
 
2.2.1.4. Company Size and Innovation 
As corporations become larger, they put structures in place to help scale their businesses 
(Christensen, 1997; Tushman, 1997).  Over time, these structures may lead to organisational 
inertia and perpetuate the old ways of doing things (Assink, 2006; Tushman, 1997).  A 
dominant design in large organisations is one that perpetuates incremental innovation which 
builds on an organisation’s current success (Assink, 2006).  Failure to develop radical 
innovations in a timely manner puts mature firms at risk of being side-lined by start-ups 
(Christensen, 1997; Leifer et al., 2000).  Baghai et al. (2000) have stressed that most 
incumbents and large companies decline with time, unless they find a way to innovate and 
grow, preparing new revenue streams as existing ones mature.  
Chandy & Tellis (2000) challenge the common perception that radical innovations do not 
come from incumbents or from large firms.  They point out the fact that most literature with 
such findings is based on small samples, and not on cross-sectional studies that would use 
large samples of products.  They also challenge the sampling techniques used in some of 




approach.  Chandy & Tellis (2000) suggest that large firms have more opportunities to 
develop radical innovations thanks to significant financial and technological capabilities, 
which among other things, can help offset failures from some innovation initiatives.  In the 
research that sought to address the above-mentioned methodological weaknesses, Chandy & 
Tellis (2000) were able to show that contrary to the common belief, the size of a firm is 
positively related to innovation outcomes.  Number of employees was used as a determining 
factor of a firm’s size in their research, where companies with more than 2,500 employees 
were considered large.  Plambeck (2012) corroborates these findings and argues that higher 
levels of resources enable large companies to engage in more innovative product 
development. 
Organisation size as an independent and moderating variable has been a popular topic of 
research (Møretrø, 2017).  Similar to Chandy & Tellis (2000), Camisón-Zornoza et al. (2004) 
also point to contradictory findings among different scholars on the relationship between 
firm's size and innovation.  They suggest that one explanation for the contradictory findings 
may be variability in methods used by these scholars.  One such example is the issue of 
defining firm’s size.  According to Camisón-Zornoza et al. (2004), there is no agreement in 
literature on a single measure of firm's size: some use number of employees, while others use 
financial resources, and yet others use measures of input or output to denote firm's size.  As it 
appears, this situation has not dramatically improved since Damanpour (1996) has pointed 
out a similar inconsistency in literature. 
Innovation in large organisations remains a topic of interest among researchers, in part due to 
the contradictory findings mentioned by Chandy & Tellis (2000) and Camisón-Zornoza et al. 
(2004). 
 
2.2.2. Corporate Entrepreneurship  
Entrepreneurship phenomenon is often associated with start-up firms working on a new 
business idea.  Increasingly, large and mature organisations find themselves in fast-changing 
business circumstances, and in order to survive have to learn new ways to respond to these 
business conditions – ways more often associated with start-ups (Hisrich & Kearney, 2014; 
Teece, 2016).  Corporate Entrepreneurship (CE) got early attention in the 70s from 
management gurus such as Peter Drucker and Arnie Cooper.  Then in the 90s it lost visibility, 




of independent entrepreneurship in the wake of the dot-com bubble, CE started gaining 
visibility again in the beginning of the century (Katz & Shepherd, 2004). 
Covin & Miles (1999) defined four forms of CE: sustained regeneration, organisational 
rejuvenation, strategic renewal, and domain redefinition.  These forms may occur 
concurrently in a given organisation, and it is unlikely to determine ahead of time which form 
will lead to high performance.  Sustained regeneration refers to the continuous introduction of 
new products and services or entry to new markets.  Organisational rejuvenation refers to 
modifications an organisation applies to its structure, processes or capabilities to improve its 
competitive standing.  Strategic renewal refers to modifications in a company's business 
model with respect to competition.  Domain redefinition refers to the creation of new 
product-market arenas that have not been identified by others (Covin & Miles, 1999). 
 
2.2.2.1. Characteristics of the Entrepreneurial Firm  
Risk taking, innovation, and aggressive competitive action are the key characteristics of 
entrepreneurial companies (Antoncic, 2003; Zahra & Covin, 1995).  Teece, Peteraf, & Leih 
(2016) draw an analogy between sports and companies operating under various degrees of 
uncertainty.  Operating under certainty, they claim, is like playing chess: a largely predictable 
strategy with a decision tree.  Conversely, operating under uncertainty is like mixed martial 
arts: the uncertainty is so high that significant agility is required.  A key characteristic of 
organisational agility, they claim, is uncertainty management, which is very different from 
managing risk.  In conditions of high uncertainty, applying entrepreneurial management 
techniques is more important than following established processes (Teece, Peteraf, & Leih, 
2016).  Firms that successfully apply entrepreneurial management when the business 
environment is calling for it are said to possess ‘Dynamic Capabilities’.  In their seminal 
work, Teece, Pisano, & Shuen (1997, p. 516) introduced dynamic capabilities as “the firm’s 
ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address 
rapidly changing environments”.  Teece (2016) argues that dynamic capabilities are about 
doing the right things: these that help companies address high demand current needs and 
anticipate future needs; ordinary capabilities are about doing things right: lower level 
activities and skills to complete ongoing, clearly identified tasks. 
Firms able to change in response to the fast-changing business environment under conditions 




ability is not easy.  According to Argyris (1977), there are two types of learning organisations 
go through.  Some organisations follow their policies and objectives as a matter of course 
(single-loop learning), whereas others question their policies or confront the basic 
assumptions in the process (double-loop learning).   
 
2.2.2.2. Link Between CE and Performance 
There is significant evidence in the literature that CE leads to superior firm performance 
(Covin & Miles, 1999; Kuratko, Ireland, & Hornsby, 2004).  In a longitudinal study across 
three samples, Zahra & Covin (1995) found that CE had a positive impact on a company's 
financial performance which became more evident as more time passed.  They also found 
that companies operating in ‘hostile environments’ benefit from CE more than those 
operating in ‘benign environments’.  The latter finding corroborates Stopford & Baden-Fuller 
(1994) conclusion that  
“troubled firms in hostile environments can shed past behaviours, adopt policies 
fostering entrepreneurship and accumulate innovative recourse bundles that provide 
a platform on which industry leadership can be built” (Stopford & Baden-Fuller 
1994, p. 521).  
An internal corporate venture is  
“an entrepreneurial initiative that originated within the corporate structure (or within 
an existing business of the corporation) and was intended from its inception as a new 
business for the corporation” (Kuratko, Covin, & Garrett, 2009, p. 460).  
In a survey of 145 internal corporate ventures across 72 companies Kuratko, Covin, & Garrett 
(2009) found that CE had a positive impact on a company’s performance, and that having 
clear goals and a clear value proposition early on had a positive correlation with the 
performance of a corporate venture.  Authors recognised that even though it's hard to 
determine the exact outcomes of the venture ahead of time, the existence of clear goals 
separated the top performing ventures from the mediocre ones and from the underperforming 
ones.  While their findings are consistent with the evidence presented in this chapter, there 
are some challenges to the approach Kuratko, Covin, & Garrett (2009) used in their study.  




impossible to determine yet, the authors didn't explain what metrics were used to evaluate 
success. 
 
2.2.2.3. Bridging CE, Lean Startup, and Dynamic Capabilities 
In his ground-breaking book, Ries (2011) has built on the experimental method typically 
applied in sciences and engineering and developed an approach that can be applied by start-
ups to succeed with their innovative ideas.  Ries introduced a new framework called Lean 
Startup, where teams follow a ‘build-measure-learn’ cycle to evaluate the results of their 
decisions in a market-validated manner before moving on with development.  The validation 
follows the experimental method, where start-ups identify their riskiest assumptions about 
desirability, feasibility, and viability of their business, develop hypotheses to test those 
assumptions, and design and run experiments to test the hypotheses.   
Ries also introduced the concept of Minimum Viable Product (MVP), a minimum collection 
of features that lets the team test their riskiest assumptions.  The idea of the framework is to 
accelerate the ‘build-measure-learn’ loop with the help of MVPs, to shorten the feedback 
loop between a start-up and a market.  Prior to the Lean Startup school of thought, the reality 
was such that companies had to invest significant resources into an innovation project to fully 
build a new product before realizing whether it was an innovation or a mistake (e.g. Leifer & 
Rice, 2001; Van de Ven, 1986).  Since Ries introduced the Lean Startup method in 2011, 
many large corporations have experimented with this approach in their internal corporate 
ventures (Innovation Leader, 2016; Owens & Fernandez, 2014; Ries, 2017) leading to such 
outcomes as making more evidence-based decisions, increasing speed of development, 
accelerating customer feedback, and development of a more entrepreneurial culture 
(Innovation Leader, 2016).  Adoption of Lean Startup in companies is challenging when 
executives are looking for financial metrics and for a fast ROI.  Additionally, moving to a 
truly validated learning was reported as a significant change management challenge 
(Innovation Leader, 2016).   
Christensen (2013) builds on the Lean Startup approach and claims too that managers must 
validate critical assumptions about the business using discovery-driven planning.  Discovery-
driven planning is a disciplined approach to identify assumptions, plan to validate them, run 
experiments to validate them, and to learn and adjust (Cagan, 2017; Ries 2011, 2017).  Teece 




frameworks together, recognizing that approaches such as rapid experimentation and pivoting 
(changing the target market, problem to be solved, or solution) are key entrepreneurial 
techniques that help manage uncertainty in large corporations.  Rapid experimentation may 
take a form of iterating on a product prototype with customers or writing a press-release and 
testing whether the customer is excited with a product that hasn’t been built yet (see Ries, 
2017). 
It is worth mentioning that the dynamic capabilities framework was initially developed in the 
context of literature on corporate strategy and competitive advantage (see Teece et al., 1997).  
Later on, Teece (2014) has expanded the dynamic capabilities framework by including 
entrepreneurial management in said framework specifically to address the corporate strategy 
and competitive advantage of multinational enterprise firms.   
 
2.2.3. Organisational Ambidexterity 
Organisational research literature often describes challenges organisations face in attempt to 
pursue the various dualities, such as alignment vs. adaptability, and exploration vs. 
exploitation (Birkinshaw & Gupta, 2013).  O’Reilly & Tushman (2008) describe exploitation 
as an activity of a company to pursue efficiency and increase productivity, while minimizing 
risk and variation.  Conversely, they describe exploration as a company’s pursuit of 
innovation through discovery, embracing risk and variation.   
In context of this thesis, ambidexterity refers to an ability of a company to pursue both 
exploitation and exploration (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008).  The term traces back to Duncan 
(1976), who argued that for a successful outcome, firms pursuing ambidexterity need to have 
different structures to explore vs. execute. 
According to March (1991), extensive focus on exploitation leads to sub-optimal long-term 
results and it is essential to balance exploration and exploitation.  March (1991) suggested 
that both exploration and exploitation compete for the same resources, but risk and reward 
from each vary in timing and expected values.  In search for the balance between the two, 
exploitation has the advantage of being more predictable, and has the speed and the clarity of 
feedback (March, 1991).   
The bulk of ambidexterity literature focuses on new product development (e.g. Birkinshaw & 




aspect is the market orientation and how that orientation relates to the innovative capabilities 
of the firm (Lisboa, Skarmeas, & Lages, 2011).  In a survey among Portuguese firms, Lisboa 
et al. (2011) found that both customer and competitor market orientations are related to 
exploitative capabilities, as a firm tries to strengthen its position in the market, while only the 
customer orientation is associated with the exploratory capability.  The focus on customer 
orientation for exploration makes sense as customer discovery is a precursor to coming up 
with truly innovative solutions (see Blank & Dorf, 2012; Cagan, 2017). 
Andriopoulos & Lewis (2009) proposed a framework for describing the exploitation-
exploration tension in organisations.  The framework has three nested tensions: strategic 
intent (profit vs. breakthrough), customer orientation (tight vs. loose coupling), and personal 
drivers (discipline vs. passion).  The first is usually evident at a firm level, the second at a 
project level, and the last one at an individual level.  They suggested managing innovation 
paradoxes across these three levels to make ambidexterity more pervasive.  Papachroni 
(2013) has evaluated how these tensions are experienced by the individuals themselves.  She 
found that the individuals balanced these tensions based on their perceptions of the nature of 
said tensions, which typically were path-dependent for the individuals involved.  This finding 
supports Nooteboom (2009), who argued that people’s cognitive structures are path-
dependent. 
 
2.2.3.1. Organizing for Ambidexterity 
Exploitation vs. exploration dyad has been the focus of scholars in the last few decades (see 
Christensen, 1997; Humble et al., 2015; March, 1991; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008; Tushman, 
1997; Zacher & Rosig, 2015).  While exploratory innovation is critical to sustain market 
leadership, few mature businesses succeed balancing the two (Sharma 1999; Tushman 1997) 
and are often disrupted by start-ups (Christensen, 1997).   
Recognizing that ambidexterity is a viable alternative to a spin-out of an exploratory 
innovation project into a separate entity, researchers looked at whether and how exploitation 
and exploration can co-exist (see Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Bonesso et al., 2014; He & 
Wong, 2004; Jansen et al., 2008; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008; Papachroni, 2013; Raisch et al., 




Cummings & Worley (2008) argue that it is the rapid technological and environmental 
changes that lead organisations to reinvent themselves and organize into leaner structures.  
They build on work of Lawrence & Lorsch (1967) and define ‘differentiation’ as the extent to 
which organizational design differs between the different business sub-units, and 
‘integration’ as a set of mechanisms used by the organization to coordinate the work across 
sub-units.  According to Cummings & Worley (2008), the need for integration increases as 
uncertainty in the environment and differentiation increase.   
Ambidexterity scholars also build on Lawrence & Lorsch (1967) and evolve the concept of 
differentiation vs. integration further.  One group of ambidexterity researchers advocates 
‘structural differentiation’, whereby exploration and exploitation activities are performed by 
different business units (see Christiansen, 1997; Jansen et al., 2009b).  In his seminal work, 
Christensen (1997) proposes that to achieve disruptive innovation, exploratory businesses are 
best kept separated from core businesses.  Christensen’s work came under fire from several 
critics (e.g. Lepore, 2014; Thomson, 2013) who challenged Christensen’s definition of 
success, his samples being small, and his model being built on consumer buying decisions 
rather than those of businesses.  Leifer et al. (2000) have also argued for the separation of an 
exploratory innovation project from the main business structure as a viable approach, but in 
their view a firm should spin-out a business (establish a separate business entity) working on 
a radical innovation when that innovation does not fit the firm’s strategic context, rather than 
merely base the decision on the fact that the team is working on a radical innovation. 
Christensen himself has recognised that a spin-out may not be the only adequate approach 
and suggested that new ways need to be considered to solve the innovators dilemma (see 
Christensen, 2013).  
Another group advocates ‘integration’ as a set of behavioural mechanisms that allow for 
exploitation and exploration activities in the same business unit (see Gibson & Birkenshaw, 
2004; Jansen et al., 2009b; Lubatkin et al., 2006).  Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004) introduced a 
concept of contextual ambidexterity (as opposed to structural), which is “the behavioral 
capacity to simultaneously demonstrate alignment and adaptability” (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 
2004, p. 209).  They claimed that contextual ambidexterity is enabled not by dual structures 
but by a collection of systems and processes facilitating and enabling ambidexterity. While 
Jansen et al. (2009b) fall into the former group, their view is that a high degree of integration 
is required through informal social integration by senior team, and through formal corporate 




2.2.3.2. Ambidexterity as a Strategy 
While some academics and practitioners are calling for ambidexterity as a deliberate strategy 
with supporting culture and structures that may help solve the innovators dilemma by 
increasing visibility of trade-offs and resource allocation (see O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008; 
Pisano, 2015; Ries, 2017; Saleh & Wang, 1993), the strategy is not always deliberate. 
Mintzberg & Waters (1985) discuss various ways the strategy is formed in organizations, 
positioning these ways on a continuum between what they call ‘deliberate’ strategy and 
‘emergent’ strategy (see glossary).  In their view, strategy formation rarely falls into these 
extremes, and is often influenced by the environment the firm operates in, a stance 
corroborated by MacLennan (2009) and Nag, Hambrick, & Chen (2007). 
O’Reilly & Tushman (2008) describe ambidexterity as a dynamic capability of the firm (see 
Teece et al., 1997) and put forward several propositions, based on an extensive literature 
review: 
Proposition 1: “The presence of a compelling strategic intent that justifies the importance of 
both exploitation and exploration increases the likelihood of ambidexterity” (p. 197); 
Proposition 2: “The articulation of a common vision and values that provide for a common 
identity increases the likelihood of ambidexterity” (p. 197); 
Proposition 3: “A clear consensus among the senior team about the unit’s strategy, relentless 
communication of this strategy, and a common-fate incentive system increases the likelihood 
of ambidexterity” (p. 198); 
Proposition 5: “Separately aligned organisational architectures (business models, 
competencies, incentives, metrics, and cultures) for explore and exploit subunits, and 
targeted integration increase the likelihood of successful ambidexterity” (p. 198); 
Proposition 6: “Senior leadership that tolerates the contradictions of multiple alignments and 
is able to resolve the tensions that ensue increases the likelihood of ambidexterity” (p. 199). 
Ambidexterity scholars Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004) and Birkinshaw et al. (2016) emphasize 
that ambidexterity strategy formation is contextual to the firm, influenced by the environment 
it operates in.  In their view, firms should not be trying to adopt some generic set of dynamic 
capabilities to become successful (Birkinshaw et al., 2016).  Bridging ambidexterity and 




“the challenge for the firm is to make a choice that is appropriate to its environmental 
context and organisational heritage, and to develop the complementary set of 
capabilities that enable it to be effective” (Birkinshaw et al., 2016, p. 55).  
 
2.2.3.3. Ambidexterity and Performance 
Ambidextrous organisations maintaining different cultures, processes and structures that 
support both the incremental and radical innovations lead in the market (Raisch et al., 2009; 
Tushman, 1997).  Tushman (1997) takes a strong view and claims that organisations have to 
become ambidextrous, because otherwise they bound to continue responding to market 
threats with incremental process and product innovation risking their market position 
(Tushman, 1997).  Ambidextrous designs were found to be more effective for innovation 
outcomes than non-ambidextrous ones, including a spin-out design, where a new corporate 
entity is established to drive the innovation project (Tushman et al., 2010).  Companies 
switching to ambidextrous designs saw more positive innovation outcomes (Tushman et al., 
2010).   
While the evidence pointing at a positive impact of ambidexterity on performance is 
mounting (see Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; He & Wong, 2004; Luger, Raisch, & Schimmer, 
2018; Pertusa-Ortega & Molina-Azorín, 2018; Solís-Molinaa et al., 2018; Tushman et al., 
2010), there are challenges with some measurement methods employed by the various 
researchers. 
Luger, Raisch, & Schimmer (2018) looked at 81 insurance firms over a 15-year period.  They 
found that impact of ambidexterity on performance depends on the environmental context the 
company operates in, leading to fluctuations in performance outcomes.  One challenge with 
their methodology was how content analysis of press releases was done for identifying type 
of innovation produced by the firms in the study.  As Luger, Raisch, & Schimmer (2018) 
indicate, companies might have withheld information about exploratory activities from public 
press releases.  Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004) have found a similar impact of business context 
on performance outcomes in a survey of 4,195 individuals across 41 business units. 
In a survey of 206 manufacturing firms, He & Wong (2004) found ambidexterity to have a 
positive effect on a company’s sales growth performance.  Pertusa-Ortega & Molina-Azorín 




found a positive impact of ambidexterity on several performance indicators, from sales 
growth to market share growth to profits.  Similar to He & Wong (2004) they relied on self-
reported results.   
In a survey of 281 manufacturing companies Solís-Molinaa et al. (2018) have looked at how 
the absorptive capacity of a firm (ability of an organisation to absorb new external 
information, assimilate it and make changes to strategy) as a moderating variable impacts the 
ambidexterity outcomes.  They found that ambidexterity has greater performance outcomes 
when absorptive capacity is at higher levels.  Solís-Molinaa et al. (2018) have controlled for 
bias and triangulated (see Yin, 2017) financial and non-financial performance measures to 
increase the validity of their findings.  
The table below summarises the key findings presented so far with respect to ambidexterity 
and its impact on a company’s performance. 
 
Table 2. Ambidexterity and Performance. Source: Author. 
Author Method Performance Impact Findings 
He & Wong (2004) Survey Sales growth increase 
Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004) Mixed 
(Interviews, 
Survey) 
Satisfaction with the business unit 
performance over the course of 5-year 
period 
Performance outcomes depend on the 
business environment context 




Performance outcomes depend on the 
business environment context 
Pertusa-Ortega & Molina-
Azorín (2018) 
Survey Sales growth, market share growth, 
profits growth 






This thesis focuses on product innovation that is new to the market and brings added value to 




The terminology used to define various types of innovation is not always clear and often 
terms are used too liberally, without regard to the theories and nuances behind these terms.  
This is the case for term ‘Disruptive Innovation’, that typically will be radical in that it will 
be new to the market and will be technologically new, but in order to be called ‘disruptive’ it 
has to follow the disruptive innovation cycle. 
For innovation to succeed in a company, certain conditions need to be present in the 
company’s internal environment: its strategy, culture, and support mechanisms need to foster 
innovation.  Many companies don’t have the most appropriate ingredients to foster 
innovation, typically due to risk aversion associated with initiatives of high uncertainty, and 
inertia perpetuating processes that got the company where it is today.   
Entrepreneurial approaches such as the Lean Startup and venture capital investment models 
help organisations cope with uncertainty, and contain investments, helping to address the 
risk-aversion challenges, while shortening the investment timeframes and allowing for 
ambiguity in requirements. 
Company size as a determinant of innovation success remains a topic of interest for scholars, 
as the evidence of its impact on innovation and the associated performance is inconclusive. 
Corporate Entrepreneurship, sometimes referred to as Intrapreneurship, is a phenomenon that 
describes project teams in established companies who apply start-up-like approaches to bring 
new product innovations to the market.  There is clear evidence that corporate 
entrepreneurship leads to positive performance outcomes in large corporations. 
Ambidexterity has emerged as a paradigm dealing with organisational designs supporting 
both exploitative and exploratory innovation.  It has proven to have a significant positive 
impact on a company’s performance, at times the outcomes depending on a business context 
a company operates in.   
Both corporate entrepreneurship and ambidexterity are considered dynamic capabilities of the 
firm, which, contrary to ordinary capabilities, help organisations achieve their strategic goals, 
evolve and transform.   
This thesis is positioned in the context of organisational ambidexterity with its exploitation-
exploration dyad, as perceptions of managers about exploratory innovation (as opposed to 




The next section will focus on the middle-management layer of an organisation and its 
criticality to the success of ambidexterity and exploratory innovation.   
 
2.3. Middle Managers 
2.3.1. Defining the Middle Manager 
This thesis focuses on middle managers from Product Management and Engineering 
functions in two multi-national software companies, as they are instrumental for innovation 
success in an organization, as will be described in section 2.3.3, and summarized in table 4.   
For the discussion that follows this thesis adopts a management hierarchy typical for large 
multi-national software companies, especially ones headquartered in the US. 
 
Table 3. Management Hierarchy in Large Software Companies. Source: Author. 
Level Group Level Name Typical Role 
Board of Directors Director Member, Board of Directors 





Vice President VP of Product/Engineering 
Senior Director Sr. Director of Product/Engineering 
Director Director of Product/Engineering 
Senior Manager Sr. Manager of Product/Engineering 
Manager Manager of Product/Engineering 
 
This level grouping spans managers throughout the organisational hierarchy from the lowest 
level supervisor to a Vice President but excludes an executive management team.  This stance 
is consistent with Mintzberg (1989, p. 98), who positions middle managers ‘between the 
operating core and the apex’, and with Harding et al. (2014), who cites multiple sources in 
support of this view and concludes that there is a consensus in definition of middle manager.   
There is some inconsistency in the terminology used in organisational literature when it 
comes to executive teams.  Terms like Top Management Team (TMT) (e.g. Cao, Simsek, & 




Holmström, 1989; Rouleau & Balogun, 2007) are used interchangeably.  The term TMT will 
be used throughout the thesis to refer to this group and differentiate it from senior managers 
in the middle management group. 
 
2.3.2. Role of the Middle Manager 
Predictions made in the 50s through the mid 80s on the future role of middle management 
anticipated the role of middle managers becoming less crucial, more automated and routine, 
eventually leading to shrinking the number of middle managers (see Dickson, 1977; 
Torrington & Weightman, 1982).  Conversely, research made in the late 80s has shown that 
information technology led to evolution of the middle management’s role rather than decline 
in its ranks (see Dopson & Stewart, 1990).  In eight case studies with organisations across 
industries, Dopson & Stewart (1990) found that middle managers had greater responsibility 
and wider scope of control.  Managers in their sample have seen increasing and diversified 
challenges their jobs evolved to handle.  Increased pressures and workload have been cited by 
many managers as a common complaint.  Huy (2011) corroborates these findings in his 
study, and similar to Dopson & Stewart (1990) claims that the role of middle managers 
during times of change becomes more critical, and middle managers are increasingly rising 
up to the challenge. 
Middle management is a link between the company's leaders and the rank-and-file employees 
(Burgess, 2013; Huy, 2001; Reynolds, 2017).  Managers translate a strategy into achievable 
objectives and communicate performance metrics that make it clear to everyone in the 
organisation how success will be measured (Harding et al., 2014; Melnyk et al., 2004; 
Rouleau & Balogun, 2007).   
Teece (2016) sees management as filling three main roles in organisation (p. 207): 
1. Entrepreneurial management: responsible for seeking new opportunities, and to shift 
resources and organisational focus in response to market shifts. 
2. Leadership: required for sharing and executing the strategic vision. 




The entrepreneurial management function in his view is also responsible for validation of 
hypotheses with data, to reveal new business opportunities.  Ries (2017) also proposes for 
organisations to instantiate the entrepreneurial function.   
 
2.3.3. Middle Managers and Innovation 
Middle management plays a key role in identifying new ideas, finding and allocating 
resources to implement these ideas (Dutton et al., 1997), and leading successful exploratory 
innovation projects (Damanpour & Schneider, 2006).  Typically, it is managers from the 
Product Management and Engineering functions, who are responsible for developing the 
ideas and bringing them to the market (see Cagan, 2017; Owens & Fernandez, 2014).  These 
managers often operate in what Cummings & Worley (2008, p. 319) call ‘Matrix 
Organization’, where people assigned to projects may be a part of multiple reporting 
structures at the same time (e.g.  one functional and one project-based).  In their view, matrix 
organization structure is appropriate for complex projects with significant amount of 
uncertainty.  The matrix organization may exacerbate the challenges surfaced by the agency 
problem (see section 2.3.4.3), because the conflict of interest between the different levels in 
an organization may span different hierarchies in a matrix organization.    
Each management level has a role to play in innovation success with a particular set of 
behaviours (Kuratko, Ireland, & Hornsby, 2004; Miller & Camp, 1985).  For example, TMT 
needs to be personally involved in disruptive innovation projects (Amabile & Pratt, 2016; 
Christensen, 2013).   
Multiple leadership behaviours such as giving rewards, and providing recognition and 
resources are positively associated with employees’ innovative behaviour (De Jong & Hartog, 
2007).  For middle managers to engage in entrepreneurial activity, an appropriate use of 
rewards, TMT support, resource availability, encouragement of risk taking, and tolerance to 
failure have to be present in the corporate environment those managers operate in (Kuratko, 
Ireland, & Hornsby, 2004).  Taken to the extreme, natural tendency of corporate 
entrepreneurs to break rules (see Edison et al., 2018) may lead to ethical challenges, and 
firms should consider including an ethical component in their innovation frameworks and 




Burgess (2013) claims that middle managers execute TMTs decisions, and identifies three 
roles managers typically fulfil in the context of corporate entrepreneurship (p.  194): 
1. Innovator.  In this role, managers introduce innovation processes and encourage idea 
generation.  They are typically an expert in their area, which helps them identify 
business opportunities and pitch them to TMT. 
2. Risk Taker.  In this role, managers are ready to take risks, as well as feel empowered 
to take risks.  They establish a culture in which failure is tolerated, so their teams have 
support to innovate without fear of consequences of failed innovation projects.  Risk- 
taking is important at both the individual and organisational level (Antoncic, 2003) 
and this will be discussed in more detail in section 2.3.4 below.    
3. Facilitator.  In this role, managers facilitate interaction between employees at the 
operational levels and TMT.  They learn from others and promote learning across the 
organisation. 
Middle-managers can focus on a limited number of initiatives, and the focus depends on the 
type of organisation, and the predictability of their planning and execution process (Ren & 
Guo, 2011).  In their empirical study, Ren & Guo (2011) found that in organisations pursuing 
new markets and offerings, exploratory projects are more likely to get noticed and sponsored, 
while in organisations focused on core business the attention is on exploitative projects.  
They also found that in organisations with patterned meeting and planning and execution 
schedules, exploratory projects are likely to be presented as exploitative to the top 
management.   
Leaders are often the ones who stand in the way of exploratory innovation (Reynolds, 2017; 
Sharma, 1999).  Reynolds (2017) calls the middle management layer in an organisation “the 
frozen middle” due to their risk and change aversion that often leads to change initiatives 
being blocked.  Byrnes (2005) was the one who popularised the term “the frozen middle” that 
described how one automotive company’s executives were referring to the middle 
management, where all initiatives senior leadership came up with got "stuck" with the middle 
managers.  This was attributed to unwillingness and inability of the middle management to 
execute on these strategic initiatives. 
In a six-year study of middle managers in organisations undergoing a radical change, Huy 




entrepreneurial ideas, (2) leveraged informal networks better than TMT, (3) maintained 
momentum of change initiatives, and (4) managed tensions between change and continuity 
Huy (2001).  In his opinion, middle managers possess key characteristics and abilities that 
make them effective in managing change.  These include creative problem solving, balancing 
between change and continuity, focus on employee well-being, communication via social 
networks. 
According to Birken et al. (2012), middle management support for innovation is pivotal to 
successful strategy implementation and successful business outcomes.   
On the other hand, there is evidence that middle management could stifle innovation for 
various reasons (Birken et al., 2012).  They propose a model for middle managers' impact on 
innovation in Healthcare, where middle managers have to take an active role in diffusing info 
about innovation, synthesizing info about innovation to make it actionable, mediate between 
strategy and day-to-day activities, and sell innovation to employees and to top management. 
Burgess (2013) found that middle managers in the hospitality industry struggled to exhibit 
entrepreneurial behaviour, even though it was encouraged by top management.  He cites 
structures, and bureaucratic processes to be main antecedent of this phenomenon.  Thornberry 
(2003) found that managers in corporations can be trained to act as entrepreneurs and drive 
new value creation for these companies. 
Dutton et al. (1997) found that managers assess the organisational environment for selling 
ideas to the top management and must perceive the environment as favourable to feel 
comfortable to sell the ideas. 
Kuratko et al. (2005) proposed a model for entrepreneurial behaviour of middle managers.  
Their model suggests that entrepreneurial behaviour depends on middle managers’ 
perceptions of organisational and individual outcomes of their actions.  For example, they 
claim that managers will exhibit entrepreneurial behaviour if they perceive the outcomes of 
their actions to meet or exceed their expectations.   
Table 4 summarises the findings presented above differentiating between hindering and 






Table 4. Middle Managers and Innovation - Key Findings 
 
Factors Facilitating Innovation Factors Hindering Innovation 
Factors Authors Factors Authors 
TMT involvement in 
disruptive innovation 
projects 




Focus on core business,  
Patterned meetings, 
planning and execution 
schedules 




De Jong & Hartog 
(2007) 
Kuratko, Ireland, 
& Hornsby (2004) 
Risk aversion, Inability 
and unwillingness to 






Encouragement of risk 
taking, Tolerance to 
failure 
Kuratko, Ireland, 
& Hornsby (2004) 
Structures, Bureaucratic 
processes, 






Chen et al. (2012)   
Shared vision,  
Social integration, 
Contingency rewards 
Jansen et al. 
(2008) 
Lubatkin et al. 
(2006) 
  









momentum of change 
initiatives; Tension 
management 
Huy (2001)   
 
And so, it appears, that middle managers take central stage when it comes to supporting 
innovation programmes and projects in a company for better or for worse; they can be key to 
making innovation succeed, and they also can be the ones to stifle innovation.  This depends, 
for the most part, on the business environment these managers operate in, internal 
environment such culture, structures, and processes, and the managers’ perceptions about the 




2.3.3.1. Implications for Leadership 
The innovation-fostering behaviours reviewed above can be seen through the lens of the 
Transformation Leadership theory.  It is the most studied theory in the context of 
ambidexterity (see Baškarada et al. 2016; Jansen et al., 2008, 2009a, 2009b; Lubatkin et al., 
2006).  It was introduced by Burns (see Burns, 1978) and later evolved by Bass (see Bass, 
1985) and suggests that transformational leadership is measured by the extent to which 
leaders influence their followers’ motivation and performance – not through a give-and-take 
relationship, but through influence, empowerment, and guidance through uncertain times, 
among other aspects.  This relationship manifests itself in day to day interactions and in more 
formal personnel development and training. 
There are four main components to transformational leadership (see Avolio & Bass, 2002, pp.  
2-3): 
1. Idealized leadership.  Transformational leaders are seen as respected, admired, and 
trusted role models. 
2. Inspirational motivation.  Transformational leaders motivate their teams by 
envisioning a desired future state and sharing that vision with them.   
3. Intellectual stimulation.  Transformational leaders encourage creativity, risk taking, 
and challenging status quo.   
4. Individualized consideration.  Transformational leaders recognize individual strengths 
of their team members and help individuals grow by coaching and mentoring them.   
Jansen, Vera & Crossan (2009) have found the transactional leadership competencies to be 
more aligned with exploitation, while transformational leadership competencies are more 
aligned with exploration.  Baškarada et al. (2016) corroborated the findings of Jansen et al. 
(2009a).  According to them, this is because transformational leadership is typically 
associated with uncertain and turbulent environments (where the need for exploratory 
innovation arises) while transactional leadership is more often associated with maturity and 
stability.   
In a survey of Taiwanese strategic business units, Chen et al. (2012) found that 
transformational leadership had a positive effect on technological innovation at the business 
unit level, and innovation culture enhanced said effect.  Jansen et al. (2008) tested multiple 




European financial services firm.  They found that shared vision, social integration, and 
contingency rewards all lead to increased organisational ambidexterity, with transformational 
leadership moderating the effect of each.  Similar results were found by Lubatkin et al. 
(2006) in small to medium sized firms.   
And so, the leaders need to recognize when they are in circumstances that demand 
transformational rather than transactional leadership and adjust their mindsets and behaviours 
accordingly, although this may be challenging since some scholars suggest that 
transformational leadership behaviours might be correlated with enduring personality traits 
(see Hetland & Sandal, 2003; Judge & Bono, 2000).   
This topic will be further discussed in relation to recommendations made in Chapter 6 in the 
context of shaping a culture of innovation and ambidexterity.   
 
2.3.4. Risk Aversion and Risk Taking 
Risk-averse attitudes of firms in general, and of middle managers in particular are 
perpetuated by the current market position of success (Assink, 2006).  The literature offers 
explanations based on agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Freeman & Engel, 2007; Holmström, 
1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), but little advice is given on how to address this challenge.   
With risk taking being a clear antecedent of a firm’s entrepreneurial behaviour (see Burgess, 
2013; Kuratko et al., 2004; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008), it’s important to understand the 
relationship between the individual’s risk taking and the organisational risk taking.  Antoncic 
(2003) attempted to shed light onto a paradox where companies with risk-averse individuals 
exhibited risk taking behaviours.  He proposed a conceptual framework for linking the two as 






Figure 2. Risk Paradox in Intrapreneurship.  
Source: Antoncic (2003) 
Antoncic (2003) based his conceptual framework on three theories explaining the 
individual’s cognition and behaviours with respect to risk: Theory of Planned Behaviour, 
Prospect Theory, and Agency Theory.  Several key propositions in Antoncic’s model are 
worth elaborating to explain the relationships presented in Figure 2 above: 
 “Proposition 1a: Risk taking propensity will not be associated with attitude towards 
risk taking” (Antoncic, 2003, p. 9). 
 “Proposition 1b: Risk taking propensity will not be associated with risk taking 
behaviour” (p. 10). 
 “Proposition 6a: Risk-oriented organisational culture will have positive impact on 
attitudes towards risk taking” (p. 14). 
 “Proposition 6: Risk attitude will be positively associated with risk taking behavioural 
intention” (p. 15). 
 “Proposition 8: Risk taking intention will be positively related to risk taking 
behaviour” (p. 16). 
Ireland, Covin, & Kuratko (2009) recognised Antoncic’s model as one of the key Corporate 
Entrepreneurship models.  Monsen & Wayne (2009) used Antoncic’s model in seeking to 




The three theories mentioned above deserve more detailed attention due to their relevance to 
managerial behaviour in the context of corporate entrepreneurship and ambidexterity, as all 
three deal with risk-taking at the level of an individual manager. 
 
2.3.4.1. Theory of Planned Behaviour 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) states that an individual’s attitude toward behaviour, 
subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control influence behavioural intentions, and, 
eventually, influence and shape the individual’s behaviours (Ajzen, 1991).  This is depicted 
in Figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3. Theory of Planned Behaviour 
Source: Ajzen, 1991 
 
Attitude toward behaviour refers to an individual’s anticipation of the outcome from enacting 
that behaviour.  If it is perceived as positive, the individual will be more likely to enact said 
behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). 
Perceived behavioural control refers to the degree an individual believes they control the 




are in control of it (Azjen, 1991).  Subjective norm refers to an individual’s perception of 
social pressure to either perform or not perform a certain behaviour (Azjen, 1991).  Intentions 
include the motivational factors associated with a behaviour (Azjen, 1991).   
According to Liñán & Fayolle (2015), TPB has become one of the most popular theories in 
social psychology and became a reference theory in the field of entrepreneurial intentions.   
TPB is uniquely relevant in the context of ambidexterity and Corporate Entrepreneurship, 
because it implies that managers will enact risk taking behaviours (those associated with 
exploration) if they anticipate positive outcome from their endeavour.  In other words, if 
managers perceive the culture to be less tolerant of failure, they may not engage in 
entrepreneurial behaviour associated with exploration.   
 
2.3.4.2. Prospect Theory 
In contrast to TPB, Prospect Theory (PT) focuses on the statistical rationality seen to 
underpin decision making.  PT was developed in response to challenges presented by 
Expected Utility Theory (EUT) widely used in economics research to describe decision 
making under risk (Barberis, 2013).  EUT assumed that all rational people will want to obey 
the axioms of EUT (i.e. make a rational choice based on probability and subjective value of 
possible outcomes), and that they actually do so in reality, whereas observations of decision 
making under risk demonstrated frequent violations of EUT (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).   
PT is viewed as the best predictor of how people make decisions under risk in experimental 
settings (Barberis, 2013).  It has four main components as described below. 
Kahneman & Tversky (1979) propose four explanations about decision making under risk: 
1. People put more value on gains and losses relative to their point of reference (their 
expectations), rather than on an absolute level of wealth.  One analogy they offer, is 
that we are more sensitive to changes in temperature, loudness, and brightness than to 
their absolute values. 
2. People are more sensitive to losses, than to gains of the same magnitude.   
3. People tend to be more risk-averse when the gains are moderate, and more risk-




4. People tend to put more weight on less likely, more extreme outcomes, at the tails of 
the outcomes distribution. 
PT is often mentioned in research on middle management in contexts of innovation, 
entrepreneurship, and managerial sensemaking (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Dutton & Jackson, 
1987; Hill & Levenhagen, 1995; Ren & Guo, 2011; Taylor, 2017; Tellis & Chandy, 1998; 
Van de Ven, 1986), yet it is rarely the main theory underlying the research, most often 
complementing theories like the Agency Theory described in the next section.  PT has also 
been used in conjunction with Personal Construct Theory (see section 2.5.5) to assess why 
boards of companies in regulated industries often make errors of judgement and don’t 
identify areas of major risks (see Woolford, 2014). 
The main criticism of PT is that it is hard to apply it outside of a laboratory setting, mainly 
due to the difficulty to define what do gain and loss mean in a particular setting, and what the 
reference point (the initially expected outcome) to be considered (Barberis, 2013). 
While PT’s focus on risk is relevant in the context of ambidexterity, PT is less relevant to the 
present research as it heavily relies on the examination of statistical rationality rather than on 
processes of cognition and sensemaking.   
 
2.3.4.3. Agency Theory 
This thesis is concerned with middle managers and how they approach exploratory 
innovation projects with respect to techniques, metrics, and goals.  Agency Theory’s focus on 
goal alignment throughout the hierarchy in conditions of uncertainty makes this theory of 
particular interest to this thesis, because ambidexterity is perceived differently by managers at 
different levels (Raisch et al., 2009) and project success is perceived differently by different 
groups of stakeholders (Fowler & Walsh, 1999; Mcleod & Macdonell, 2010) – while 
alignment is required for optimal results as described in the next section.  Also, Agency 
Theory (AT) makes for a better theoretical basis for this research over PT due to PT’s 
limitations (its focus on a binary set of outcomes (see Barberis, 2013)) and over TPB due to 
TPB’s lack of acknowledgment of the corporate hierarchy, which is of particular interest in 
this thesis. 
Agency Theory (AT) was developed in the 70s, combining elements of principal-agent 




Meckling, 1976).  It is concerned with two main scenarios: (a) conflicting goals between the 
principal and the agent, and (b) difficulty for principal to validate agent's actions (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  For definitions of principal and agent, see ‘Principal-Agent Problem’ entry in the 
glossary.  One example of agency is cannibalisation risk, where new inventions may threaten 
an established product, leading to a conflict of interests for managers at various levels and 
roles (Freeman & Engel, 2007).   
According to AT (Eisenhardt, 1989), outcome-based contracts (as opposed to behaviour-
based contracts) between the principal and the agent are effective in controlling the agent's 
opportunism.  This is because the agent’s asymmetric information, different risk aversion, 
and self-interest may differ from that of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989).  However, many 
organisational contracts that aim at alignment of outcome-based goals and metrics are 
inherently incomplete, as they cannot account for risk and uncertainty inherent in innovation 
(Freeman & Engel, 2007).   
Holmström (1989) has developed an extension to AT, which he called multi-task agency 
theory, to discuss the incentive costs in large corporations with regards to innovation and 
routine work.  According to Holmström, incentives cost for a task depend on the entire 
portfolio of tasks and increases as that portfolio becomes more heterogeneous.  Specifically, 
mixing easy to measure tasks (routine tasks) and hard to measure tasks (innovation tasks) is 
very costly, as it may lead to either misallocation of attention or misallocation of risk.  
Holmström found that excessive bureaucracy and optimisation for uniformity in resources 
and processes that usually can be observed with large organisations are detrimental to 
innovation.  Comparing large organisations to start-ups which innovate faster, especially 
bringing disruptive innovations faster to the market, Holmström suggests decentralizing 
innovation in particular and R&D in general to solve the multi-task agency problem and the 
incentive cost associated with mixed task portfolios.  Further, Holmström proposes a venture 
capital (VC) model for incentivizing the "monitor" - the senior manager in charge of 
innovation.  By aligning innovation incentives with the VC model, the monitoring of 
contracts under the agency theory is accomplished by means of market forces, reducing 
asymmetry in information between the principal and the agent. 
Agency problems seem inevitable in the context of Corporate Entrepreneurship (CE), as CE 
success requires top management to provide some level of autonomy to the middle 




Ireland, & Hornsby, 2004).  Interestingly, Latham & Braun (2009) found that when 
organisations face decline, managers with few resources and low ownership tended to take 
major risks – a behaviour that is more aligned with the prospect theory reviewed earlier, than 
with the agency theory. 
In a survey of small and medium-sized high-technology enterprises, Randall et al. (2017) 
found that misalignment in goals has led to opportunistic behaviours.  They cite several 
sources in support of the claim that misalignment in goals is detrimental to project outcomes, 
whereas alignment helps to curb opportunism and improve the outcomes.   
Antoncic (2003) indicates that in some organisational contexts designing contracts may be 
impractical due to their complexity.  He suggests that in such scenarios, organisational 
culture might be a better mechanism than the AT focus on formal contracts.   
The next section will look at how the agency problem can be addressed in business practice 
with help of goal alignment frameworks (or contracts, in AT terms).   
 
2.3.4.4. Solving the Agency Problem with Alignment 
The key issue in agent-principal problem is a mismatch in expectations of project or initiative 
outcomes between TMT and a middle manager, a manager and an employee (see Eisenhardt, 
1989).  If different outcomes are pursued by the different parties it is likely that business 
goals may not get achieved, as a result leading to suboptimal business performance 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Decoene & Bruggeman, 2006; Holmström, 1989). 
Outcome based contracts (Eisenhardt, 1989), became foundational in development of 
frameworks and methodologies for organisational alignment.  Contracts in this context refer 
to common goals and metrics (Decoene & Bruggeman, 2006), shared between a principal and 
an agent for alignment on outcomes.  Further, organisational alignment refers to how these 
contracts cascade throughout all levels and functions in an organisation. 
Chandrasekaran & Mishra (2012) found that proper alignment between the goals of an R&D 
team and the goals of an organisation leads to higher psychological safety among the team 
members. 
In the last two decades several frameworks have been developed to help organisations create 




of such frameworks are the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) (Decoene & Bruggeman, 2006; 
Ivanov & Avasilcăi, 2013; Kasie & Belay, 2013; Montgomery & Perry, 2011) and Rhythm 
(Thean, 2014; Thean et al., 2017; Walcott, 2014).  Whether applied separately or in 
conjunction with each other, in this author’s opinion BSC and Rhythm provide a practical 
way for companies to match the goals between principals and agents and monitor and 
measure these goals, thereby offering business practitioners a viable framework to deal with 
the agency problem.  Moreover, as managers decide on the appropriate metrics to track and 
measure success of exploratory projects, following these frameworks may ensure these 
metrics align throughout the hierarchy – across different management levels and employees.   
2.3.5. Incentivizing Innovation Behaviour Among Middle Managers 
Merriman and Sen (2012) indicate that incentive schemes are a way to align the outcomes 
between the principal and the agent, and those schemes need to be optimised to favour a 
particular type of focus among multiple competing initiatives.  Managers who are invested in 
the business success are more likely to come up with and drive initiatives (Byrnes, 2005).  
This seems to imply that incentives can be an effective tool to direct managers’ attention to 
innovation activities in general, and exploratory projects in particular.  However, as the 
following account indicates, companies do not always use incentives in the most appropriate 
way. 
Freeman & Engel (2007) indicate that often incentives between managers and employees 
engaged in innovation projects are not aligned in such a way where both would fail/succeed 
together.  Instead, the participants in innovation processes are compensated based on their 
role and level in the company as if they were engaged in a typical activity with traditional 
outcomes. 
A majority of organisations implement short-term incentive schemes for middle managers, 
and in most cases, it is bonus-based to reward the achievement of business results through 
superior performance (Grigoiadis & Bussin, 2007).  These findings are not favourable for 
exploratory innovation, because when innovation through exploration is a goal to be 
achieved, it is incentives that tolerate early failure and reward the long-term outcome are the 
ones that lead to better business outcomes in the long run (see Christensen, 2013; Manso, 
2009; Quinn, 1985; Ries 2011).  Moreover, in a laboratory experiment, Manso (2009) found 
that contrary to some prior claims by principal-agent theorists, incentives for early failures do 




short term rewards stifle innovation.  They advocate for rewarding innovative employees 
with attendance of tradeshows where their inventions are showcased or giving special 
rewards to innovative employees.  In their views, managers should use the rewards and 
incentives levers to foster innovativeness.  Extrinsic rewards while helpful are not as 
impactful as intrinsic rewards when it comes to innovation, and leaders should look for ways 
to foster intrinsic rewards (Mumford & Licuanan, 2004). 
Decoene & Bruggeman (2006) build on agency theory, and expectancy theory (see Vroom, 
1964) and argue that strategic alignment in context of BSC, with extrinsically motivating 
incentive plan increases managers' motivation and leads to higher organisational 
performance.  They tested this theory on a single case study only, and the results could not 
verify the theory as there was no strategic alignment evident in the chosen company.  The 
deductive reasoning leading to the theory itself seems reasonable but requires further 
validation. 
Lerner & Wulf (2007) found a strong positive relationship between long term incentives and 
number of patents and their originality.  They also found that short term incentives did not 
have a similar effect.  One challenge with their research is reliance on number of patents 
rather than new products or services as a way to approximate the innovation outcomes.   
Barros and Lazzarini (2012) evaluated two incentives schemes: pay for performance and 
promote for performance.  They found that promotion-based incentive is stronger for 
encouraging innovation. 
With this in mind, it’s imperative for organisations to design their incentive schemes in a way 
that recognises different motivations associated with exploitative and exploratory projects.  
Incentives schemes tailored to exploratory innovation projects would show tolerance for 
failure and emphasise long term success over immediate returns.  Organisations should find a 
way to foster intrinsic motivation of employees, and not rely only on extrinsic rewards. 
 
2.3.6. Summary 
For the purposes of this thesis, the middle manager was defined as any manager below the 
Top Management Team (TMT).  Middle managers are the link between the TMT and the 
rank-and-file employees.  They are implementing the strategic direction of the TMT and 




The role of the middle manager has been discussed in literature for decades, and at different 
times middle managers performed roles at various degrees of strategic importance.   
While middle managers are key for the success of corporate entrepreneurship initiatives and 
exploratory innovation projects, they may also be the ones to stifle innovation.   
Risk taking is an antecedent of entrepreneurial behaviour at both the individual and the 
organisational levels.  Several theories help us understand the risk-taking behaviour: the 
Prospect Theory, the Theory of Planned Behaviour, and the Agency Theory. 
Risk-aversion leads to an agency problem and is one of the key reasons why middle 
managers may stifle innovation.  Agency problem develops when a principal and an agent 
have different goals, interests, and possess different information.  As a result, a principal 
can’t verify that an agent, who acts on the principal’s behalf, performs in accordance with the 
principal’s expectations.  Agency problem often develops in conditions of uncertainty, and 
therefore more likely to develop in context of corporate entrepreneurship and ambidexterity.  
Goal misalignment and opportunism may lead to suboptimal project outcomes, and in that, 
Agency Theory is of particular interest to this thesis.   
Alignment frameworks, such as BSC and Rhythm, help address the agency problem, by 
aligning the goals of agents and principals, forming a contract between the two parties, and 
subsequently monitoring the progress towards these goals with an outcome-based metrics and 
KPIs. 
The majority of organisations do not have incentive schemes that are aimed at fostering 
innovation.  These are typically short-term focused, extrinsic in nature, and do not foster 
experimentation that is key to a culture of innovation.   
Thus, the way in which managers handle these issues in the service of alignment is important, 
and so the next section will focus on the management of exploratory projects as opposed to 
exploitative projects.  Detailed attention will be given to project outcomes and the 
measurement of success of exploratory projects in particular.   
 
2.4. Project Management in Context of Ambidexterity 
Over the past few decades the discipline of project management has substantially matured 




based on traditional projects that could be appropriate for incremental innovation, but 
inappropriate for exploratory innovation projects faced with different types of risks and 
uncertainties (Leifer et al., 2000).  Leifer et al. (2000) called for new approaches and tools to 
be developed to extend the project management body of knowledge and practice.  Agile and 
Lean development methods (see Cagan, 2017; Ries 2011) are examples of how the field of 
project management has evolved in the last two decades.  Some research was done on impact 
of project portfolio management (e.g. Petro, 2017) and Agile project management (e.g. Sailer, 
2019) on ambidexterity. 
 
2.4.1. Managing in Complex Contexts 
In complex business contexts where information is incomplete, it may be impossible to 
predict the outcome of actions (Aram & Noble, 1999).  When certainty is high, or agreement 
is high, typical planning- and vision-based management techniques can be employed 
successfully (Aram & Noble, 1999).  However, when certainty is low, or agreement is low, 
the environmental complexity increases and the decision-making process “becomes more 
intuitive, hard to programme, a messy discontinuous process” (Aram & Noble, 1999, p. 325).  
McKenzie et al. (2009) build on the conceptual work of Aram & Noble (1999) and point out 
that complexity increases as managers advance in their careers, and in those circumstances, 
conventional thinking becomes detrimental.   
Kurtz & Snowden (2003) argue that individuals find themselves in four business contexts: 
simple, complicated, complex, and chaotic.  They describe the Cynefin framework as an aid 
in sensemaking as presented below and emphasize that different leadership techniques are 
required in different contexts. 
1. Simple context.  This context is characterised by clear causal relationships, with a 
clear understanding of actions to be taken, as information is available to all 
participants.  Leaders sense, categorise, then respond.  Problem solving in this context 
follows best practices.  Here, ‘best practices’ refer to standard operating procedures 
that are acceptable as most effective in a given situation.  Incorrect classification of 
issues as simple, and over-reliance on past experiences, are among the dangers leaders 




2. Complicated context.  Multiple right answers are possible in this context, and causal 
relationships do exist, but may not be visible to the stakeholders.  Good practices 
rather than best practices may be more appropriate in these situations, and experts are 
often called in to help reach decisions.  Leaders sense, analyse, then respond.  Longer 
decision cycles and a risk of reaching analysis-paralysis due to expert disagreements 
are likely in this context (Snowden & Boone, 2007).   
3. Complex context.  In this context it is unclear what the right answer is – even to the 
experts.  The nature of the situation is unpredictable, and leaders are in the realm of 
“unknown unknowns” (Snowden & Boone, 2007).  In these situations, leaders should 
probe through experimentation first, sense, then respond (Snowden & Boone, 2007).  
Kurtz & Snowden (2003) define exploration (vs. exploitation) as a movement from 
complicated context to complex context.  Exploratory innovation projects are most 
associated with the complex context, as issues dealt with in new product development 
are complex and knowledge generated is tacit (Goffin & Koners, 2011). 
4. Chaotic context.  In this context relationships between cause and effect constantly 
shift and are impossible to determine.  Leaders should act first to establish order, 
sense, and then respond to transform the context from chaotic to complex (Snowden 
& Boone, 2007).   
The Cynefin framework is frequently referenced in literature on decision-making in project 
management in complicated and complex contexts (e.g. Appelo, 201; Pelrine, 2011; 
Shalbafan et al., 2018; Wingo & Tanik, 2015).  It drew some criticism from Firestone & 
McElroy (2011), as in their opinion the contexts are too limited, and the model lacks rigorous 
foundation.  In this author’s opinion, the Cynefin framework, and the conclusions it offers for 
complex contexts typical for exploratory innovation projects, may be helpful as they seem 
reasonable and consistent with other authors (e.g. Aram & Noble, 1999; Teece, 2016). 
As it follows from the above, when innovation projects with high uncertainty are considered, 
organisations find themselves in complex business contexts.  In these situations, they need to 
recognise that different management techniques and strategies are required to succeed.  
Experimentation (Cagan, 2017; Ries, 2011, 2017) becomes critical to determine the right 
response, rather than following established processes and best practices.  Experimentation in 
this context refers to the product team’s identification of risky assumptions about viability, 




customers to confirm that the product team is building something which will ultimately 
succeed in the market (Cagan, 2017; Ries, 2017), proving the product-market fit.   Therefore, 
it becomes crucial to identify the ways in which managers interpret the situation they are in, 
and construe the appropriateness of their techniques, including the metrics they use to achieve 
the goals they have set (see McGrath, 2013; Mumford & Licuanan, 2004).  The next two 
sections will expand on this notion. 
 
2.4.2. Management Strategies for Investment Horizons 
2.4.2.1. The ‘Three Horizons’ and ‘Zone to Win’ Frameworks 
Baghai et al. (2000) introduced a model for investment in innovation that allows large and 
mature companies to develop short term and long-term investment strategies.  Short term 
strategies are aimed at defending the core business, and long-term ones at exploring new 
products and markets.  In that model, core business investments fall into the first category, 
called Horizon 1; Horizon 2 projects are typically emerging businesses with a significant new 
opportunity for the company; Horizon 3 refers to early seeds into what could become a 
significant opportunity in the future.  
 
 
Figure 4. Three Horizons of Innovation.    
Source: Baghai et al. (2000) 
The 3 Horizons model became a fairly popular investment framework among practitioners 
(e.g. Carbone, 2012).  Recently a new investment framework was developed by Moore 




Microsoft and Salesforce.com (Moore, 2015).  This new framework, called ‘Zone-To-Win’, 
offers concrete practical means of identifying projects belonging to each of the three 
horizons, and suggests investment allocations and management and leadership techniques to 
be applied in each.  Moore (2015) maps the three horizons to four types of project a company 
typically undertakes: performance, productivity, incubation, and transformation projects.  
Horizon 1 projects map to the ‘Performance Zone’ (core product and services contributing 
10% or more to the bottom line) and the ‘Productivity Zone’ (projects aimed at keeping the 
business running, like business systems).  Horizon 2 maps to the ‘Transformation Zone’ 
(these projects are being accelerated to become Horizon 1 projects in near future).  Lastly, 
Horizon 3 maps to the ‘Incubation Zone‘ (where most early stage innovation projects are).  
Moore recommends 4% of the investment to be allocated to the ‘Incubation Zone’ and 
running each project in the ‘Incubation Zone’ as a separate entity, following a VC funding 
model. 
The management and leadership techniques to be applied to projects in the 4 zones map to 
those applied in the corresponding horizons (see Moore, 2017). 
 
Table 5. Zone to Win. Source: adapted from Moore (2017) 
Transformation Zone 
Horizon 2 








(Products incubated with the aim to move to 
the Transformation Zone) 
Productivity Zone 
Horizon 1 
(Projects, Systems supporting the product 
offerings in the Performance Zone) 
 
In this model, exploratory projects would typically fall into the ‘Incubation Zone’ and the 
‘Transformation Zone’.  Moore’s model implies that different metrics would apply to 
different zones since it is built on the 3 horizons model.  Moreover, it implies that metrics 
change for a particular project over time, as that project moves from the ‘Incubation Zone’ to 





2.4.2.2. Process Management vs. Lean Innovation Management 
Projects in Horizon 1 would typically require traditional management and leadership 
techniques, while projects in Horizon 2 and Horizon 3 carry more uncertainty and ambiguity, 
and therefore require techniques more appropriate to start-ups (see Baghai et al., 2000; Blank, 
2015; Ries, 2011; Teece, 2016). 
Blank is considered a thought leader in the lean innovation approaches to entrepreneurship 
and intrapreneurship (e.g. Blank & Dorf, 2012), and in fact he was a mentor to Ries, who 
popularised the Lean Startup method (see Ries, 2011).   
Blank (2015) builds on work by Baghai et al. (2000) and describes how different approaches 
apply to different horizons.  In his view, Horizon 1 requires ‘process management’, while 
Horizon 2 and Horizon 3 require what he calls ‘lean innovation management’.  Process 
management is about repeatability, and execution at scale – that’s where innovations are 
mostly around making processes and procedures better and finding efficiencies to reduce 
costs and optimise execution.  Lean innovation management builds on the Lean Startup 
methodology.  Projects in Horizon 2 benefit from entrepreneurial techniques such as 
experimentation to innovate within the existing business model.  Horizon 3 projects, 
according to Blank (2015), are true corporate start-ups that require their own policies, 














Table 6. The Three Horizons: Differences in Approaches. Source: Baghai et al. (2000), Blank 
(2015) 
 Horizon 1 Horizon 2 Horizon 3 
Focus Executing to defend, 
extend and increase 
profitability of existing 
businesses 
Resourcing initiatives to 
build new businesses 
Uncovering options for 
future opportunities and 
placing bets on selected 
options 
Output Annual planning and 
forecasting;  






business plans for new 
ventures 
Decisions to explore: 





execution at scale, 
repeatability 
Lean Innovation Management: Entrepreneurial 
techniques and practices 
 
As outlined above, strategies for different horizons require different management techniques, 
goals, metrics, and incentives.  The discussion on incentives was covered in more detail in 
section 2.3.5.  The next section outlies the topic of goals and metrics in context of exploratory 
innovation projects. 
 
2.4.3. Goals and Metrics 
According to Mumford & Licuanan (2004), goals of innovation projects need to be defined 
more broadly that those of exploitative projects, and need to account for exploration, 
unexpected deviations, and interactions.  As Leifer et al. (2000) point out: 
“overcoming project discontinuities and progressively reducing uncertainties are the 
overarching goals of the radical innovation project team and its manager” Leifer et 
al. (2000, p.58). 
In essence, for a company to invest further into an exploratory innovation project, the project 
team needs to show that desirability, viability, and feasibility concerns have been addressed, 
and entrepreneurial techniques (e.g. Lean Startup) should be used in that pursuit (Cagan, 
2017; Christensen, 2013; Leifer et al., 2000; Ries, 2017; Teece, 2016) as described in prior 
sections.  Measuring progress against these goals in a matter most appropriate to innovation 




Metrics are important for tracking the performance of a company against its objectives and 
help prioritise the right activities and resource allocation (Bhatti et al., 2014; Melnyk et al., 
2004; Montgomery & Perry, 2011).  In 35 years of research on goal-setting theory, Locke 
et.al, (2002) found specific and challenging goals to positively impact performance.  
Numerous studies have identified a positive relationship between tracking metrics and 
company’s performance (see Bhatti et al., 2014; Davis & Albright, 2004; Kasie & Belay, 
2013).  For innovation initiatives to achieve best outcomes, innovation metrics have to align 
with strategic goals (Ivanov & Avasilcăi, 2013; Montgomery & Perry, 2011; Muller et al., 
2005).   
In a survey of 84 manufacturing organisations in Pakistan, Bhatti et al. (2014) concluded that 
measuring performance has a positive effect on the overall performance of the organisations.  
They looked at a range of performance indicators, including cost, quality, time, financial 
outcomes, as well as customer and employee satisfaction. 
In a survey of 33 manufacturing firms, Kasie & Belay (2013) found a positive correlation 
between the use of both financial and non-financial performance measures and the overall 
performance.  One of their key findings was that companies which are using non-financial 
metrics to measure performance did not have these metrics integrated with each other, with 
financial metrics, or with strategic objectives.  They also argue, that in labour intensive 
companies, where companies are dependent on employee performance, leading rather than 
lagging non-financial performance indicators need to be tracked more closely by managers.   
Hisrich & Kearney (2014) argue that to fully benefit from innovation and entrepreneurship 
integration with a company’s strategy, the company has to focus on objectives that are 
important to the market (customers and other stakeholders).  This implies non-financial 
objectives and hence metrics companies need to track and measure success by.    
With that in mind, the importance of defining both financial and non-financial metrics that 
are aligned with a company’s strategy, and are most appropriate for business context, cannot 
be underestimated.  Companies finding themselves in Horizon 2, and especially in Horizon 3 
contexts need to be aware of the differences associated with these stages and chose goals and 






2.4.3.1. Measuring Success of Exploitative Projects 
In traditional project management, success factors and metrics have been a research topic for 
a long time with broad implications to practitioners, and yet there is no agreement on a 
common set of metrics (Ika, 2009; Toor & Ogunlana, 2010).  One key reason cited is success 
being highly dependent on individual judgements and perceptions (Mcleod & Macdonell 
2010; Pankratz & Basten, 2014) as different individuals at different levels within the 
organisation have different wants, needs, and expectations (Fowler & Walsh, 1999; Mcleod 
& Macdonell, 2010).  In a thematic analysis of literature on project success, Davis (2014) 
concluded that there is no uniformity in perceptions of project success across the various 
stakeholder groups.  Davis (2014) invited researchers to explore further how different 
stakeholder groups perceive success of projects.  She indicated the focus of the extant 
literature on the role of Project Manager and advised to consider additional stakeholders in 
future research.  Additionally, she noted that omissions in the literature reviewed may be the 
reason for not finding agreement on the topic.  Indeed, Davis (2014) references do not 
include sources on topics of innovation, ambidexterity, and corporate entrepreneurship.    
Mcleod & Macdonell (2010) reviewed the literature on project outcomes and concluded that 
there is more to the definition of project success and failure than the "iron triangle" of cost, 
schedule, and scope.  They claim that project outcomes may vary based on the perspectives 
of participants and are constructed based on participants’ sensemaking.  In a longitudinal 
study of implementation of a software project in a large multi-national company, they 
confirmed the ambiguity that exists around the definition of success and failure, and found its 
nature to be multi-dimensional, emergent, and unpredictable.  They identified six categories 
to perceptions of project outcomes: empirical, temporal, personal, multi-dimensional, 
contextual, and negotiated. 
To further address this gap, Pankratz & Basten (2014) conducted research to answer the 
question “What criteria do IS project managers consider relevant for IS project success 
assessment?” (where IS stands for Information Systems).  Among the 12 success criteria they 
identified in a case study were several criteria in the realm of stakeholder satisfaction, which 
is consistent with findings of Davis (2014), who indicated that project success literature 
evolved beyond the traditional factors such as cost, quality, and time.  One of the limitations 
of this study is its exclusive focus on a Project Manager role, and not considering 




organization correspond to Product Management and Engineering Management (see Menguc 
& Auh, 2010).   
 
2.4.3.2. Measuring Success of Exploratory Projects 
The issue of project success is not unique to traditional projects.  All projects in a business 
world have a goal, and it’s sensible to assume that a successful outcome is always desired.  
However, exploratory projects are different from exploitative projects, as these target 
different horizons and need to be measured differently (see Baghai et al., 2000).  Traditional 
metrics are detrimental to innovation projects (see Henttonen et al., 2016; Kristiansen & 
Ritala, 2018), as these metrics assume a project will be completed, where in reality, 
innovation projects thrive on trial and error, and experimentation and learning are the focus 
and therefore should be measured (McGrath, 2013). 
Innovation teams are under pressure to predict revenues from disruptive innovation in early 
stages (Assink, 2006).  It seems the situation hasn’t significantly changed from what 
Burgelman (1988) describes when comparing expectations of exploratory project outcomes 
among the various groups in a R&D intensive high-tech firm.  In his research, scientists 
claimed that running good experiments should constitute as a performance measure, whereas 
managers focused on the actual results of innovative ventures in terms of financial outcomes 
of the firm.    
Kristiansen & Ritala (2018) conducted a multiple-case study to learn how radical innovation 
projects are measured.  They interviewed directors and managers of innovation and found 
that project teams struggled when financial metrics were used to measure outcomes of radical 
innovation projects.  In a survey of 720 managers from Dutch information technology and 
construction industries, Blindenbach-Driessen et al. (2010) found that metrics used for 
innovation involving new product development were mostly ones used for traditional, 
incremental innovation projects.  One reason for this might be the fact that their research was 
made before methods like the Lean Startup became popular for innovation project 
management. 
Hauser & Zettelmeyer (1997) have proposed to use customer-driven metrics in R&D.  The 
proposition of measuring innovation differently is also advocated by Owens & Fernandez 




corporate innovation projects.  Kasie & Belay (2013) cite multiple sources in support of their 
claim that financial metrics are harmful to innovation projects.  Ries (2017) put forward a 
proposal to rely on a different set of metrics for innovation projects, where traditional metrics 
(revenue-based and sales based) may not apply.  He proposes a set of metrics under the 
umbrella term of Innovation Accounting (IA).  Such a framework, in his opinion, allows 
teams to have leading indicators of their progress in what inherently is a highly uncertain 
venture.  Building on the concept of the ‘Leap of Faith Assumption’ (LOFA) – the riskiest 
assumption for a new venture – Ries (2017) claims that IA helps teams focus on testing their 
LOFAs, and most importantly, allows teams to track value creation with fast feedback loops - 
something that traditionally was a challenge for innovation projects.  Some examples of IA-
related metrics include traction metrics (customer sign-ups, conversion rates, new users, 
returning users, active users, retention rate, channel adoption) as well as revenue per 
customer, lifetime value per customer, and cost per customer (Ries, 2017).  The concept of 
traction-based metrics is not new: it was originally introduced by McClure (2007) and then 
found its way to various textbooks (e.g. Maurya, 2016; Owens & Fernandez, 2014; Ries, 
2017). 
Muller et al. (2005) describe their experience as innovation management consulting 
practitioners and rely on their experience and literature review to propose a framework for 
innovation metrics.  They found that while many of their clients put innovation programmes 
in place, managers often don't have a set of good metrics to track success of these 
programmes.  Among those companies that do have metrics, they found, most use traditional 
product development metrics, such as percentage of sales, number of patents, and number of 
ideas submitted.  While useful, these metrics offer an incomplete picture of a company's 
innovativeness (Muller et al., 2005).  They suggest two key metrics to track the innovation 
programme success: 
1. Number of ongoing experiments and ventures 
2. Number of times during the past 5-10-20 years in which senior management has redefined 
the company's core business. 
Muller et al. (2005) recommend incorporating innovation metrics with the existing 
methodology such as Balanced Scorecard.  
Unfortunately, Muller et al. (2005) provide few details on the methodology used to collect 




were surveyed, and what if any differences were found among the various stakeholder 
groups. 
Different metrics may apply to different stages of an exploratory innovation project.  
Kristiansen & Ritala (2018) suggest applying innovation metrics during the early phase 
(during the customer discovery) and apply exploitative metrics when projects reach maturity. 
They build their argument on the work of Henttonen et al. (2016), who, in a single case study 
found that more indicative measures like “level of innovativeness” were often used in the 
early stages of an innovation project, until sales and other financial figures become available.  
Although Henttonen et al. (2016) did not clarify what type of innovation they focused on, 
their findings and later recommendations by Kristiansen & Ritala (2018) align with Baghai et 
al. (2000) 3 horizons model.  In that model as projects move from Horizon 3 to Horizon 2 to 
Horizon 1 over time, what constitutes the appropriate metrics changes too.   
 
2.4.4. Summary, and an Initial Model 
Project management is a mature discipline that has been researched and perfected over the 
decades.  However, not all projects are equal, and when it comes to exploratory innovation, 
there seems to be relatively little research on the topic.   
Exploratory innovation projects are unique in that they carry risk inherent in their uncertain 
and ambiguous nature.  Therefore, techniques that can successfully be applied to traditional 
projects (including exploitative innovation projects) do not and should not be applied to 
exploratory innovation projects.   
Managers at different levels operate at various degrees of complexity.  The higher the level, 
higher the complexity, and again, different types of techniques need to be applied for their 
decision-making process.  In complex contexts it becomes critical to probe first through 
experimentation as leaders seek clarity in conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty.   
Models such as ‘3 Horizons’ and ‘Zone to Win’ aim at guiding organisations to allocate 
investments across the project types and provide guidance on how to lead and manage 
projects in various horizons or zones.   
Metrics are key for tracking progress towards a company’s objectives.  Measuring 




Exploratory projects require metrics that are different from ones used in an exploitative 
project management, because financial metrics may not be adequate to the early stage 
corporate ventures dealing with exploratory innovation.  Metrics that focus on early traction 
of a new innovation are more appropriate than financial metrics or the traditional metrics 
around scope, schedule, and quality.  In both exploitative and exploratory projects individual 
judgement needs to be exercised in the process of defining the metrics.  Some scholars 
suggest that different metrics may apply at different stages of an exploratory project, where 
innovation metrics would apply in the early stages, while exploitative metrics would apply 
once innovation project reaches maturity.   
The notion of recognizing the different business contexts, the different project types, and 
applying the most appropriate management techniques makes managers a critical actor in 
exploratory project’s success.   
In view of the above and building on the material presented in Table 5 (Zone to Win), Table 
6 (The Three Horizons: Differences in Approaches), and Figure 4 (Three Horizons of 
Innovation), a conceptual model could be developed to describe how various approaches 
apply to an exploratory innovation project throughout its different lifecycle stages.  As an 
exploratory innovation project moves from exploration stage to exploitation stage, the 
approaches applied to that project change accordingly, being consistently appropriate to its 







Figure 5. Exploratory Innovation Project Lifecycle.  
Source: Author. 
 
The next section will discuss antecedents of managerial decision making in conditions of 
uncertainty, where personal judgement is critically important to the choice of the most 
appropriate metrics.  It will cover topics like cognition, sensemaking, and construing, and 
will introduce Personal Construct Theory, that is central to this thesis.   
 
2.5. The Psychology of Managerial Decision Making  
Managerial cognition and the way the managers think about their objectives, is one factor 
influencing the setting of strategy, and therefore cognitive activities, such as perception and 
interpretation are key to an organisation’s success (Ambrosini & Altintas, 2019; Wrona, 
Ladwig, & Gunnesch, 2013).  However they address their planned behaviour, section 2.3.4.1 
indicates that individuals often act according to how they perceive their environment, and 
these perceptions influence their decision making (Sund, 2015), especially in conditions of 
ambiguity and uncertainty (Weick et al., 2005).  According to Sund (2015), managers 
influence how strategic issues are labelled and categorised, although the process of labelling 
and categorisation is a social endeavour – a result of collective interpretation.  Wrona, 
Ladwig, & Gunnesch (2013) also emphasise that strategic processes are shaped collectively 




experiences.  McKenzie et al. (2009) claim that as managers advance in their careers, their 
past experiences may become detrimental to decision making in conditions of uncertainty, as 
more unconventional techniques are required in this context.   
The importance of understanding how managers think has been a popular topic of research 
for decades (e.g. Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Daft & Weick, 1984; Maitlis & Christianson, 
2014; Sund, 2015; Uygur & Kim, 2016; Weick et al., 2005).  
 
2.5.1. The Nature of Managerial Cognitive Processes 
Cognitive activities include perception and interpretation of information, and researchers 
have long been interested in the relationship between the cognitive activities and behaviours 
in an organisational setting (Wrona, Ladwig, & Gunnesch, 2013).  
Managers proceed by creating and utilizing “mental models used to make judgements and 
decisions [and] are shaped by […] knowledge and experience” (Taylor, 2017, p. 2).  Mental 
models in this context are cognitive structures that Wrona, Ladwig, & Gunnesch (2013) 
describe as 
“conceptual interrelated representations of objects, persons, actions, or events. [...] 
They are simplified representations of reality and try to fill potential information 
gaps, which then are the basis for subsequent decision-making.” (Wrona, Ladwig, & 
Gunnesch, 2013, p. 698). 
Chermack (2003) argues that not only should decision makers understand their mental 
models, they should seek to alter them if those models are found inadequate for the situation 
at hand. 
Understanding of cognitive processes is essential to an organisation's success (Taylor, 2017).  
Mitchell et al. (2007) emphasise the importance of studying entrepreneurial cognition in 
particular.  In their view, such research could lead to understanding of why some people 
become entrepreneurs, why are they able to identify opportunities, and why some are more 
successful than others.   
Plambeck (2012) found that both the organisational context and managerial cognition 
influence the degree of a new product’s innovativeness.  He argues that TMT has an ability to 




turn, influences the innovativeness of a product.  He invited researchers to explore further 
how cognition of decision makers influences entrepreneurial action as such understanding 
can help executives gain insight on how to enable entrepreneurial behaviour in their 
companies.  Such an understanding is crucial to a company’s success, as corporate 
entrepreneurship leads to superior performance of a company as discussed earlier (see Covin 
& Miles, 1999; Kuratko, Ireland, & Hornsby, 2004).  There would appear to be two 
difficulties with the sample selection and data collection by Plambeck (2012).  First, the study 
focused on the individual managers responsible for innovation in each company, rather than 
recognizing that multiple stakeholder groups are involved in decision making (a key finding 
of the extensive review by Davis, 2014).  Second, while Plambeck sought to understand the 
managers’ construing, his survey instruments and rating scales requested responses on 
predetermined issues rather than identifying the actual issues felt to be important by the 
respondents themselves, something made feasible by the Repertory Grid technique described 
in sections 3.3 and 3.4.   
The research on entrepreneurship shows a significant focus on how entrepreneurs think, how 
their decision making is affected by uncertainty, ambiguity, high stress, and high risk, and in 
what way is their thinking different from that of non-entrepreneurs (Shepherd, Williams, & 
Patzelt, 2015).   
In their seminal work, Tversky & Kahneman (1974) argue that when making decisions, 
people anticipate outcomes with various degrees of uncertainty, and rely on a limited number 
of problem-solving approaches – heuristics – to simplify this process.  Tversky & Kahneman 
(1974) claim there are three main heuristics used in decision making: (1) representativeness 
(the degree to which one event is being associated with another event), (2) availability of 
scenarios to compare the current event to, and (3) adjustment from an anchor (a starting point 
based on initial estimate).  In their opinion, these heuristics are often useful, but at times lead 
to errors in decision making due to common biases.  One simple analogy Tversky & 
Kahneman (1974) give is estimation of a distance to an object.  In conditions of good 
visibility, the object seems closer than it actually is, and as conditions of visibility change the 
tendency is to overestimate the size in poor visibility and underestimate it in high visibility. 
Drawing on the work of Tversky and Kahneman on biases and heuristics, Simon, Houghton, 
& Aquino (2000) studied how entrepreneurs perceive risks associated with business 




cognitive biases: overconfidence, illusion of control, and use of a limited number of inputs 
for decision making.  The illusion of control, they claim, leads individuals to believe that they 
can control ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in entrepreneurial ventures. 
Busenitz & Barney (1997) based their research on the heuristics and biases theory presented 
by Tversky and Kahneman and explored the differences in decision-making processes 
between entrepreneurs and managers in large corporations.  They found that entrepreneurs 
are more prone to biases such as overconfidence and tendency to overgeneralise from few 
observations in their decision making.  Busenitz & Barney (1997) claim that in conditions of 
uncertainty, where cautious decision-making is not possible, heuristics can be more effective.  
They theorise, that applying similar heuristics in large and mature corporations may be 
detrimental to the business.  In this author’s view and in light of the review presented in 
section 2.2.2 on corporate entrepreneurship, this is not likely to be the case when these 
heuristics are applied to exploratory projects in large firms.  This is because start-up 
techniques can be extremely useful when applied to exploratory projects in these 
circumstances (Teece, 2016; Ries, 2017). 
In a single case study with 30 branch managers in the financial services industry, Goodhew 
et. al (2005) found that higher performing managers had considerably simpler cognitive 
structures than the low performing managers.  The main reason for this, they claim, is the fact 
that the performance goals were clearly defined for the higher performing group of managers.  
Goodhew et al. (2005) used a combination of interviews and questionnaires to develop 
cognitive maps and understand the differences among the managers.  Their methodology 
choices are well substantiated.  Xu (2011) suggested that an entrepreneur’s cognitive model 
of innovation is complex, since they are required to have a broad understanding of five facets 
(p. 913): (1) meeting the customers’ needs, (2) responding to the competition, (3) developing 
new technologies, (4) achieving effective internal coordination, and (5) building relationships 
with external stakeholders.  Xu’s empirical findings confirmed a higher cognitive complexity 
among entrepreneurs in high-technology industries.  As described in sections 2.3 and 2.4 
above, intrapreneurs operate in conditions of uncertainty and risk, such that the goals of the 
exploratory projects they are leading or involved in are not as obvious as in case of 
exploitative projects.  Following Goodhew et. al (2005) and Xu (2011) findings, one might 
expect that cognitive structures of managers in the context of corporate entrepreneurship are 
more complex.  Cognitive complexity is discussed further in the context of Personal 




Entrepreneurial cognition has been reviewed by Mitchell et al. (2002).  They argued that the 
cognitive view on entrepreneurship allows for better understanding of the entrepreneurship 
phenomena, especially the understanding of how one entrepreneur differs from another.  
Nooteboom (2009) corroborates this argument and claims that prior experiences of 
entrepreneurs influence their cognitive structures. 
Managerial cognition (especially that of entrepreneurs and intrapreneurs) can be analysed in 
the context of Personal Construct Theory, as will be described in more detail in section 
2.5.5.2.   
In view of the above, understanding the cognitive processes and the role they play in 
managerial and entrepreneurial decision making is important.  Managers involved in 
intrapreneurship may exhibit different cognitive structures and more complex cognitive 
structures as compared to non-entrepreneurs.  Understanding the antecedents of cognitive 
structures and processes and their impact on decision-making and performance is key to an 
organisation’s success. 
 
2.5.2. Individual and Organisational Interpretation 
Interpretation of the environment can be analysed at two levels: individual and organisational 
(Argyris, 1977; Daft & Weick, 1984), where the former is an antecedent of the latter (Dutton 
& Jackson, 1987). 
In their seminal work, Daft & Weick (1984) claim that managers must actively make sense of 
events happening to and within an organisation.  They define interpretation as  
“the process of translating [..] events, of developing models for understanding, of 
bringing out meaning, and of assembling conceptual schemes among key managers”. 
(Daft & Weick, 1984, p. 286).  
Daft & Weick (1984, p. 286) define a three-stage organisational learning model (see Figure 6 







Figure 6. Relationships Among Organisational Scanning, Interpretation, and Learning.   
Source: Daft & Weick (1984). 
 
Daft & Weick (1984) recognised that their model has weaknesses, optimised to be general 
and simple, and in that not very accurate (p. 294).  They go further and categorise 
organisations into four interpretation modes based on beliefs organisations hold about their 
environment.   
Table 7. Model of Organisational Interpretation Modes. Source: Daft & Weick (1984) 
 
Companies with enacting and discovering modes of interpretation most closely align with 
characteristics of start-ups and corporate ventures (see section 2.2.2.1 for discussion on 
characteristics of entrepreneurial firms).  Especially of interest in the context of 
entrepreneurship are enacting companies, which assume that the environment is 
unanalysable.  These companies exhibit entrepreneurial capabilities (see Baum et al., 2014, p. 
145), apply entrepreneurial techniques such as experimentation and testing, and ignore rules 
and traditional expectations (see Daft & Weick, 1984).  Organisations in this mode tend to 
define new markets (Daft & Weick, 1984) and are likely to be associated with market 
breakthrough or radical innovations (see Table 1). 




1. A manager’s job is to interpret and not to do the operational work.  This means 
managers have to take cues from the environment and to translate these cues into 
meaning for the rest of the organisation.   
2. Managers should revisit their perceptions about the external environment that may not 
be as analysable as they may have assumed, and therefore they should seek to modify 
their approaches for the interpretation of that environment.   
These implications can be viewed through the lens of the ‘Double-Loop Learning’ concept 
proposed by Argyris (1977).  According to Argyris, single-loop learning refers to an 
organisation’s approach to problem solving that involves established policies and objectives, 
where new information is interpreted, and a corrective action is taken to close the loop.  
Double-loop process, on the other hand, occurs when organisations challenge their 
assumptions about the environment to solve problems before taking an action.   
According to Dutton & Jackson (1987), decision makers selectively attend to some strategic 
issues and ignore the others.  The issues selected are interpreted and meanings are attributed 
to them.  The internal environment of the firm impacts the meanings and how they evolve.  
Therefore, similar events may have different meanings among different organisations (Dutton 
& Jackson, 1987).  Business opportunities and threats impact what meanings will be attached 
to strategic issues.  These meanings lead to cognitions and motivations, which, in turn lead to 
organisational actions (Dutton & Jackson, 1987). 
Two influential theories depict the processes involved: Sensemaking (Weick et al., 2005) 
focuses on the social aspect of the process and therefore focuses more on the organisational 
level, while the other – Personal Construct Theory (Kelly, 1955, 1963) focuses on the 
individual.   
 
2.5.3. Sensemaking 
In situations of ambiguity or uncertainty, individuals attempt to analyse their environment 
and interpret cues from it (Weick et al., 2005).  Understanding of meanings by individuals 
seeking clarity in ambiguous circumstances inevitably leads to actions, that in turn shape 
change over time (Weick et al., 2005).  Moreover, Weick et al. (2005) describe sensemaking 
as a retrospective process whereby people interpret events in the social context they are in 




literature on sensemaking and describe it as “the process through which individuals work to 
understand novel, unexpected, or confusing events” (p.57). 
There is a positive correlation between sensemaking and performance (Morandin & Bergami, 
2014; Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993), and between sensemaking and innovation (Deazin, 
Glynn, & Kazanjian, 1999; Thrane, Blaabjerg, & Møller, 2010).  
People construct meaning differently because of the different backgrounds, interests and 
positions (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014), and because of differences in personal and business 
goals (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Maitlis, Vogus, & Lawrence, 2013).  
Sensemaking is also key in the context of corporate entrepreneurship, where uncertainty and 
ambiguity are high (see Teece, Peteraf, & Leih, 2016; Maitlis, 2005).  In fact, Hill & 
Levenhagen (1995) suggest that both sensemaking and sensegiving (communicating to others 
to influence their sensemaking) are required to cope with ambiguity typical for 
entrepreneurial environment, and therefore – for exploratory projects.  Maitlis (2005) claims, 
that sensemaking makes it possible for people to cope with uncertainty and ambiguity. 
In the process of strategy formation, it is cognitive processes that underpin sensemaking 
(Narayanan et al., 2011).  Cognitive structures and processes impact decisions, and 
sensemaking and sensegiving play a role during implementation of these decisions 
(Narayanan et al., 2011).  Weick et al. (2005) emphasises the role social context and 
interaction with others play in sensemaking.  This is because, in their opinion,  
“sensemaking tends to occur when the current state of the world [with respect to the 
social context among other things] is perceived to be different from the expected state 
of the world” (Weick et al., 2005, p. 409). 
Some scholars see sensemaking as a cognitive process, while others see it as a social process 
(Maitlis & Christianson, 2014).  Weick, in particular, discusses sensemaking in the 
organisational context, emphasizing the collective sensemaking (Weick et al., 2005; Weick & 
Roberts, 1993).  Yet it’s the individuals who do the sensemaking, and the individual 
sensemaking shapes the organisational sensemaking and its outcomes (Rouleau & Balogun, 
2011).  These outcomes may be suboptimal where corporate cultures, routines, and processes 





2.5.4. Cognitive Ambidexterity 
As described in section 2.2.3, ambidexterity can be experienced and enacted at the personal 
level in addition to the organizational level (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Bonesso et al., 
2014; Papachroni, 2013; Raisch et al., 2009; Schnellbächer, Heidenreich, & Wald, 2019; 
Xiang et al., 2019).  In fact, scholars have been calling for more research into ambidexterity 
at the individual level (see Xiang et al., 2019), because individual ambidexterity and 
organizational ambidexterity are interconnected (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Raisch et al., 
2009). 
Bonesso et al. (2014) collected comprehensive data from multiple stakeholder groups using 
multiple rounds of in-depth interviews.  They found four situations with respect to 
employees’ actual behaviour as opposed to their perceptions: enacted personal ambidexterity, 
dominant learning orientation, perceived personal ambidexterity, and full personal 
ambidexterity.  They concluded that full personal ambidexterity – where behaviours and 
perceptions are fully aligned – is not easily achieved due to a cognitive dissonance (an 
anticipated mismatch between cognition and action) the employees experience arising from 
the tensions between exploitation and exploration on a personal level.  Bonesso et al. (2014) 
suggested one reason being unclear expectations set with employees about their roles. 
Chandrasekaran (2009) focused on the concept of cognitive ambidexterity at the personal 
level that describes the cognitive duality individual managers face as they encounter tensions 
of exploration and exploitation in their organisations.  He claims that resolving the 
paradoxical tensions inherent in the ambidextrous duality is critical for managers to balance 
exploration and exploitation.  
Karhu (2017) built on the work of Chandrasekaran (2009) and looked at managers’ cognitive 
processes that occur as managers make sense of their situation and chose best alternatives to 
resolve a problem at hand.  Karhu (2017) concluded that managers recognise the dualities 
involved in a given context and make decisions appropriately.  Her study was conducted in 
the beverage industry, and so it is unclear whether these findings can be indicative of other 
industries, and whether the beverage industry managers operate in the same level of 
complexity (as per the Cynefin framework), as managers in the high-tech industry do.  
Additionally, Karhu’s study focuses only on idea generation stage of new product 




Both Karhu (2017) and Chandrasekaran (2009) see ambidexterity as a group process and 
frame their research in Weickian view of sensemaking (as described in section 2.5.3 above), 
which is organizational in its core (see Weick et al., 2005, p. 410).  The next section will 
introduce the Personal Construct Theory to look in detail into the processes that occur at the 
individual level and how these processes might be influenced by cognitive complexity. 
 
2.5.5. Personal Construct Theory 
With cognition and sensemaking being central to managers’ decision-making process, and 
subsequently to the understanding of what leads to success or failure of a project or, indeed, 
an organisation, we need to turn to a theory that helps us make sense of how individual 
managers think about certain issues and events in their own terms.  Kelly’s Personal 
Construct Theory (PCT) makes personal construing – the personal interpretation of 
experience – its basic assumption (see Kelly, 1955, 1963, 1966).  PCT led to development of 
the field of Personal Construct Psychology (PCP) which is highly relevant to management 
studies with new areas of research (see Cornelius, 2015). 
PCT is useful for analysing managerial decision making, because, as Butt & Burr (2004) 
explain, understanding of a person stems from understanding their construction, in other 
words, their understanding of the world.  In turn, that knowledge leads to understanding of 
why people act the way they do (Butt & Burr, 2004).  It helps turn managers’ tacit knowledge 
to explicit knowledge (see Jankowicz, 2001; Malmström et al., 2015).  This is achieved with 
help of Repertory Grid Technique (Fransella, 2004) which will be discussed in detail in 
section 3.4.   
Kelly (1963) argues that people see world’s realities through patterns and templates, and 
while these may not be a perfect fit for understanding of these realities, they only need to be 
useful rather than absolute.  These patterns are what Kelly calls ‘constructs’.  These 
constructs are what enables actions and behaviours (Kelly, 1963).   
PCT has been criticized for disregarding human emotion and therefore being too focused on 
cognition (see Fransella, 1995).  However, constructs naturally account for emotions such as 
anxiety and guilt in terms of the experience of change in the construing system (Bannister 




that construing “is about experiencing our private worlds” and in that accounts for emotion 
as well as cognition.  
    
2.5.5.1. The Basic Postulate and the Corollaries 
Kelly’s Basic Postulate states that “A person’s processes are psychologically channelized by 
the ways in which he anticipates events” (Kelly, 1963, p.46).  He elaborates this by means of 
11 corollaries, of which 7 are particularly relevant to this thesis. 
Construction Corollary states “A person anticipates events by construing their replications” 
(Kelly 1963, p. 50).  In essence, as people look forward to a particular event, they construct 
that event based on their existing experience with a similar event (Butt & Burr, 2004).   
Individuality Corollary states “Persons differ from each other in their constructions of 
events.” (Kelly, 1963, p. 55).  This is due to the fact that people anticipate events and 
experience them in different manner. 
Dichotomy Corollary states “A person’s construction systems is composed of a finite 
number of dichotomous constructs.” (Kelly, 1963, p.59).  This indicates that the meaning 
expressed by a particular construct is comprised of a polar dichotomy stating a particular 
contrast; thus, the construct ‘risky versus certain’ expresses, by means of its two poles, a 
different meaning to ‘risky versus safe’.   
Choice Corollary states “A person chooses for himself that alternative in a dichotomized 
construct through which he anticipates the greater possibility for the elaboration of his 
system.” (Kelly 1963, p. 64).  As Butt & Burr (2004) put this, when we evaluate different 
constructs for a particular phenomenon it is much more important to understand the 
usefulness of a construct than to prove it is correct.  Construing is a process – something that 
we do, and the meaning that we extract from this process is a result of a constant comparison 
and contrasting of the construct’s dichotomy (Butt & Burr, 2004).  When confronted with a 
choice, a person will tend to choose that alternative construct which aligns best with 
anticipation of events (Kelly, 1963, p. 67).  
Experience Corollary states “A person’s construction system varies as he successively 
construes the replications of events.” (Kelly, 1963, p. 72).  The evolution of the construct 




Commonality Corollary states “To the extent that one person employs a construction of 
experience which is similar to that employed by another, his processes are psychologically 
similar to those of the other person.” (Kelly, 1963, p. 90).  Thus, concludes Kelly, two people 
with different experiences and who have encountered different events, may have similar 
constructions of their experiences, and therefore a similar subsequent inquiry.  
Sociality Corollary states “To the extent that one person construes the construction 
processes of another, he may play a role in a social process involving the other person.” 
(Kelly, 1963, p. 95).  As social interactions happen in an organisational setting (and in our 
lives in general), some level of mutual understanding happens, where people interpret each 
other constructs (Kelly, 1963).  Then, people may adjust their own actions and behaviours as 
they anticipate the actions and behaviours of others (Kelly, 1963, p. 96).  As a result, the role 
relationships (e.g. manager-subordinate, interviewer-interviewee) become more effective to 
the extent that one person understands the constructs of another (Kelly, 1963). 
Construing Importance 
What follows from the basic postulate in general and the ‘Choice Corollary’ in particular is 
the anticipatory aspect of PCT: the way people construe a particular issue will indicate factors 
which they feel are important for successful outcomes, and hence the action they will take 
faced with a particular choice.  Different approaches for measuring success of exploitative 
and exploratory projects have been outlined in sections 2.4.3.1 and 2.4.3.2.  In this thesis, the 
focus is on understanding how managers think about exploratory and exploitative innovation 
projects, and the relative importance of the metrics in question among the other factors they 
consider; hence the value of PCT becomes evident in its ability to predict how those 
managers will act faced with an exploratory or exploitative project in their companies. 
 
2.5.5.2. Philosophical Stance of PCT 
Kelly’s work helps us deconstruct the notion of sensemaking (see section 2.5.2) at the level 
of individual psychology.  PCT has been applied in this field for several decades (see Butt & 
Burr, 2004), with business scholars taking note and applying this theory to understand how 
managers think about a particular issue or event (e.g. Cullina 2016; Jankowicz, 2001; 
Malmström, Johansson, & Wincent, 2015; Pankratz & Basten 2014, 2017; Quirk, 2013). 




Table 8. Selected examples of PCT use in managerial studies. 
Authors Research Focus 
Cornelius (2015) Emphasis on importance of exploration of individual and shared 
construing (review article) 
Cullina (2016) Construing of Western leadership theories by Egyptian 
managers  
Goffin & Koners (2011) Lessons learnt in new product development 
Gough (2014) Recruitment difficulties experienced by recruiting service 
providers 
Jankowicz (1990) Personal Construct Psychology and Repertory Grid Technique 
use by business practitioners (review article) 
Jankowicz (2001) Use of Repertory Grid Technique to turn tacit knowledge into 
explicit knowledge in Financial institutions. 
Malmström, Johansson, 
& Wincent (2015) 
Differences in the way entrepreneurs construe high-profit and 
low-profit business models 
Napier et al. (2009) IT project managers’ skills contributing to a successful project 
management practice 
Pankratz & Basten 
(2014) 
Managers’ perceptions about a project’s success 
 
Personal Construct Theory is more than a theory of cognition.  Kelly’s basic postulate and 11 
corollaries form a basis of what Kelly (1963) calls ‘constructive alternativism’ – a 
philosophical stance, which is an epistemology in its own right (see Butt & Burr, 2004; 
Fransella, 2003; Jankowicz, 2004, 2016; Kelly, 1963; Raskin, 2002).  Constructive 
alternativism, which will be discussed in section 3.2.1 stresses that it is possible to construe a 
given experience in different ways, as follows from the Individuality Corollary described 
above. 
Fransella (2003, p.24) emphasizes the ‘reflexivity’ of Kelly’s theory, building on Kelly’s 
claim that all people in their construing of events act as scientists trying to understand the 
world around them – and concludes that PCT applies to both the scientist and the person 
being studied.  This stance will become key to the current thesis, since if one seeks to 
understand how others see the world in their own terms, one needs to understand their 




of construing in its own right, the issue of researcher reliability becomes paramount.  This 
will be elaborated in more detail in chapter 3 on methodology.   
 
2.5.5.3. Understanding Cognitive Complexity  
In addition to the core terms described in section 2.5.5.1, PCT offers several concepts highly 
relevant to the cognitive complexity involved in innovation (see in particular Xu, 2011), 
because cognitive complexity may influence construing as discussed below.  Fransella (1995) 
describes several Kellyan concepts typically discussed in the clinical context, yet directly 
related to this thesis and its use of the notion of cognitive complexity: tight and loose 
construing, the Creativity Cycle, and the CPC Cycle.   
Tight and Loose Construing 
Tight construing is construing which leads to a predictable way of thinking about an issue at 
hand; conversely, loose construing involves variability and flexibility in the way of thinking 
about an issue (Fransella, 1995).  The implication is that when construing is tight, the person 
may be productive, but is unlikely to be creative at that time, since flexibility is required for   
creativity and innovative problem solving. 
Creativity Cycle 
Most of us are not tight construers or loose construers, but rather move on a continuum 
between tight and loose construing in a cycle (Fransella, 1995).  This cycle is called ‘The 
Creativity Cycle’ (Fransella, 1995).  It is important to emphasise that maintaining the cycle 
and being able to move from loose construing to tight construing (or between the two, for that 
matter) is what provides the foundation for creativity and allows for decision making in 
conditions of uncertainty (Fransella, 1995). 
CPC Decision Cycle 
According to Kelly (see Fransella, 1995) people go through three stages in the process of 
decision making: Circumspection: considering the various options available to them; Pre-
emption: selecting a particular way of construing the issue at hand; Choice: deciding that one 
pole of the selected construct applies, rather than the other pole.  See the discussion on 






Bieri (1955) was the first to coin the term ‘cognitive complexity’ in context of Kellian theory 
of personality.  He suggested that “the greater the degree of differentiation among constructs, 
the greater will be the predictive power of the individual” (Bieri, 1955, p. 263).  Over the 
years several indices have been developed to measure cognitive complexity.  Bell (2003) 
mentions Bieri’s original index developed in 1955, ‘intensity index’ developed by Fransella 
and Bannister in 1977, ‘intraclass correlations’ developed by Bell and Keen in 1981, and 
‘functionality-independent-construct index’ (FIC) developed by Landfield and Schmittdiel in 
1983.  According to Bell (2003) Principal Component Analysis (PCA) has been traditionally 
most accepted approach to measure cognitive complexity and cites sources who demonstrated 
how PCA can be used to describe the structure of relationships between constructs, unlike 
more traditional average correlation approaches (see Fransella et al., 2004, p.119).   
Heckmann & Bell (2016) derived several new measures of complexity associated with cluster 
analysis (see Bell, 2003) and concluded that there is little correlation between their measures 
and the standard measures mentioned above, arguing that the former describe aspects of 
construct relationships not explained by the standard complexity indices. 
Section 3.4.1.3 describes PCA and a choice of index for the current thesis in more detail. 
 
2.5.6. Summary 
Antecedents of managerial decision-making in conditions of uncertainty have been a focus of 
management and business scholars for several decades.  Cognition, sensemaking, 
interpretation, and perceptions are the typical terms used in this context.   
Interpretation refers to the development of models to understand events, extracting meaning 
from them.  Cognition refers to mental models people use to make decisions.  Sensemaking 
refers to the process through which people make sense of novel or unexpected events. 
Managerial cognition is an antecedent of strategic decisions.  Managers often apply heuristics 
as they make decisions, but at times make errors due to common biases.  One common bias is 
overconfidence, leading entrepreneurs and intrapreneurs (more so than traditional managers) 
to an illusion of control and the belief they can control uncertainty inherent in exploratory 




The manager’s job is to interpret the environment by extracting cues from it and translating 
these cues into meaning for the rest of the organisation.  Moreover, in learning organisations, 
managers recognise that traditional approaches to problem solving may not be appropriate 
and seek to modify their approaches for interpreting the environment.   
Understanding of the processes preceding decision-making and action is key for an 
organisation’s success, as meanings lead to cognitions and motivations, which, in turn lead to 
organisational actions.  Individual sensemaking is an antecedent of organisational 
sensemaking and its outcomes.  Strategic processes are influenced by managers yet shaped 
collectively by organisational members. 
Personal Construct Theory is an epistemology in its own right and helps us understand what 
processes take place in a managers’ mind, helping researchers turn managers’ tacit 
knowledge into explicit knowledge.  In the context of corporate entrepreneurship and 
ambidexterity, when the business environment is complex, and complexity of cognitive 
processes is increased, Personal Construct Theory and constructive alternativism in particular 
helps make sense of the managers’ decision-making processes.   
PCT offers a glimpse into the future as its anticipatory aspect helps predict how people will 
behave given a particular choice. 
 
2.6. Literature Synthesis 
2.6.1. Argument Development 
This section develops an argument that leads to the research question by integrating the 
literature reviewed so far and positioning the research in the context of the gap that exists in 
extant literature on managerial decision making in the context of ambidexterity. 
Radical and disruptive innovations are critical to a firm’s long-term success in the market 
(Bower & Christensen, 1995; Christensen, 1997; Christensen, Raynor & McDonald, 2015; 
Leifer et al., 2000).  To achieve these types of innovations that are new to the market, and at 
times create new markets, firms embark on exploratory innovation projects (Leifer et al., 
2000; March, 1991; Raisch et al., 2009).  However, innovation is not easy: there are multiple 
ways to fail, and special ingredients are required for it to succeed, such as strategy 
examination, culture of experimentation, tolerance to failure, and appropriate incentives 




ingredients, unnecessarily complex processes, and risk aversion are the typical antecedents of 
failed innovation efforts (Assink, 2006; Büschgens et al., 2013; Holmström, 1989; Quinn, 
1985; Sharma, 1999).  Additionally, exploratory innovation is especially difficult in large and 
mature companies due to the innovator’s dilemma: these companies struggle to defend the 
core business and innovate at the same time (Baghai et al., 2000; Christensen, 1997; Owens 
& Fernandez, 2014).   
In an attempt to solve the innovator’s dilemma, organisational ambidexterity has emerged as 
an organisational design, that describes how to explore (pursuit of innovation through 
discovery) and exploit (pursuit of efficiency to increase productivity) at the same time 
(Birkinshaw & Gupta, 2013; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; March, 1991; O’Reilly & 
Tushman 2008; Raisch et al., 2009).  Many scholars argue for innovation and ambidexterity 
to become a deliberate strategy with supporting culture and structures (O’Reilly & Tushman, 
2008; Pisano, 2015; Ries, 2017; Saleh & Wang, 1993), but the strategy is rarely completely 
deliberate or completely emergent (MacLennan, 2009; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Nag, 
Hambrick, & Chen, 2007).  Ambidexterity is contextual to the firm and the environment it 
operates in (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Birkinshaw et al., 2016), hence the innovation 
strategy formation is influenced by that context and environment. 
The form of organisational design that aids exploration, is called Corporate Entrepreneurship 
(Covin & Miles, 1999; Hisrich & Kearney, 2014; Teece, 2016).  Ambidexterity and corporate 
entrepreneurship lead to superior performance (Covin & Miles, 1999; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 
2004; He & Wong, 2004; Kuratko, Ireland, & Hornsby, 2004; Luger, Raisch, & Schimmer, 
2018; Pertusa-Ortega & Molina-Azorín, 2018; Solís-Molinaa et al., 2018).  These are 
considered the dynamic capabilities of the firm which help organisations achieve their 
strategic goals (Birkinshaw, Zimmermann, & Raisch, 2016; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008; 
Teece, 2014, 2016; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997).  It is crucial for firms to recognise they 
are in a complex business environment that demands development of these dynamic 
capabilities (Birkinshaw, Zimmermann, & Raisch, 2016).  The ability of organisations to 
recognise that they are in the kind of business environment that requires exploration is key to 
innovation success (Quinn, 1985).   
While companies may recognise they are in a complex business context, it may be impossible 
to predict outcomes of actions they take in response (Aram & Noble, 1999) and it may be 




had to do with less complex contexts (McKenzie et al., 2009).  Entrepreneurial approaches 
such as Lean Startup help organisations cope with uncertainty, contain investments, and help 
address the risk-aversion challenges, while shortening the investment time-frames and 
allowing for ambiguity in requirements (Blank, 2015; Blank & Dorf, 2012; Owens & 
Fernandez, 2014; Ries, 2011, 2017; Teece, 2016). 
It follows, that for exploratory innovation projects to succeed, managers have to first 
recognise that they are in a complex environment that is more appropriate for exploration 
rather than exploitation.  They need to embrace the complexity of their situation (Chermack, 
2003; Jankowicz, 2001) and to recognise that exploration-appropriate management 
techniques need to be employed (Baghai et al., 2000; Blank, 2015; Cagan, 2017; Leifer et al., 
2000; Loewe et al., 2001; Kurtz & Snowden, 2003; Moore, 2017; O'Connor & Rice 2013; 
Owens & Fernandez, 2014; Ries, 2011, 2917; Teece, 2016) and exploration-appropriate 
metrics need to be set to track and measure the goals (Hauser & Zettelmeyer, 1997; 
Henttonen et al., 2016; Kasie & Belay, 2013; Kristiansen & Ritala, 2018; Maurya, 2016; 
McGrath, 2013; Muller et al., 2005; Mumford & Licuanan, 2004; Owens & Fernandez, 2014; 
Ries, 2017).  Measurement approaches like Innovation Accounting (Ries, 2017) and traction 
metrics (Maurya, 2016; McClure, 2007) focus on early traction and are more appropriate to 
exploratory innovation projects, than financial metrics, and quality, scope, and schedule 
metrics. 
Both the ambidexterity and the business environment may be perceived differently by 
managers at different levels (Raisch et al., 2009), because of different wants, needs, 
expectations, roles, and experiences (Fowler & Walsh, 1999; McKenzie et al., 2009; Mcleod 
& Macdonell, 2010).  Moreover, individual managers may experience ambidexterity tensions 
as they balance between exploitation and exploration.  Each management level has a different 
role to play in exploratory innovation success with a particular set of behaviours (Kuratko, 
Ireland, & Hornsby, 2004; Miller & Camp, 1985).  Perceptions of success also vary between 
various stakeholders (Davis, 2014; Mcleod & Macdonell 2010; Pankratz & Basten, 2014), yet 
alignment on goals and outcome-based metrics of success throughout the hierarchy is critical, 
to avoid risk-aversion due to agency issues (Eisenhardt, 1989; Freeman & Engel, 2007).  
Choosing the right outcome-based metrics in both exploitative and exploratory innovation 
projects may be hard but is especially so in exploratory projects because of inherent risk and 
uncertainty of outcomes (Freeman & Engel, 2007).  Therefore, innovation-appropriate 




And, so it follows, that when it comes to risk-aversion, Agency Theory is of a higher interest 
to this thesis than Theory of Planned Behaviour and Prospect Theory.   
While several authors mentioned above have studied managerial perception on topics of 
ambidexterity and project success, few have looked at project success in the context of 
ambidexterity or have applied a constructivist approach to explore how managers construe 
approaches used to drive to project success in that context.  The latter being important in 
particular in new product development, where activities are complex, and knowledge is tacit 
(see Goffin & Koners, 2011).  As follows from Kelly’s basic postulate, the study of 
construing differs from study of perceptions, as the former offers an opportunity to shed light 
on managers’ expectations of what would happen next and how they will act in similar 
circumstances with future projects.    
PCT is not without criticism, yet it remains a respectable choice for understanding of 
individual construing (Chiari, 2013; Fransella, 1995).  As described in section 2.5.5.1, the 
application of PCT may help predict how middle managers from Product Management and 
Engineering functions (see Cagan, 2017; Menguc & Auh, 2010; Owens & Fernandez, 2014) 
will act when faced with the next exploratory project.   
In view of the above it follows, that understanding how middle managers at different levels 
and functions construe their situation in these complex and dynamic business environments, 
and what issues they find important with respect to leading exploitative and exploratory 
innovation projects to successful outcomes is of value to firms seeking to achieve superb 
financial performance (see Mitchell et al., 2007; Morandin & Bergami, 2014; Taylor, 2017; 
Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993; Wrona, Ladwig, & Gunnesch, 2013).  The research question, 
aim, and objectives described in the next section are designed to explore this gap.   
 
2.6.2. Research Question, Aim, and Objectives 
And so, this study aims to learn how middle managers at different levels construe exploitative 
and exploratory innovation projects with respect to techniques used to manage these projects 
towards the desired outcomes, and the metrics used to measure these outcomes.  To achieve 
this aim, the empirical investigation of this study will address the following main question 




Main question: How do middle managers at different levels construe exploitative and 
exploratory innovation projects? 
Supporting question:  What issues do they construe as more important in achieving success 
of exploitative as opposed to exploratory innovation projects? 
The following objectives have been set to achieve the aim of this study and answer the main 
question and supporting question: 
1. to establish how middle managers construe exploitative and exploratory innovation 
projects; 
2. to examine differences in construing and choices of approaches between the two 
middle management levels: strategic and tactical.   
3. to examine differences in construing and choices of approaches between the two 





3. Research Methodology & Design 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 culminated in positioning the research question in the gap shown by integration of 
the various literature fields.  To answer this research question and to achieve the aim and 
objectives of this thesis, a methodology rooted in the phenomenological paradigm is 
developed and justified throughout this chapter.  It is followed by the research design that 
applies the chosen methodology to two case companies. 
 
 
3.2. Research Paradigm 
Guba & Lincoln (1994) define a paradigm as  
“the basic belief system or worldview that guides the investigator, not only in choices 
of method but in ontologically and epistemologically fundamental ways” (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994, p. 105). 
According to Jankowicz (2016), while a researcher may decide to mix qualitative and 
quantitative techniques (see discussion in section 3.3.1), epistemology does pose a choice as 
different epistemologies such as positivism and constructivism rely on different and 
contradictory ontological assumptions.  The ontological difference stems from the way the 
data is interpreted.  Positivist researchers seek to establish causal relationships among 
variables (Jankowicz, 2016), as they seek to establish probabilistic generalisations to form a 
system of laws (Harré, 1981).  However, many of the issues dealt with in social sciences, and 
especially in management research, are more appropriately handled by avoiding a search for 
universal laws, which assumes that events exist “out there”, independent of the observer, and 
better approached by focusing on meaning and understanding of these issues in a way that is 
agreed on by the social actors (Jankowicz, 2005; Patton, 2002; Patton & Appelbaum, 2003; 
Ritchie et al., 2014).  Jankowicz (2005), argues there are several key reasons for this: 
 problems dealt with by practitioners are typically complex and tend to be thought of 
in terms of ‘issues’ rather than ‘variables’, being better examined by constructivist 
epistemology, which is phenomenological in nature, as will be described in the next 




 problems cross discipline boundaries and make it harder to choose a clear technique 
to be applied in a particular situation (also see the discussion on ‘complex context’ in 
section 2.4.1 above); 
 the way professionals think of issues is not easily analysed using the hypothetico-
deductive method with an assumption that problems and truth exist “out there”, 
independent of the observer. 
As the next section describes in detail, constructivist researchers are trying to understand the 
phenomenological positions taken by people being studied in social contexts (see Jankowicz, 
2016; Patton & Appelbaum, 2003; Ritchie et al., 2014).   
 
3.2.1. Phenomenology and Constructivism 
Ritchie et al. (2014, p. 13) define phenomenology as an exploration of “meaning people 
attach to a particular phenomenon, concept or idea”.  In phenomenology  
“knowledge is produced by exploring and understanding the social world of the 
people being studied, focusing on their meanings and interpretations” (Ritchie et al., 
2014, p. 12).  
Understanding of a person stems from the understanding of their construing (see Kelly 1955, 
1966), in other words, their understanding of the world.  In turn, that knowledge leads to the 
understanding of the why people act the way they do (Butt & Burr, 2004).  Kelly (1955) 
stresses the importance of events and assumes that “all of our present interpretations of the 
universe are subject to revision or replacement” (Kelly, 1955, p. 15). 
According to Jankowicz (2016), constructivism is 
”phenomenological and deals with issues as they are understood by both participants: 
the person being researched and the person doing the research.  It seeks to invent 
understandings consistent with evidence” (Jankowicz, 2016, p.101) 
rather than discovering truths out there.   
A constructivist researcher and the researched both attempt to “make sense of events and data 
they have to deal with” Jankowicz (2016, p. 4), with the research subject actively 




Kelly’s claim that if a researcher to understand a subject, they “must subsume the constructs 
of the subject rather than merely interpret his overt behaviour” (Kelly, 1963, p. 174).  Kelly 
(1963) goes further and claims that accounting for the researcher’s own construction of what 
they observe, is what makes constructivism phenomenological in nature. 
Phenomenology has been relied on as a paradigm of choice by researchers to understand 
perceptions of individuals on a particular issue (Cullina 2016; Jankowicz, 2001; Malmström, 
Johansson, & Wincent, 2015; Pankratz & Basten 2011, 2017; Quirk, 2013; Wachira, 2013).  
As presented in the argument development (see section 2.6.1), this research has an 
opportunity to add to findings of authors who looked at managerial perceptions on 
ambidexterity and project success by using PCT with Repertory Grid Technique (see section 
3.4) to learn how managers construe exploratory innovation projects, and how their roles, 
levels, and experiences influence their construing and choice of approaches used to manage 
these projects.  Additionally, applying PCT to this research offers an opportunity to explore 
the anticipatory aspect of personal constructs, and, as described in section 2.6.1, offer insight 
into managers’ expectations of what would happen next, and what actions they are likely to 
take in future projects.   
Answering the research question in this thesis required the author to actively engage with the 
participants and interpret their construing of issues this question explores.  The inquiry into 
middle managers’ cognition in the context of this question is aligned with epistemological 
assumptions of PCT as described above and in the introduction to PCT in section 2.5.5.   
Constructionism, an epistemology that postulates that we invent beliefs based on social 
relationships, cultural contexts, linguistics and communication patterns (Raskin, 2002) was 
considered as an epistemological alternative to constructivism.  Constructivism was deemed 
more appropriate given the research questions as it is the individuals and their personal 
understanding of reality that are of interest in the present research. 
 
3.3. Research Method 
3.3.1. Qualitative – Quantitative Distinction 
While mainstream literature on research methods tends to make a distinction between 
qualitative research and quantitative research (e.g. Merriam, 1998; Ritchie et al., 2014; Yin, 




between paradigms, methods, and techniques (see Bennet, 1991; Jankowicz, 2016).  The term 
‘qualitative’ is often used in that literature as an umbrella term for various non-positivist 
paradigms (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).  Bennett (1991) differentiates between methods and 
techniques, clarifying that methods deal with “what” we do and “why” we do it, whereas 
techniques deal with “how” we are going to do it.  Jonker & Pennink (2010) also make a 
distinction between these concepts, clarifying that methods are specific actions or phases a 
research goes through, whereas techniques are tools used by the researcher to collect and 
analyse the data.  This author finds this distinction helpful and distinguishes between the 
methods and techniques in the material presented in this chapter, keeping in mind that one 
may use qualitative techniques, quantitative techniques, and often a combination of both, as is 
the case with the Repertory Grid Technique used in this thesis and described in detail in 
section 3.4. 
 
3.3.2. The Case Study Method 
Bennett (1991) claims that more qualitative and exploratory in nature methods are 
appropriate for situations where little is known about the nature of variables involved in the 
issue at hand, as is the case with the topic of this research.  Yin (2017) compares several 
methods and indicates that case studies are well suited for answering “how” and why” 
questions, and can be used for three purposes: exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory, with 
an in-depth focus on a case.  Merriam (1998) argues that case studies stand out among other 
methods to provide “intensive descriptions and analysis” of units such as organisations and 
individuals.  Exploring people’s perspectives in a particular context is one of the primary 
features of a case study (Ritchie et al., 2014; Yin, 2017).  In their multiple-case study of 
radical innovation project management in large corporations in various industries, Leifer et 
al. (2000, p. IX) build on Yin’s point, and emphasise that “how” and “why” questions “are 
designed to push the envelope of thinking of practitioners and academics about a very 
difficult subject”.  Patton & Appelbaum (2003) quote several sources in support of this view, 
suggesting that complex organisational issues are to be researched in a comprehensive way 
with the help of case studies.  The distinctive advantage of the case study method over other 
methods comes from its reliance on multiple techniques in order to integrate different 
perspectives on a complex issue, and as a result build an in-depth understanding of that issue 




sources of information to verify the findings is known as triangulation (Ritchie et al., 2014; 
Yin, 2017). 
The Basis to be Used for Generalisation 
Historically, case studies have not been popular in research and came under heavy criticism 
from positivist researchers (Patton & Appelbaum, 2003).  Two main claims against case 
studies were (a) lack of rigour and (b) lack of generalisation to population (Patton & 
Appelbaum, 2003).   
Bennett (1991, p. 88) argues that rigour is contextual to the research and has to meet its own 
objectives and needs.  For example, the rigour in the experimental method is achieved by 
control of moderator variables, whereas the case study method is phenomenological in nature, 
focused on a rich description from a variety of data sources, and rigour is achieved by 
analytic generalisation and triangulation (see Yin, 2017).  Also, while positivist methods may 
be thought of as having higher rigour thanks to the perceived lack of bias, they too have 
proven to suffer from bias (Patton & Appelbaum, 2003).  Ironically, the supposed source of 
bias in phenomenological methods – the researcher and their interpretation of the data – is the 
strength of the case study method (Patton, 2002; Patton & Appelbaum, 2003; Merriam, 1998; 
Ritchie et al., 2014).  This stance is aligned with Heron (1981) and with Kelly’s sociality 
corollary described in section 2.5.5.1 and is crucial for the researcher as they attempt to 
construe the interviewee’s understanding of issues and events (see Jankowicz, 2016).   
According to Yin (2017) case studies do not seek to generalise findings to population - 
statistical generalisation typically suited for surveys and experiments.  Instead, Yin claims,  
“rather than thinking about your case(s) as a sample, you should think of your case 
study as an opportunity to shed empirical light on some theoretical concepts or 
principles” Yin (2017, p. 37). 
And so, the form of generalisation sought in a case study is called ‘analytic generalisation’ 
(Yin, 2017, p. 37).  Its aim is to generalise from the study (not the case) to a variety of 
situations, in which the same theoretical concepts or principles apply.  Bryman and Bell 
(2015) explain that analytic generalization is similar to theoretical generalization in that it 
“refers to credibility of the theoretical inferences that the researcher draws from his or her 




Section 3.5.2 will discuss a sampling approach that is more appropriate to studies aiming at 
analytic generalization. 
Exploratory Approach 
As discussed in section 2.6, the research question is dealing with a complex issue, and little is 
known on the topic.  Managerial construing of issues of ambidexterity and choice of 
approaches can be classified as ‘tacit knowledge’ (see Nonaka & Konno, 1998) with some 
evidence of attempts to make it explicit (e.g.Goffin & Koners, 2011; Pankratz & Basten, 
2014).  Therefore, an exploratory case study was chosen to examine the cognitive dimension 
of the tacit knowledge of social actors (managers) as they ascribe meaning to exploratory 
projects, techniques used, project outcomes and metrics in the context of ambidexterity.  
Similar to Pankratz & Basten (2014) and Jankowicz (2001), this research aims at 
transforming the tacit knowledge on a subject into explicit with the use of Repertory Grid 
Technique (see section 3.4) and extends their findings to the realm of exploratory innovation 
projects in the context of ambidexterity.  Case study approach has been used by researchers 
on topics of ambidexterity (Bonesso et al., 2014), exploratory innovation (Kristiansen & 
Ritala, 2018; O'Connor & Rice, 2013), project outcomes (Pankratz & Basten, 2014), and 
sensemaking (Goffin & Koners, 2011; Gough, 2014). 
Reliability 
Reliability in the case study method is achieved through a carefully documented and detailed 
study protocol (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Yin, 2017), which helps to minimise errors, and, in theory, 
would allow another researcher to repeat the same case study and to arrive at the same 
findings.  As described later in this chapter, the Repertory Grid Technique used in this study 
relies on well-documented, rigorous data collection and analysis techniques, which include an 
explicit reliability assessment of agreement between two researchers.   
Researcher Bias 
To address the researcher bias concerns and ensure the construct validity of the study, 
triangulation technique – reliance on multiple sources of evidence (Ritchie et al., 2014; Yin, 
2017) – was used to examine and elaborate the interview-based findings.  In this research, the 
author has examined the interpretation of the findings with interviewees (see Meriam, 1998), 
to validate the findings.  This was done with the help of Key Informant Interviews (see 




the next section, the Repertory Grid Technique is known to reduce the researcher bias as 
well, as it helps capture the interviewee’s constructs in their own terms (Jankowicz, 2004). 
 
3.4. Research Techniques 
The empirical work has been conducted over three stages: a pilot study, and two stages of the 
main study.   
The goal of the pilot study has been to test the logistical aspects of the inquiry (see Yin, 
2017), and estimate the target sample size.  Pilot study design is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 4. 
The main study has been divided into two stages (see Gough, 2014; Sitte, 2015): 
Stage 1: semi-structured interviews have been conducted using the Repertory Grid Technique 
(see section 3.4.1) to collect and analyse the main body of data. 
Stage 2: Key Informant interviews have been conducted to examine and elaborate the 
findings of stage 1 (see section 3.4.2). 
 
3.4.1. Repertory Grid 
3.4.1.1. Introduction 
Among the various techniques at a case study researcher’s disposal are interviews, 
questionnaires, focus groups, direct and participant observations, and mining data from 
documents, with interviews being the most common technique (Merriam, 1998; Patton, 2002; 
Yin, 2017), and multiple techniques being used in the course of a study to increase the 
internal validity through triangulation (Yin, 2017). 
Researchers looking to study perceptions, or personal constructs of people regarding a 
particular issue in a business setting often use Repertory Grid Technique (RGT) (see Cullina, 
2016; Goffin & Koners, 2011; Gough, 2014; Hisrich & Jankowicz, 1990; Honey, 
1979a,1979b; Pankratz & Basten, 2014; Napier et al., 2009; Wachira, 2013).  Goffin et al. 
(2012) demonstrate how the application of RGT leads to more meaningful constructs as 
compared to a more direct questioning interview technique.  While RGT is the most common 




‘free choice profiling’, and ‘self-characterisation’ may lead to elicitation of personal 
constructs similar to the results obtained through RGT elicitation (see Denicolo, 2003; Höft, 
Heckmann & Jankowicz, 2019). 
Repertory Grid is not as popular in qualitative research as the traditional structured or semi-
structured interview, yet it has gained popularity across a variety of fields (see Saúl, 2012).  
According to Saúl (2012), 468 journal papers, 335 book chapters, 108 doctoral theses, and 62 
books were published on studies using RGT between the years 1998 and 2007, with business 
administration being one of the more prominent topics outside of the field of psychology (p.  
123).  Cornelius (2015) supports this view and cites close to 50 articles relying on RGT, 
published between 1979 and 2013 focused on topics such as organizational studies, 
management, organizational learning and change, and entrepreneurship. 
RGT has evolved from Kelly’s Personal Construct Theory and is a particular interviewing 
technique that allows a researcher to elicit personal constructs about a certain issue from 
participants (Bell, 2003; Fransella, 2003; Fransella et al., 2004; Jankowicz, 2004; Tan & 
Hunter, 2002).  It involves the definition of elements, elicitation of constructs that contrast 
these elements, and relating the elements to the elicited constructs (Bell, 2003; Fransella et 
al., 2004).   
In Kelly’s terms, a construct is ”a way in which some things are constructed as being alike 
and yet different from others” (Kelly, 1963, p. 105), and elements are defined thus “The 
things or events which are abstracted by a construct are called elements” (Kelly, 1963, p. 
137). 
As presented in section 2.5.5.1, Kelly’s fundamental postulate states “a person’s processes 
are psychologically channelized by the ways in which he anticipates events” (Kelly, 1966, 
p.7).  According to Bell (2003, p. 95), RGT flows directly from this postulate, where the ways 
are the constructs, and the events are the elements.   In Kelly’s own words: 
“In construing, the person notes features in a series of elements which characterize 
some of the elements and are particularly uncharacteristic of others. Thus, he erects 
constructs of similarity and contrast.” (Kelly, 1963, p. 50) 
Figure 7 below is an example of a portion of a grid sheet as generally used in PCP research, 





Figure 7. Repertory Grid and its key attributes.  
Source: adapted from Fransella et al. (2004). 
In the example presented in Figure 7 above, elements are rated on a 5-point scale, where the 
phrase on the left (the emergent pole of the construct) anchors the ‘1’ end of the scale and the 
phrase on the right (the implicit pole of the construct) anchors the ‘5’ end of the scale.  For 
instance, in the first construct, the interviewee construes Person C as more approachable than 
person A.  To emphasise, a single construct consists of two contrasting poles, conveying a 
single meaning, as follows from the choice corollary (see section 2.5.5.1). 
Figure 8 below provides an actual example taken from one of the pilot study responses (see 
Appendix 1b).  This sample includes eight elements: three exploratory projects, three 
exploitative projects supplied by a participant, as well as two “ideal” projects supplied by the 





Figure 8. Repertory Grid sample of pilot study data.  
Source: Author 
 
RGT helps prevent researcher bias (Cullina, 2016; Easterby-Smith & Aston, 1975; Pankratz 
& Basten, 2014; Quirk, 2013), and the status-quo bias of individuals being researched (see 
Pankratz & Basten, 2014).  The benefit here is that an interviewee is not asked to work with 
constructs and frameworks developed by the researcher as is the case with typical structured 
and even semi-structured interviews (see Jankowicz, 2004).  Instead, the grid elicits the 
interviewee’s own constructs (Bell, 2003) as illustrated in figures 7 and 8 above.   
RGT interview was the key technique for this research, and the next section provides more 
details on the grid design and elicitation procedure specific to this research. 
 
3.4.1.2. Repertory Grid Procedure 
Elements are typically instances or exemplars of the topic being covered in the interview (e.g. 
people, projects, cars, books) (Bell, 2003; Pankratz & Basten, 2014), and are better to be 
expressed as nouns rather than verbs that describe related activities (Jankowicz, 2004).  The 
topic of this grid is “exploratory and exploitative projects”.  There are two main ways in 




participant does (Bell, 2003; Jankowicz, 2004; Tan & Hunter, 2002).  A variant of these two 
main techniques was adopted for this research, where the researcher asked the participant to 
name instances of a particular category where categories were supplied by the researcher.  
This way, the researcher had the benefit of alignment for the subsequent multiple-grid 
analysis, while the participant named the actual elements that they cared about (Bell, 2003; 
Pankratz & Basten, 2014).   
As exemplified in Figure 7 above, each grid was structured to include six elements plus two 
‘Ideal’ elements.  The participants were asked to name three incremental innovation projects 
(exploitative), and three projects aimed at new product development for new and existing 
markets (exploratory).  Two ‘Ideal’ elements were supplied (see Fransella, 2003): ‘Ideal 
Exploratory Project’ and ‘Ideal Exploitative Project’.  This allowed the author to compare 
how the projects being discussed differed from the ideally managed project from the 
interviewee’s point of view, in terms of approaches used to manage these projects.   
To facilitate analysis across grids from multiple respondents, the researcher may supply a 
summary construct to establish the interviewee’s stance on a particular issue.  The following 
summary construct has been supplied at the beginning of the interview, and then reviewed 
again at the end of the interview:  
“Overall, approaches used were more effective for project success vs. Overall, approaches 
used were less effective for project success”. 
A standard form of grid procedure (see Bell, 2003; Fransella et al., 2004; Jankowicz, 2004; 
Pankratz & Basten, 2014) has been used as outlined below. 
At the beginning of the interview, participants were briefed on the purpose of the interview 
and were asked to name a number of exploitative and exploratory projects, thereby setting the 
‘range of convenience’ (Kelly, 1963, pp. 68-72) of interviewees constructs.  Once these 
projects were recorded as elements in the grid, the researcher picked three projects at a time 
for a ‘triadic comparison’ and asked the interviewee to explain in what way two of them are 
similar but different from the third one.  The response expressed as a two-pole construct was 
recorded in the grid.  An example can be seen in Figure 8 above:  
“Had a strong executive commitment” vs. “Marginal executive support” 
In accordance with RGT, a technique called ‘Laddering Down’ was used, if the participant 




way?” to help the participant to arrive at a more specific construct.  Once the construct was 
elicited and the robust poles were recorded in the grid, the participant was asked to rate all the 
elements on a scale from 1 to 5, and the results were recorded in the grid.   
Each construct was coded with a unique identifier to aid the subsequent content analysis, 
indicating the company, level, function, interviewee sequence, and the construct’s sequence 
from a particular grid.   
 
Figure 9. Application of RGT with Laddering Down.  
Source: Adapted from Pankratz & Basten (2014). 
 
The constructs were elicited by using the phrase below, with the qualifying phrase 
emphasized in bold letters.  The qualifying phrase helps establish focus for the interviewee’s 
responses.   
 “Which two projects are similar in some way, but different from the third, in terms of what 
approaches make for effective management of these projects?” 
Remote Administration of RGT 
As described in section 3.5, both companies participating in the study are multi-national with 




participants face to face through frequent national and international travel, some qualified 
participants resided in offices outside of the author’s reach with respect to timing and cost 
constraints.  In these cases, the interview was conducted with help of video conferencing 
service with screen sharing capabilities: GoToMeeting (https://www.gotomeeting.com/).  The 
author had a full-featured access to this software through his employer.  A similar approach 
was taken by Magni (2010) in an organizational setting, where it was not practical to meet 
face to face with a respondent.  Magni’s sample, although small (8 respondents from the 12 
who did the remote grid), found the experience user-friendly, interesting and engaging. 
 
3.4.1.3.  Repertory Grid Analysis 
A repertory grid contains information about one person’s construing as captured by 
qualitative data (the meaning expressed by each construct) and quantitative data (the way 
elements are construed, as indicated by ratings on each construct).  A typical approach to 
analysis of this data across multiple grids is twofold: 
a) to aggregate the meanings present in the sample as a whole by means of content 
analysis (Jankowicz, 2004; Tan & Hunter, 2002), while 
b) retaining two personal attributes: the personal importance of the constructs to the 
individuals providing them, by means of Honey’s technique (see Honey, 1979a, 
1979b), and providing information about the cognitive complexity of the individuals’ 
construing. 
The Content Analysis 
According to Ritchie et al. (2014), content analysis involves the analysis of both the content 
and context, where themes or categories are identified, and the frequency of constructs in 
each category is presented.  Bryman & Bell (2015) argue that content analysis has an 
advantage of being transparent in its approach and flexible in that it can be applied to variety 
of content.  
And so, a content analysis of meanings present in a group of grids was the main analysis 
technique following the basic approach as outlined by Krippendorff (2004) and Saldaña 
(2009), and followed a similar approach used by Cullina, (2016) and Goffin & Koners (2011) 




repertory grid material involves a single-level analysis, where each construct is allocated to 
just one category, with the categories being mutually exclusive and completely exhaustive.   
As described in sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2, two companies were included in this research to 
satisfy the requirement for sufficient number of constructs.  The data from both companies is 
pooled for content analysis.  A ‘First Cycle’ coding (see Saldaña, 2009) was done, followed 
by single-level content analysis (Krippendorff, 2004). 
As discussed earlier, managers at different levels may have different perceptions of success 
(Davis, 2014; Mcleod & Macdonell 2010; Pankratz & Basten, 2014), and different 
perceptions of ambidexterity (Raisch et al., 2009).  Therefore, it was of interest to group the 
respondents based on their levels and look for an indication in the relative importance of the 
categories of similarities among the respondents at the same level and how it differs from 
respondents at other levels.  Janckowicz (2004) calls this procedure ‘differential analysis’.  
For the purpose of this analysis, the managers were stratified into two groups: strategic (VPs, 
Sr. Directors) and tactical (Managers, Sr. Managers, Directors), as described in section 3.5.2, 
to compare how construing of projects by managers in the strategic group differed from that 
of managers in the tactical group, and to explore the differences between construing of 
exploitative versus exploratory projects.  
Both the coding and the analysis have been manual processes and did not involve software 
packages such as NVivo. 
Reliability Check 
A colleague of the researcher has repeated the procedure as part of a reliability check, with 
the goal of achieving higher than 90% agreement between the researchers on categorization 
of constructs, and on coding to those constructs hence indicating that categorization is 
meaningful more than to a single researcher.  %Agreement score may be a sufficient method 
to check the agreement if number of constructs is high and probability of chance agreement is 
low, however, some more robust indices exist which account for chance agreement as 
described next.  Cohen’s Kappa adjusts the level of agreement to take into account the level 
one could expect by chance given the number of categories, and Perreault-Leigh which takes 
into account the nature of the agreement given the separate researchers’ judgements that 





Personal Construct Importance: Maintaining Provenance of Individual Ratings 
While content analysis is key for multiple grid analysis, it has a drawback, in that it ignores 
the ratings collected in each grid.  The personal importance of the constructs prior to the 
aggregation provided by a content analysis can be identified by Honey’s technique (Honey, 
1979a, 1979b).  This uses a supplied ‘summary construct’ that establishes the participants’ 
overall stance on the topic of the grid.  Honey’s analysis computes a % Similarity Score 
between  
a) each of an individual’s construct ratings, and  
b) that individual’s own ratings on the ‘summary construct’ – the overall issue at hand.   




Where ∑𝒅 is the sum of absolute differences between ratings, r is the maximum possible 
rating, and e is the number of elements in the grid. 
This approach allows a researcher to analyse constructs across the entire sample yet preserve 
the idiosyncrasies expressed in the individual grids.   
Each respondent provided their own constructs and ratings and these were categorised in the 
content analysis, the frequency of each category giving an impression of the relative 
importance of the different categories in the sample as a whole; while the %Similarity Scores, 
being based on each respondent’s own overall summary ratings, provided an indication of 
which of the individual’s constructs matter most to that individual when he or she construes 
the overall issue at hand.  In addition to the %Similarity score, it is customary to indicate the 
H-I-L index, specifying whether the %Similarity score is placed high (H), intermediate (I), or 
low (L) for that particular individual (Honey, 1979a, 1979b; Jankowicz, 2004).  As a result, it 
is possible for two individuals to have constructs marked as high (H) while %Similarity score 
might be in 70% range for one individual’s construct and 90% for another’s.   
It is imperative to clarify the notion of construct importance in the context of this thesis.  
Some early literature (Myers & Alpert, 1968, 1976) stresses the multi-dimensional nature of 





1. Salience: refers to the extent to which attributes are top of mind to an individual 
thinking about a particular topic (in the context of their paper: a product) and would 
be reflected in the order the constructs are elicited.  As Heckmann et al. (2019) 
indicate, prior studies relying on RGT did not reach a definitive conclusion on 
whether order of elicited constructs indicates relative importance of constructs, except 
for situations where a grid’s topic is person-related.   
2. Importance: refers to the extent to which something is of significance and 
consequence when making a choice (in the context of their paper: when deciding 
which product or brand is more superior).  Van Ittersum et al. (2007) elaborates 
further and refers to Myers & Alpert definition of importance as ‘relevance’ which is 
based on personal preferences.  In the context of the RGT this relevance would reflect 
the relative importance of constructs with respect to the overall topic of the grid.   
3. Determinance: refers to an additional characteristic of decision making, where an 
attribute maybe important on its own, but not sufficient for making a decision (in the 
context of their paper: when making a purchasing decision among multiple products 
being evaluated). 
Unfortunately, neither Myers & Alpert (1968, 1976) nor Van Ittersum et al. (2007) have 
referenced Kelly’s PCT.  In fact, the methods reviewed by Van Ittersum et al. (2007) with 
respect to measuring importance rely on scales provided to the interviewee by a researcher.  
In this author’s opinion, RGT is substantially superior to the methods reviewed thanks to its 
reliance on the constructs provided by the interviewee on a particular concrete topic and 
operationalized through careful ‘Laddering down’ and negotiation between the researcher and 
an interviewee.   
Moreover, Honey’s technique described above measures the relative importance of constructs 
by comparing their ratings with those of the ‘overall construct’, and hence is more consistent 
with the ‘importance’ definition given in item 2 above.  For consistency, when referencing 
the relative construct importance to an individual in this thesis, the term ‘importance’ is used 
henceforth and is most closely based on the definition of that term by Myers & Alpert (1976). 
Rojon et al. (2019) corroborates the stance taken by Jankowicz (2004) and argues that 
Honey’s technique does not compromise the individual grid’s data granularity, and allows for 




Höft, Heckmann, & Jankowicz (2019) evaluated a novel approach to improving the content 
analysis outcomes through colour-coding of constructs based on their %Similarity scores.  
This approach helps address situations where respondents use similar terminology for 
different constructs or use different terminology for the same constructs.  The risk of 
encountering this situation was considered low assuming respondents are likely to share a 
similar, relatively confined range of discourse, what Jankowicz (2003) refers to as ‘localized 
discourse’.  Additionally, ambiguity of construct meanings in the present research was 
removed by carefully applying the technique of ‘Laddering Down’ (see section 3.4.1.2).   
Cognitive Complexity 
Cognitive complexity is of interest in the context of research on innovation and 
entrepreneurship, in relation to cognitive ambidexterity as argued in sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.4.  
Further, cognitive complexity may influence the flexibility with which issues are construed 
and re-construed (see section 2.5.5.3).   
Since the approach chosen for content analysis is that of meanings expressed across the 
sample (as opposed to cluster analysis), Principal Component Analysis was used as an 
indicator of the complexity of a single repertory grid, as computed using the RepPlus package 
(Gaines & Shaw, 2018), the key indicator being the proportion of variance in the grid that is 
accounted for by the first two principal components.  The greater the cumulative variance 
accounted for by the first two components, the lower the cognitive complexity: in other 
words, the individual has relatively few distinct ways of thinking about an issue.  Conversely, 











Table 9. Principal Component Analysis example 
Respondent Variance Components 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
ATPI-3 Variance % 74.45 11.58 7.31 3.82 1.95 0.77 0.13 0.00 
Cumulative 
Variance % 
74.45 86.03 93.34 97.16 99.11 99.87 100.00 100.00 
BSPX-11 Variance % 31.12 26.79 15.74 12.41 7.69 3.41 2.83 0.00 
Cumulative 
Variance % 
31.12 57.92 73.66 86.07 93.76 97.17 100.00 100.00 
 
Table 9 shows PCA output from the RepPlus package for two respondents.  The cumulative 
variance percentage accounted for by the first two components is the highest in the sample 
for respondent ATPI-3 (86.03%) and the lowest in the sample for respondent BSPX-11 
(57.92%).  This indicates that respondent ATPI-3 has the lowest cognitive complexity in the 
sample, and respondent BSPX-11– the highest (with respect to the particular issue being 
studied).  See Appendix 1c and 1d for grids solicited from these two respondents. 
 
3.4.2. A Stance Towards Triangulation 
3.4.2.1. Introduction 
The importance of triangulation in the case study research has been discussed in sections 
3.4.1 and 3.3.2.  According to Ritchie et al. (2014, p. 45), triangulation “involves the use of 
different methods and sources to check the integrity of, or extend, inferences drawn from the 
data”.  The Repertory Grid procedure itself includes a kind of triangulation, as the constructs 
are arrived at through negotiation between the researcher and the participant.  An additional 
triangulation occurs when at the end of the interview ratings for individual elements are 
compared with ratings for ‘ideal’ elements (see section 3.4.1.2), and a respondent is asked to 
confirm whether what appears to be the closest/furthest element to the ideal is indeed 
closest/furthest.  Researchers relying on constructivism (and drawing on PCT in particular) 




is treated as co-researcher by actively participating in the inquiry side of the research (see 
Heron, 1981). 
Once the data has been collected and analysed using the Repertory Grid technique as 
described in prior sections, the findings can be examined and elaborated using a second 
technique.  This is considered to be a methodological triangulation (see Ritchie et al., 2014; 
Yin, 2017), which, in the terminology clarified in section 3.3.1, simply means use of multiple 
techniques within the context of the same paradigm and method to increase the construct 
validity (see Yin, 2017) of the study.  Denicolo et al. (2016) offers several recent examples of 
follow up interviews as an example of collaborative inquiry aimed at joint interpretation of 
data elicited with RGT.  
 
3.4.2.2. Key Informant Interviews Procedure 
The goal of triangulation in this research is to validate and elaborate the researcher’s 
interpretation of the data collected in stage 1 of the main study.  According to Tremblay 
(1957), the Key Informant Interview technique can be used to shed light on how issues are 
understood by practitioners in a specific organisational setting, based on practitioners’ 
personal experience, and to help a researcher understand the issues that arise in the research.   
Tremblay argues that this particular use of key informants differs from its use in an 
ethnographic study (see for example Arce & Araujo, 2017), in that it seeks to focus on 
specific issues that arise from an earlier study, and therefore seeks a few key informants with 
a specialized knowledge, who might be able to shed more light on the issue in question.  For 
example, in their study on new product development, Smeilus & Pollard (2016) interviewed 
key informants in the second stage of their study to refine a model developed based on 
findings from the first stage.   
Yin (2017) argues that in a case study, interviews resemble guided conversations.  The intent 
of these in-depth conversations was to examine in more detail the findings from the construct 
and element analyses (see section 3.4.1.3).   
Two approaches were considered for conducting the semi-structured interviews.  In the first 
approach, informants would be guided through a series of questions aimed at arriving at data 
to be used for comparison with findings from the stage 1 of the study.  Alternatively, 




these findings.  Merriam (1998) and Yin (2017) argue that this type of validation with 
participants is an important triangulation method in a case study.  This latter approach was 
chosen as more consistent with the Kellian philosophical stance, with the goal to examine the 
key informants' thinking about results that are there, established, and of known reliability, to 
draw on their sensemaking about the results.  Respondents were shown simplified tables from 
this thesis, exemplifying the points of discussion around the emergent findings (see Appendix 
13).  This collaborative approach (see Heron, 1981) helped explore how informants 
understand what's going on, and what they see as the implications for their organizations. 
 
3.4.2.3. Key Informant Interviews Analysis 
Informants’ perspectives on the issues examined were captured and recorded in a role-
ordered matrix (see Miles & Huberman, 1994; Miles et al., 2019). According to Miles et al.  
(2019, p. 157), this kind of presentation “systematically permits comparisons across roles on 
issues of interest to a study, and tests whether people in the same role see issues in 
comparable ways”. 
This matrix helped present and analyse relationships between an informant’s stance on an 
issue identified in stage 1 of the study, and their role, allowing for comparisons within a role 
and between roles.  According to Miles & Huberman (1994, p. 122), “a role is a complex of 
expectations and behaviours that make up what you do, and should do, as a certain actor in a 
setting”.   
The analysis then proceeded with search for patterns to identify: 
(a) to what extent did informants with similar roles, experiences, or organizations agree 
on issues involved; 
(b) to what extent their individual views varied based on their roles, experiences, or 
organizations.   
 
3.5. Case Companies and Sampling 
3.5.1. Organisations Participating in Research 
Two case companies proposed for this research are the author’s employer (Company A) and 




partnership in a joint corporate start-up accelerator between Company A and Company B.  As 
can be seen in Table 10 below, both companies have many similarities in terms of age, size, 
number of employees, financial performance, and market leadership.  Both companies have a 
history of bringing new products to new and existing markets through exploration 
organically, and an evidence of corporate innovation programs aimed at the development of 
new products.  It is unclear at this point whether ambidexterity is a deliberate strategy for 
these companies, and as described in section 2.2.3.2, strategy formation rarely is completely 
deliberate or emergent. 
 
Table 10. Companies participating in research. Source: Morningstar, n.d. 
Characteristic/Indicator Company A Company B 
Fortune 1000 Yes Yes 
Founded Late 80s Early 90s 
Focus Secure productivity 
solutions 
Open source software 
products  
Employees ~10,000 ~10,000 
Market Cap ~$12 billion ~25 billion 
5-year revenue average ~$3 billion ~$2 billion 
Gross Margin ~85% ~85% 
Operating Margin ~20% ~14% 
R&D Spend Ratio ~15% ~20% 
 
Both companies are consistently recognised as leaders in their respective markets by analysts 
such as Gartner and Forrester. 
It is important to clarify the reasoning for choosing two case companies.  The design is not 
that of replication of findings across the two companies.  The author recognized the challenge 
of finding participants with experience of leading both exploitative and exploratory projects 
in a single company.  Therefore, Company B was included in this study to ensure that a 
sufficient number of interviewees with relevant experiences could be sampled and a sufficient 





3.5.2. Sampling within the Case Companies 
3.5.2.1. Sampling for Stage 1 
Probability sampling, while most rigorous according to positivist researchers, would not be 
appropriate for most qualitative research (Ritchie et al., 2014) as it aims to aid with 
generalization from sample to population.  Purposive sampling is popular in qualitative 
research as it allows a researcher to gain the most insight, with its focus on participants with a 
particular background and expertise (Merriam, 1998).  This is particularly applicable to this 
research as perceptions of middle managers who led both exploitative and exploratory 
innovation projects are being explored.  Additionally, research aiming at analytic 
generalization (see section 3.3.2) is more appropriately supported by purposive sampling (see 
Denicolo et al., 2016). 
A typical purposive sample (Merriam, 1998) was used for this research, focusing on middle 
managers who were leading or have previously led both exploratory and exploitative 
innovation projects.  The sample was limited to managers in Product Management and 
Engineering functions, as managers in these functions are ultimately responsible for defining 
and releasing products in LHTCs (see section 2.3.1).  One of the key benefits of exploring the 
construing of managers is the ability to predict how managers will approach the future 
projects thanks to the anticipatory nature of construing (see section 2.5.5.1).  Therefore, it 
was not considered a hard requirement to have had the experience with the six projects (three 
exploitative, three exploratory) in the current company, but overall, experience with both type 
of projects was considered a hard requirement for participant selection.    
The first set of interviewees were identified as follows: in Company A the author has 
approached the individuals matching the profile described above, based on the author’s own 
interactions and observations from the last five years in Company A; in Company B the first 
introductions were made by the author’s contact from the executive leadership team, making 
sure that the participants match the same profile.   
Two groups of middle managers were identified to provide contrast between the various 
middle-management levels following the argument developed in section 2.6.1.  According to 
Mitrzberg (1989), middle managers are those who operate between the ‘strategic apex’ and 
the ‘operating core’ – stance that is supported by Huy (2001) and Harding (2014).  Therefore, 
the first group consisted of functional VPs and Senior Directors – those operating closer to 




the second group consisted of Directors, Sr. Managers, and Managers – those operating closer 
to the ‘operating core’ and overseeing the projects contributing to strategy implementation.  
For the remainder of this thesis, the former group will be labelled as ‘strategic group’ and the 
latter as ‘tactical group’. 
Purposive sampling is common for studies in the realm of ambidexterity (see Bonesso et al., 
2014; Lubatkin et al., 2006; Papachroni, 2013) and project success perceptions (see Agarwal 
& Rathod, 2006; Pankratz & Basten, 2014, 2017).   
According to Merriam (1998), the data collection continues until saturation occurs, that is, 
when no new insights are coming out of the interviews.  In the context of Repertory Grid 
technique and considering the content analysis that follows (see section 3.4.1.3), the 
saturation occurs when new constructs obtained do not change the proportion of constructs 
across the categories.   
While it may be impossible to set the sample size ahead of time in a purposive sampling 
scenario (Merriam, 1998), Ritchie et al. (2014) cite several authors recommending a range 
between 12 to 50 sample size.  According to Jankowicz (2004), with the constructivist 
approach utilizing the Repertory Grid Technique, what matters is the number of constructs 
solicited from interviewees for the purposes of content analysis, rather than the number of 
interviewees.  This is because the units of analysis are constructs.  He argues that an hour-
long interview may result in between 7 and 12 constructs, and that some 300 constructs may 
be required to achieve sufficient saturation for a comparison between the two groups.  This 
corroborates the suggestion by Tan & Hunter (2002) that a sample of 15 to 25 Repertory Grid 
interviews is typically enough to generate sufficient constructs. 
There are two compatible RGT-based studies worth mentioning with respect to sample size 
estimation.  Pankratz & Basten (2014) – the study my thesis is modelled after - relied on a 
purposive pooled sample of 11 participants across three companies to study the project 
managers’ construing on topic of project success.  Rojon et al. (2019) interviewed a 
purposive pooled sample of 25 participants from multiple companies to study a management 
phenomenon of conceptualization of workplace performance behaviours.  
As follows from the above, the author anticipated the range to be between 10 and 15 





3.5.2.2. Sampling for Stage 2 
As described in section 3.4.2, the goal of stage 2 of this study was to examine and elaborate 
findings of stage 1 with key informants.  According to Tremblay (1957), the key criterion for 
informant selection and eligibility to participate in the interviews is exposure to the kind of 
information being sought.  An empirical meta-analysis of 127 studies of triangulation 
applications by Homburg et al. (2012) indicates that the higher in the hierarchy the informant 
is, and the longer their tenure with the company, the higher the reliability, and in that sense 
the value, of their responses.  The criteria for identifying key informants was decided based 
on the nature of the finings as described in section 5.7.2, and in accordance with Homburg et 
al. (2012) suggestions, focused on strategic level managers (VPs and Senior Directors) with 
at least 2 years at the company.  
 
3.6. Ethical Considerations 
Social sciences research is unique in that the data is produced through interaction with the 
participants, and the knowledge is created as a result of that interaction (Patton, 2002; Ritchie 
et al. 2014).  This knowledge may depend on the cultural context, the researcher’s skills, the 
researcher’s agenda, and the participant’s agenda (Ritchie et al. 2014).  Ethical conduct is 
critical in social research to ensure participants well-being, through assurances of anonymity, 
confidentiality, voluntary participation, and statement of research objectives (Ritchie et al. 
2014).  
Throughout the research, the author has complied with the Heriot-Watt University Code of 
Conduct.  Additionally, the following measures were taken to ensure that participants were 
aware of their rights, and what was being done to guarantee the confidentiality and privacy of 
the information they provide. 
Prior to the interview, all participants were clearly informed about the nature of this research.  
At the beginning of the interview, several statements were made to ensure voluntary 
participation, and to ensure the participants of confidentiality and anonymity.  Participants 
were made aware that they could decline to respond to any particular question or withdraw 




Additionally, it was clearly stated that no responses were to be shared with the organisation, 
although some anonymised quotes may be presented in the final thesis to emphasise certain 
findings.  In no case would the responses be identifiable.   
The author is a Sr. Director of Product Management in Company A and has established 
himself as innovation leader through his role in the various innovation initiatives worldwide.  
It is not expected that the author’s reputation will impact the data collection process thanks to 
the nature of RGT technique as described in section 3.4.1 above.   
 
3.7. Summary 
This study was conducted under the phenomenological paradigm using constructivism as the 
underlying epistemology, chosen as the most appropriate to explore how middle managers 
construe the exploratory innovation projects and the approaches used to effectively manage 
these projects. 
Case study method was selected for this study, as it is most suited to answer questions like 
“How” and “Why”, and is recommended for exploration of complex issues, and situations 
where variables are not known.  A case study researcher can use various techniques and 
different data sources to validate results from multiple perspectives. 
An exploratory study has been conducted with the expectation of finding similarities in 
construing between middle managers at the same level, and differences in construing between 
middle managers at different levels.  Two case companies that the author has access to have 
participated in the study.  Both companies are multi-national, of a similar size, have similar 
financial indicators, leaders in their respective industries, exhibit ambidextrous behaviour, 
and have elements of corporate entrepreneurship.  Interview participants have been selected 
using purposive sampling.  These were middle managers from Product Management and 
Engineering functions, who led both exploitative and exploratory projects in the case 
companies.   
In stage 1 of the main study, the Repertory Grid Technique was used to elicit personal 
constructs of middle managers on the topic of exploitative and exploratory projects, in terms 
of what approaches (techniques and metrics), made it for successful outcome of these 
projects.  This technique helps prevent the researcher bias because it is focused on 




Multiple-grid analysis was conducted to analyse the results.  First a content analysis was 
done, where constructs were categorised, and frequency of each category recorded.  Then, 
Honey’s technique (see section 3.4) was applied to analyse constructs across the entire 
sample without sacrificing the idiosyncrasies of the individual grids. 
RGT’s reliance on a well-documented and rigorous data collection and analysis techniques 
contributed to the reliability of this study.   
A triangulation study was intended to be conducted as stage 2 of the main study, with the 
goal to confirm and explain the findings generated in stage 1. 
The author has complied with the university’s guidelines for ethical conduct to ensure the 
confidentiality and privacy of the case companies and participants, among other 





4. Pilot Study 
The previous chapter described the paradigm, method, techniques, and research design aimed 
at addressing the research questions.  This chapter provides an overview of the pilot study 
that took place prior to the main study to ensure that the research design as described in 
section 3.5 is viable, and to identify possible lines of investigation, pertaining to differences 
between the two groups (strategic and tactical).   
 
4.1. Aim and Objectives 
A pilot study helps a researcher to refine their ‘case study protocol’ (see Eisenhardt, 1989a), 
inform the main study design, gain an early insight into data to be collected, and practice 
techniques for data collection and analysis (Yin, 2017).   
The aim of this pilot study was to test the overall procedure and the applicability of RGT in 
answering the research questions.  Several objectives were set to achieve this aim: 
 to test access to managers in Company B, where the author relied heavily on 
introductions. 
 to practice the use of video conferencing software with screen sharing (Go To 
Meeting) for remote administration of Repertory Grid. 
 to estimate the average number of projects that interviewees were ready to produce as 
elements, and the number of exploratory projects they could come up with.  This 
would indicate the ‘range of convenience’ of their constructs as noted in section 3.4.1. 
 to estimate the average number of constructs that could be elicited in a one-hour 
interview.  This was used as a basis for estimating the target sample size to reach 
construct saturation (see section 3.6.2). 
 to gain an early insight into constructs elicited and evaluate the qualifying phrase (see 
section 3.4.1.2) for eliciting the relevant constructs.   
 to gain early insight into constructs elicited from managers from different levels. 
 to practice the content analysis, and to assess the implications for triangulation in 






To meet the objectives described above, four participants were selected: two from Company 
A and two from Company B.  In both companies the author approached two individuals that 
matched the profile described in section 3.6.2.  Two managers were from the ‘tactical group’, 
and two more from the ‘strategic group’. 
Ahead of the interview, managers were contacted over e-mail, which included an informed 




Data collection for all interviews followed the protocol described in section 3.4.1 to resemble 
the upcoming main study as much as possible.  Interviewees were told that their participation 
will help to lay the ground for the main study, and they will be asked to provide feedback at 
the end of the interview on both the overall procedure and the extent to which the meanings 
reflect how they feel about the topic at hand.   
The individual grids were analysed with Rep Plus software (Shaw & Gaines, 2018) to 
uncover %Similarity scores between the elements, and %Similarity scores between the 
constructs.  Rep Plus is a modelling tool that has been developed over several decades by 
multiple academic institutions and made available by Shaw and Gaines on servers located in 
several universities worldwide. 
A content analysis was performed across all four grids manually in accordance with the 
technique described in section 3.4.1.3.  Given the small number of constructs inherent in this 
pilot study design, no reliability check was done, and the results of analysis performed were 




Overall, all four participants provided a positive feedback about the process – steps leading to 




encountered the RGT technique before, and that it took one-two rounds of triadic elicitation 
for them to get used to the technique.  Several minor procedural adjustments were made to 
make it for a smoother administration during the main study, as described in section 4.5.1. 
Company B came through on their promise to the author prior to the start of the supervised 
stage and made introductions to interviewees matching the requested profile.   
Remote administration was tested with one of the interviewees using the GoToMeeting 
software.  Constructs elicited using this approach were deemed specific enough, as can be 
seen by comparing Appendix 1a and 1b.   
 
4.4.2. Elements 
Ahead of the interview the participants were asked to provide a list of projects: three-four 
exploitative and three-four exploratory.  In all cases the participants struggled to come up 
with more than a total of six projects, but all were able to generate a list of three exploratory 
projects (referred to as ‘Project A’, ‘Project B’ and ‘Project C’) and three exploitative 
projects (referred to as ‘Project D’, ‘Project E’ and ‘Project F’).  It should be noted that, while 
all were particular projects from each interviewee’s own prior experiences, they were not 
necessarily the same actual project for each interviewee. 
The notion of the ‘ideal exploitative’ and ‘ideal exploratory’ projects was well received, and 
all participants were able to rate them alongside the projects from their own list.  Using the 
ideal projects in the triadic elicitation (see section 3.4.1.2) was not as intuitive for 
participants, but participants who were asked to use the ‘ideal project’ in a triad were able to 
complete the task of naming a construct. 
With these finding in mind the implication to the main study is for each grid to consist of 
eight elements: three exploratory projects, three exploitative projects, one ideal exploratory 
project and one ideal exploitative project. 
 
4.4.3. Constructs 
A total of 46 constructs was generated in these four interviews, not including the supplied 




considering a start-up time and a wrap-up time of about five minutes each in a one-hour 
interview.  Two examples of a grid elicited in this study are shown in Appendix 1a and 1b. 
Each grid was typed into MS Excel and processed with Rep Plus software package to indicate 
similarities among elements and similarities between constructs.  The grids (originals and 
processed) were returned back to the participants, with indication of insights identified by the 
author.  Participants were asked to review the grids and the results for accuracy. 
 
4.4.3.1. Content Analysis 
All constructs were coded to 10 categories according to the process described in section 
3.4.1.3.   Results are presented in Tables 11 through 13, while the detailed constructs are 
listed in Appendix 2. 
 
Table 11. Pilot Study Content Coding – All Constructs 
Category Description f % 
Lean Startup 
Approaches 
Techniques typically used by teams to build products 




Techniques typically used by teams to make software 









Having metrics in place to track the progress of a 
project and measure its outcomes 
6 13.0 
Resourcing Whether resources on projects are dedicated or shared 4 8.7 
Executive 
Sponsorship 
Executive commitment and support for a project 3 6.5 
Collaboration Collaboration among stakeholders and across teams 3 6.5 
Team 
Location 
Distributed vs. co-located teams and stakeholders 2 4.4 
Project 
Uncertainty 





Team formation, composition and size 2 4.4 





Table 11 shows the general awareness of the importance of Lean and Agile approaches to 
product development (one third of the constructs are in those two categories), and relatively 
low awareness of importance of issues such as execute sponsorship and project uncertainty.  
Table 12. Pilot Study Content Coding – Strategic Level Only 
Category Description f % 
Lean Startup 
Approaches 
Techniques typically used by teams to build 
products that address customer needs 
7 30.4 
Agile Approaches Techniques typically used by teams to make 
software delivery more predictable  
5 21.7 
Tracking Success Having metrics in place to track the progress of a 




Executive commitment and support for a project 3 13.0 
Resourcing Whether resources on projects are dedicated or 
shared 
1 4.4 
Collaboration Collaboration among stakeholders and across 
teams 
1 4.4 
Team Location Distributed vs. co-located teams and stakeholders 1 4.4 
Project 
Uncertainty 
How clear is what needs to be built and how it 
needs to be achieved 
1 4.4 
Team Structure Team formation, composition and size 1 4.4 
Operational Focus Topics focused on day-to-day tactical team and 
task management 
0 0 
Total  23 100 
 
Table 12 shows recognition of the strategic group that Lean and Agile approaches are critical 
to project success (over half the constricts are in these two categories).  This group 
recognized the importance of tracking success but did not see managing uncertainty as an 








Table 13. Pilot Study Content Coding – Tactical Level Only 
Category Description f % 
Operational Focus Topics focused on day-to-day tactical team and 
task management 
7 30.4 
Agile Approaches Techniques typically used by teams to make 
software delivery more predictable  
3 13.0 
Tracking Success Having metrics in place to track the progress of a 
project and measure its outcomes 
3 13.0 
Resourcing Whether resources on projects are dedicated or 
shared 
3 13.0 





Techniques typically used by teams to build 
products that address customer needs 
2 8.7 
Team Location Distributed vs. co-located teams and stakeholders 1 4.4 
Project 
Uncertainty 
How clear is what needs to be built and how it 
needs to be achieved 
1 4.4 
Team Structure Team formation, composition and size 1 4.4 
Executive 
Sponsorship 
Executive commitment and support for a project 0 0 
Total  23 100 
 
Table 13 shows heavy emphasis of the tactical group on operational focus and Agile 
approaches (almost half the constructs are categorised here), while low emphasis is seen on 
topics such as Project Uncertainty and no mention of Executive Sponsorship. 
 
4.4.3.2. Implications from the Pilot Data 
While four respondents are an insufficient number from which to draw conclusions, this set 
of interviews has hinted at a possibility of difference in type of constructs received from 
managers in different level groups.  As Table 12 shows, managers in the strategic group 
tended to give higher importance to Lean and Agile approaches than managers in the tactical 
group.  As Table 13 shows, the tactical group did not recognise the importance of executive 




Also, the tactical group did not give as high importance to the Lean Startup approaches as did 
the strategic group.  The importance of tracking a project success – having metrics in place – 
was equally recognized by both management groups – strategic and tactical.  Both groups 
gave low attention to the project uncertainty, which may indicate the inability to recognize 
the highly uncertain environment managers find themselves in the context of exploratory 
projects.  In turn this may lead to suboptimal choices of techniques and metrics for these 
projects.   
 
4.5. Conclusions and Implications for the Main Study 
Overall, the pilot study has succeeded in achieving its aim and objectives.  It has informed the 
main study design, with the key decisions listed below. 
 
4.5.1. Procedural Outcomes 
1. Grid administration.  Following adjustments were made to make it for a smoother 
administration in the main study: 
a. In the beginning of the interview the researcher is to explain the notion of 
constructs, giving several examples to the participant.  This will help set the 
expectation early on about the kind of data to be expected from the interview. 
b. Set an expectation with the participant that the first few elicitations may feel 
unfamiliar, and that typically after 2-3 triadic elicitations the interview will 
flow much smoother.  This will help put the participant at ease and avoid 
stress early in the interview process.   
2. Remote Administration.  Since the constructs elicited in a GoToMeeting session 
were detailed enough (similar to the level of detail elicited during an in-person 
interview) and both the author and interviewee did not run into any difficulties, it was 
decided to use this approach as a viable option in situations where travel for a face-to-
face interview was not possible.   
3. Elements.  It was decided to ask each participant to provide six elements: three 
exploratory and three exploitative.  Two ‘ideal’ elements (exploratory and 




4. Sample size.  With 11 constructs per person and the estimated target of about 300 
constructs to achieve saturation, it was expected that the target sample will consist of 
30 participants across both companies, equally divided between the Strategic and 
Tactical groups.   
5. Groupings.  Since the division into these two sub-groups has proven useful, it was 
decided to proceed with additional sub-groups mentioned in section 2.6.2: Product 
Management vs. Engineering, and Company A vs. Company B.  Additionally, a 
dimension of experience became of interest to the author during the pilot study data 
analysis, and it was decided to compare construing between the two sub-groups: 
“More experience with exploratory innovation projects” vs.  “More experience with 
exploitative innovation projects”.  In the beginning of an interview, the respondents 
would have been asked to choose which group they belong to. 
6. Implications for the second stage of main study.  As indicated by the preliminary 
analysis of the pilot study data, the researcher expects to find differences in how 
managers from different groups (strategic and tactical) think about exploratory 
projects in stage one of the study (e.g with respect to topics like executive sponsorship 
and Lean/Agile approaches).  Stage two of the study will seek confirmation and 
explanation of these differences using the triangulation technique described in section 
3.4.2. 
 
4.5.2. Belief Statement for Further Exploration 
As became evident from the literature synthesis (see section 2.6), the choice of exploration-
appropriate approaches and alignment on goals and outcome-based metrics is critical for 
exploratory project success.  That alignment is hard to achieve in part due to the principal-
agent problem (see sections 2.3.4.3 and 2.3.4.4), and because managers at different levels 
have different perspectives on the business environment and project success. 
As suggested by the literature synthesis, the pilot study has hinted that managers in the 
tactical group give importance to different issues than managers in the strategic group (see 
section 4.4.3.1).  For example, managers from the tactical group may not recognize the value 
of executive commitment to the success of an exploratory project or may not give as high 




Therefore, it is sensible to formulate the following tentative belief statement:  
"Managers at the strategic level construe exploratory innovation projects differently from 
managers at the tactical level". 
As a software product management practitioner, the author has observed that managers at 
tactical levels may give importance to a different set of outcomes than managers at the 
strategic level and may expect different approaches to be applied to these projects.   
The research question and the objectives laid out in section 2.6.2 are positioned to investigate 





5. Main Study 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter describes findings from stage one and stage two of the main study following the 
methods and techniques presented and discussed in chapter 3.  It is organized in a way that 
helps test the belief statement offered in section 4.5.2 and answer the main and supporting 
research questions presented in section 2.6.2. 
First, the sample overview is given, and the various groups of respondents are discussed.  
Then, the analysis of the data collected in the first stage of the main study is presented in the 
following sequence: 
1. Constructs are analysed to answer the main research question and test the belief 
statement. 
2. Elements are analysed to answer the supporting question. 
The second stage of the main study follows with Key Informant Interviews as the technique 
used for triangulation.  The chapter concludes with the synthesis of findings and analysis 
from both stages of the main study.   
 
5.2. Sample and Groups 
The data was collected from both companies (Company A and Company B) following the 
procedure described in chapter 3.  Since the main research question focused on the difference 
in construing between the strategic and tactical levels in an organization, an attempt was 
made to interview similar number of managers from each of these levels.  Additionally, as 
described in section 3.5.2, a comparison of construing between managers from Product 
Management and Engineering functions was of interest, and so an attempt was made to 
interview a similar number of managers from each of these functions.  While Company B 
was included in this research mainly to provide a sufficient number of constructs (see section 
3.5.1 and compatible studies by Pankratz & Basten (2014) and Rojon et al. (2019)), 
inevitably, with two case companies participating in this research the question of comparison 
in construing between managers of these two companies would become of interest, and so an 
attempt was made to interview similar number of managers in each company.  As described 




with leading at least six projects of both types: three exploratory and three exploitative.  This 
has limited the number of possible respondents from each company, yet as can be seen from 
the Table 14 below, the author was able to come close to the objective of interviewing a 
similar number of participants from each of the various groups.  
Table 14 compares the number of participants in each group between the case companies, and 
Appendix 3 provides an additional level of detail, listing the makeup of each group as well as 
the number of constructs elicited from each group and sub-group.  
 
Table 14. Summary sampling structure by company and group  
  Company A Company B % of All 
Respondents 































































While the author was able to interview a similar number of respondents from each company 
(52% from Company A, 48% from Company B), the author faced a significant difficulty 




Company B, 58.3% - from Company A).  This is mainly due to the fact that the author was 
not known to participants from Company B and therefore it was harder to get senior level 
managers to commit their time.  Additionally, only one VP-level manager from company B 
participated in the research, as compared to five VP-level managers from Company A.  
Overall, the strategic level respondents accounted for 48% of all respondents and the tactical 
level respondents for 52%.   
Respondents from the Product Management function accounted for 48% of all respondents, 
and Engineering for 52%.  The author faced some challenges recruiting managers from the 
Product Management function in Company B, which resulted in 58.3% of Product 
Management managers from Company A, and 41.7% from Company B. 
As described in section 4.5.1, the remote administration of the RGT was deemed successful 
during the pilot study, and it was extensively utilized during the main study.   
Table 15. Data Collection Approach Details 
Approach Number of Constructs Interview Length (min) 
In Person                Total 





Remote                    Total 





Overall                    Total 






While in Company A the author had more opportunity to interview in-person, the majority of 
participants from Company B were interviewed remotely.  No difficulties were encountered 
in the remote sessions.  As illustrated in Table 15 above, these resulted in an average of 11.6 
constructs elicited per person.  As a comparison, on average, in-person interviews resulted in 
12.8 constructs elicited per person.  The average time spent in a remote session was 47.7 







5.3. Construct Analysis 
5.3.1. Content Analysis Procedure 
A total of 307 constructs was collected from 25 respondents in both companies.  As discussed 
in section 3.5.2 the goal was to reach approximately 300 constructs.  A content analysis was 
performed in accordance with the procedure outlined in section 3.4.1.3.  Figure 10 below 
shows the process of coding that is described in this section.   
 
Figure 10.  Content Coding Workshop 
 
Appendix 4 provides details of all constructs verbatim.  Each construct is accompanied by 
two scores: the %Similarity score and H-I-L index.  As described in section 3.4.1.3, these 
values preserve the idiosyncrasies of individual responses as the constructs are presented in 
the context of the entire sample.    
 
5.3.2. First Attempt at Categorization 
The researcher categorized the 307 collected constructs into 24 distinct categories (see Table 
16 below).  A colleague who has been trained in the coding procedure in advance by the 
researcher was asked to assist for the purposes of reliability check.  The colleague’s coding 





Table 16. Content Coding – First Attempt  
Researcher Colleague 
Category f % Category f % 
Funding 5 1.6 Well Resourced 6 2.0 
Partner & Community 
Involvement 
6 2.0 Partner Engagement 7 2.3 
Organisational Alignment 12 3.9 Strategic Alignment 6 2.0 
Executive Sponsorship 9 2.9 Executive Support 9 2.9 
Leadership 9 2.9 Project Leader / Hero 
Reliance 
6 2.0 
Clarity of Vision 25 8.1 Clear Vision and Goals 21 6.8 
Methodologies 20 6.5 Agile / Waterfall 27 8.8 
Data Driven Decision Making 12 3.9 Data Visibility 9 2.9 
Clarity of Objectives and 
Outcomes 
24 7.8 Clear Success Metrics 16 5.2 
Customer Feedback 10 3.3 Customer Engagement / 
Empathy 
17 5.5 
Motivation & Incentives 9 2.9 Team motivation and 
incentives 
6 2.0 
Market Orientation 9 2.9 Established Market 
Alignment 
16 5.2 
Dependency Management 11 3.6 Dependencies 21 6.8 
Technology 10 3.3 Technology Considerations 18 5.8 
Risk Reduction 9 2.9 Risk Avoidance 11 3.6 
Metrics 20 6.5 Revenue Based Metrics 10 3.3 
Team Skills & Structure 32 10.4 Team Structure & 
Organization 
22 7.2 
Scope Management 3 1.0    
User Experience Focus 6 2.0    
New Market Orientation 9 2.9    
Delivery Cadence 12 3.9    
Software Development 
Practices 
11 3.6    
Requirements Source 20 6.5    
Misc 14 4.6    
   Team Size 9 2.9 
   Co-Located Resources 6 2.0 
   Ability to Execute 8 2.6 
   Market Understanding and 
Expertise 
15 4.9 
   Hard Deadlines 5 1.6 
   Scope 4 1.3 
   Validation Methods 5 1.6 
   Autonomy vs. 
Micromanagement 
8 2.6 
   Stakeholder Considerations 5 1.6 
   Business Case / Model 
Considerations 
6 2.0 
   Misc 8 2.6 





Appendix 5 shows the results of reliability analysis for this round.   
As can be seen here, this resulted in %Agreement of 46.2% on constructs in the agreed upon 
17 categories, which is an unacceptably low degree of agreement.  The reliability was 
reduced further by the fact that only 236 constructs out of 307 were captured by the agreed 
upon categories.  As a result, a negotiation on category meaning and another coding attempt 
was required.   
 
5.3.3. Intermediate Categorization 
Before the second attempt at coding, the researcher and colleague compared the categories, 
and discussed their meanings   As a result, new categories were created, and category 
meanings were agreed upon.  At the end of the second coding round, the researcher coded all 


















Table 17. Intermediate Categories 
Researcher Colleague 
Category f % Category f % 
Funding 5 1.6 Well Resourced 5 1.6 






Customer Engagement 19 
6.2 
Customer Engagement / 
Empathy 17 5.5 
Organisational Alignment 6 2.0 Strategic Alignment 6 2.0 
Stakeholder Considerations 9 2.9 Stakeholder Considerations 9 2.9 
Executive Sponsorship 8 2.6 Executive Support 7 2.3 
Leadership 9 
2.9 
Project Leader / Hero 
Reliance 6 2.0 
Clarity of Vision 14 4.6 Clear Vision  13 4.2 




Outcomes and Goals 
17 5.5 
Agile / Waterfall 30 9.8 Agile / Waterfall 30 9.4 
Data Driven Decision Making 10 3.3 Data Visibility 9 2.9 
Market Alignment 16 
5.2 
Established Market 
Alignment 14 4.6 
Motivation & Incentives 8 
2.6 
Team motivation and 
incentives 7 2.3 
Team Organization 22 
7.2 
Team Structure & 
Organization 28 7.2 
Team Size 8 2.6 Team Size 9 2.6 
Co-Location 6 2.0 Co-Located Resources 6 2.0 
Ability to execute 8 2.6 Ability to execute 9 2.6 
Dependency Management 10 3.3 Dependencies 14 3.3 






Practices 6 2.0 
Risk Reduction 10 3.3 Risk Avoidance 11 3.3 




Design Team Involvement 
3 1.0 




Market Understanding & 
Expertise 14 4.6 




Management 8 1.6 
Schedule Considerations 5 1.6 Hard Deadlines 5 1.6 
Metrics focused on Revenue 8 2.6 Revenue Based Metrics 9 2.6 
Clarity of Metrics 9 2.9 Clear Success Metrics 9 2.3 




Business Case / Model 
Considerations 8 2.3 
Scope Management 5 1.6 Misc 6 1.0 
Misc 4 1.3    
Total 307 100  307 100 
 




This attempt resulted in %Agreement of 93.7%.  While this is a respectable level of 
agreement, upon closer review of the resulting categories several opportunities for combining 
categories were identified as described in the next section. 
 
5.3.4. Definitive Categorization 
According to Miles et al. (2019), ‘Second Cycle’ coding is a technique used to identify 
patterns in a list of categories from the ‘First Cycle’ coding (see section 3.4.1.3) and combine 
them into a smaller list of categories with bigger picture meanings.  The researcher’s and 
colleague’s view as practitioners was used to make the final decision on which categories are 
to be combined, and what broader meaning the combined categories have.  This resulted in a 
total of 15 categories as presented in Table 18 below. 
Two examples below demonstrate the reasoning used in combining the categories.   
 
Example 1 – Combining ‘Risk Management’ with ‘Agile/Waterfall’ under the 
‘Methodologies’ category  
One of the main premises of Agile methodology (see Glossary) is raising visibility of project 
risk, and then actively reducing that risk through early experimentation, implementing an 
engineering proof of concept, or performing a time-boxed research activity.  The following 
are examples of constructs under the ‘Risk Management’ category that exemplify this point: 
Risks were visible and transparent Risks were not visible 
Involved prototyping (POC) to reduce 
feasibility risk 
Prototyping was not required as risk was low 
Agile spikes were needed to reduce 
uncertainty 
Spikes were not needed as there was less 
uncertainty 
Significant number of interviews to 
address major unknowns 
Small number of interviews to validate some 
assumptions with some unknowns 
Heavy experimentation & technology 
investigation 







Example 2 – Combining ‘Market Understanding and Expertise’ with ‘Market 
Alignment’ under the ‘Market Focus’ category  
To successfully deliver a product to market, a company needs to understand that market in 
terms of its needs (what problems need to be solved, who are competitors in this market, how 
do customers solve the problem today, etc).  That understanding is also required to develop 
an effective ‘go to market’ plan, and enable the sales force and partners, so they become 
effective at selling, deploying, and maintaining the product.  Following are examples of 
constructs under both categories: 
Aligned with existing routes to market No alignment with existing routes to market 
Focused on new personas Focused on personas we knew well 
Follow existing Go To Market motion Changing the Go To Market Approach 
Had a big legacy market to deal with Started fresh with a new customer base 
A clear vision about what market we are 
going after 
Less clarity about target market 
The target user was well known The context for the product use was less 
known 
Thorough market analysis was done No market analysis 
Solution that addresses a market need Solution has no target market, done for the 
sake of being done 
 
The constructs in this final list of categories were reviewed to ensure that the broader 
meaning of each resulting category made sense for these constructs.  Appendix 8 provides 
more detail on constructs included in each resulting (and henceforth – definitive) category.  
Column f indicates the overall frequency of constructs in a category, f(H) indicates the 
frequency of ‘high importance’ constructs (those with H-I-L index of H), f(H)% indicates the 
percentage of high importance constructs in that category (as described in section 3.4.1.3, the 
H-I-L index indicates whether the %Similarity score is placed high (H), intermediate (I), or 













Table 18. Definitive Categories 




Includes f f(H) f(H)% 






Considerations about the 
software development 
methodology used for 
project execution (Agile vs. 
Waterfall), cadence of 
releases, response to 
change, risk reduction 


















Considerations about the 
team structure and 
organization around a 
project,  team size, co-
location, and dependencies 












Business Case / 
Model 
Considerations 
Factors involved in 
understanding the customer 
behaviour, engaging with 
customers and partners, 
and whether these 











The extent to which the 
leadership team of the 
project understands the 
market the product is being 
developed for; how well is 
the project aligned with the 







Metrics Clarity of Metrics, 
Metrics focused on 
Revenue 
Presence of metrics, ability 













Importance of having clear 
objectives and outcomes 












The extent to which the 
product in development is 
aligned with the rest of the 
organization and its 
strategy, had alignment and 












Clarity of Vision How clear is the overall 












The extent to which the 
teams were motivated, 
incentivized, and 
empowered to make 











Considerations about the 
technology and architecture 












Ability to track product 
health and usage and make 












The extent to which the 
project had budget 









Strong Leadership Importance of having 
strong leadership on the 
project.  It may come from 
above or from within the 









Ability to Execute How well is the team 
positioned to execute on 
the project, with respect to 











Importance of having an 


















Appendix 7 shows the results of reliability analysis for this round.   
This attempt resulted in %Agreement of 92.5%.  As described in section 3.4.1.3, for more 
robust measure of reliability, two additional indices are typically used to assess the reliability 
of agreement between the researchers, as they account for chance agreement between the 
researchers.  In this final codding attempt, these indices were as follows: Cohen’s Kappa of 




Landis & Koch (1977) were the first to suggest a benchmark based on Cohen’s Kappa.  
According to them, an agreement of 0.61 to 0.8 is considered ‘substantial’, and an agreement 
above 0.81 is considered ‘almost perfect’ (Landis & Koch, 1977, p. 165).  According to 
Jankowicz (2004), the benchmarks to aim for are %Agreement of 90%, Cohen’s Kappa or 
Perreault-Leigh Index of at least 80%, with a common target of 0.90 for a typical Repertory 
Grid analysis for these two indices.  And so, the resulting agreement of this round was 
deemed acceptably reliable, and hence sufficient to complete the analysis.  
 
5.4. Construct Analysis Results 
5.4.1. Category Analysis 
The following is the summary of the categories, their description and characteristics.  Each 
category description mentions the percentage of high importance constructs in the overall 
number of constructs in that category.  The intent is to show the proportion of all constructs 
that interviewees found more closely aligned (and therefore more important to achieving the 
project success) with the ‘summary construct’ (see section 3.4.1.2) supplied at the beginning 
of the interview.   
Methodologies 
The ‘Methodologies’ category includes considerations about the software development 
methodology used for project execution.  Constructs in this category may refer to 
methodologies such as Agile, Lean, or Waterfall (see Glossary) directly, or they may imply a 
use of one of these methodologies by referencing cadence of releases, the way the team 
responded to change, what risk reduction methods were employed, or type of software 
development practices used.  This category has the highest frequency of constructs (overall 
and high importance constructs), with high importance constructs contributing to 45.5% of 
the total constructs (see the right-most column in Table 18).  Below are examples of high 







Agile methodology used for 
development 
More traditional / waterfall methodology 
Multi-staged overengineered discovery Lean, prototype-driven discovery 
Get to a shippable increment/MVP as 
soon as possible to have people 
experience the product 
Wait too long to ship 
Had a clear understanding of risk Risks were not clearly identified 
Requirements scope has changed often Minor alterations to scope 
Good ‘definition of done’ No good ‘definition of done’ 
 
Quotes below were captured during the Repertory Grid interviews, and are relevant to 
constructs in the Methodology category: 
“Agile is not suited for charting new territories" (respondent ASEX-7). 
“By adding Sales, Marketing, and Support to the daily SCRUM, customer stories were shared 
constantly, developers became more engaged and customer focused" (respondent ATPI-11). 
Constructs in this category that relate to risk management, are closely aligned with Agile 
practices, as mentioned above.  While there are only 10 constructs related to risk reduction, 
these come from 9 different individuals – more than a third of the sample.   
Team Organization 
This is the second highest frequency category, with high importance constructs contributing 
to 30.6% of the constructs.  This category includes considerations about the team structure 
and organization around a project.   It includes topics such as team size, co-location, shared 
vs. dedicated resources, involvement and engagement of different functions such as Product 
Management and UX Design, and dependencies on other teams.  Below are examples of high 
importance constructs from this category: 
 
Well defined responsibilities for each 
member of the team 
Responsibilities loosely defined or 
undefined 
Project coordination was more complex Project coordination was less complex 
Clarity of roles and responsibilities Lack of clarity of roles and 
responsibilities 
High degree of focus, small co-located 
team 
Globally distributed team, personnel 
issues, communications overhead 
Product managers not co-located with 
Engineering 







The ‘Customer Focus’ category includes factors involved in understanding customer 
behaviour, engaging with customers and partners, and whether these interactions drove the 
product direction as opposed to the internally driven projects based on the product leadership 
team’s vision.  High importance constructs contribute to 18.9% of the constructs.  Below are 
examples of high importance constructs from this category: 
Customer partnership and commitment 
from day 0 (customer got stock) 
Solution developed in-house then looked for a 
market 
Requirements driven by customer 
validation 
Requirements are not driven by customer 
validation 
Customer-driven input early in the project Customer input/validation before shipping 
In person customer discovery Aggregate customer data 
 
The quote below was captured during the Repertory Grid interviews, and is relevant to 
constructs in the Customer Focus category: 
"Important to have community engagement (in the context of Open Source software) as it 
leads to traction and feedback and helps develop at scale through community contributions" 
(respondent BSEX-1). 
It is surprising to see that only four respondents mentioned validation approaches focused on 
getting fast customer feedback.  This will be discussed further in Chapter 6.   
Market Focus 
This category includes considerations related to the extent to which the leadership team of a 
project understands the market the product is being developed for and how well the project is 
aligned with the market needs, and with the go-to-market motion.  High importance 
constructs contribute to 30% of the constructs.  Below are examples of high importance 
constructs from this category: 
Aligned with existing routes to market No alignment with existing routes to market 
Had a good go to market plan and 
execution 
Poor go to market plan and execution 
Solving high impact and high urgency 
(time to market) problems for the business 
The problem was not as urgent or as impactful 
Had a good understanding of the target 
market 






This category focuses on presence of metrics of various kind and the ability to track success.  
High importance constructs contribute to 29.4% of the constructs.  Below are examples of 
high importance constructs from this category: 
High focus on revenue and sales Low focus on revenue or sales 
More rigorous in defining and tracking 
KPIs 
Less rigorous in defining and tracking KPIs 
Success measured as an impact on the 
target market  
No significant impact on target market 
Had team efficiency/productivity metrics 
in place 
Team productivity was not measured 
 
Quote below was captured during the Repertory Grid interviews, and is relevant to constructs 
in the Metrics category: 
“For exploratory projects the value of the financial KPIs is higher than for exploratory 
projects, because the ROI needs to be clearly shown to justify the investment” (respondent 
ASPX-2). 
With only 17 constructs in this category, these came from a total of 13 respondents – just 
over 50% of all respondents. 
The most surprising finding as it relates to this category, is the fact that only 3 out of 17 
constructs mention non-revenue-based metrics - metrics focused on traction/usage.  This will 
be discussed further in Chapter 6.    
Clarity of Objectives and Outcomes 
This category includes considerations related to the importance of having clear objectives and 
outcomes for the project.  Unlike the ‘Clarity of Vision’ category, here the focus is on project 
outcomes rather than the strategic vision.  High importance constructs contribute to 52.9% of 
the constructs.  Below are examples of high importance constructs from this category: 
Had clear objectives and clear leadership Lack of solid objectives and good leadership 
Success criteria was known to all Success criteria was not clear 
Starting out with well-defined milestones Starting out with no or ill-defined milestones 







While this category is seventh in terms of the construct frequency (15 constructs, 4.9% of all 
constructs) it has the highest percentage of high importance constructs (66.7%), indicating 
that the issue of organizational alignment is very important (to those specific interviewees 
who mention it) to achieve a successful project outcome.  This category includes 
considerations about the extent to which the product in development is aligned with the rest 
of the organization and its strategy, as well as the extent to which there was an alignment and 
buy-in from external and internal stakeholders.  Below are examples of high importance 
constructs from this category: 
Strategic alignment led to success Strategic misalignment led to failure of a 
project 
Alignment with strategic goals No alignment with strategic goals 
Alignment across various functions in the 
company 
Siloed functions, no alignment across 
company 
Diverse set of stakeholders aligned and 
partnered to achieve goals 
Stakeholders were not aligned on mutual 
goals 
 
Quote below was captured during the Repertory Grid interviews, and is relevant to constructs 
in this category: 
“I observed this a lot in my career: you have a cool idea, but the company is not behind it. 
Working on something nobody cares about” (respondent BSEX-1). 
“I was able to kill projects that didn't align with the strategy” (respondent ATPI-3). 
Clarity of Vision 
This category focuses on clarity of the overall vision, mission, and strategic direction.  High 
importance constructs contribute to 52.9% of the constructs in this category.  Below are 
examples of high importance constructs from this category: 
Had a shared vision of what we are trying 
to accomplish 
Did not have a shared vision 
Vision, requirements, target audience were 
clear 
Vision, requirements, target audience were 
NOT clear 
Had clear business problems to be solved Open scope, no boundaries, business problem 
too broad 





Motivation and Empowerment 
This category focuses on the extent to which the teams were motivated, incentivized, and 
empowered to make decisions and execute on the project.  High importance constructs 
contribute to 38.5% of the constructs in this category.  Below are examples of high 
importance constructs from this category: 
Team motivated to drive project to 
successful outcome 
Unmotivated, burnt-out team members 
Right compensation and incentives for the 
team 
Underpaid, no rewards for success 
Sales teams were incentivised to sell Sales teams were not incentivised to sell 
Lowest level engineers knew the short-
term goals and were empowered to make 
decisions 
Engineers were not able to make decisions 
due to lack of empowerment or knowledge 
 
Technology Considerations 
This category includes considerations about the technology and architecture of the product 
being developed.  High importance constructs contribute to 18.2% of the constructs in this 
category.  Below are examples of high importance constructs from this category: 
Solved only one technical problem Needed to solve a myriad of technical 
problems 
Fully expected to build entirely in house Fully expected to buy technology or product 
 
Data Driven Decision Making 
This category includes constructs concerning the ability to track product health and usage and 
make decisions based on that data.  High importance constructs contribute to 50% of the 
constructs in this category.  Below are examples of high importance constructs from this 
category: 
No telemetry to measure usage Good usage telemetry 
Full usability into the usage data No visibility into usage data 
Multiple indicators of usage Few indicators of usage 







This category includes considerations about the extent to which the project had budget 
available and deadlines imposed.  High importance constructs contribute to 30% of the 
constructs in this category.  Below are examples of high importance constructs from this 
category: 
Well-funded with resources Not well funded 
Predictable delivery based on past 
performance 
Imposed deadlines 
Projects had a realistic deadline The deadline was not realistic 
 
Strong Leadership 
This category focuses on the importance of having strong leadership on the project.  It may 
come from above or from within the team, it can be business or technical.  High importance 
constructs contribute to 66.7% of the constructs in this category, making it the second 
category with that high proportion.  Below are examples of high importance constructs from 
this category: 
Unity of command, one goal, one person 
in charge of that goal 
Diffused command – multiple people, 
multiple goals 
Had a strong champion to drive the project 
forward, involved in day to day 
Did not have a strong champion 
Driven by a passionate engineer PM driven requirements without clear 
purpose 
Had a benevolent dictator at the helm Had a committee in charge 
 
Ability to Execute 
Constructs in this category focus on how well the team is positioned to execute on the 
project, with respect to the skills, resources, and maturity.  High importance constructs 
contribute to 62.5% of the constructs in this category.  Below are examples of high 
importance constructs from this category: 
Teams with a complete skill set (had skill 
diversity) 
Homogenic skills, no diversity 
Appropriate resources (right skills, 
adequate number of resources) 
Resources not appropriate for the project 







Constructs in this category focus on  the importance of having an executive commitment, at 
times in the form of a clear sponsor on a project.  High importance constructs contribute to 
25% of the constructs in this category.  Below are examples of high importance constructs 
from this category: 
Had a strong executive commitment Marginal executive support 
Had executive buy in Did not have executive buy in 
 
5.4.2. Category Analysis Summary 
15 categories have been reviewed in depth, with the frequency of constructs in each, and the 
examples of high importance constructs in each category.  The three highest frequency 
categories are ‘Methodologies’, with 55 constructs (17.9%), followed by ‘Team 
Organization’, with 49 constructs (16.0%), and ‘Customer Focus’, with 37 constructs 
(12.1%); between them, these account for almost half, 46%, of all the constructs. 
The ‘Methodologies’ category is not only the one with the highest frequency of constructs 
(17.9%), but also the one with the highest percentage of high importance constructs (45.5%) 
among the top 3 categories; in other words, not only is it important in terms of frequency 
across the sample, but it is important in terms of individual importance (in other words, for 
those who mentioned it, it really matters). 
As mentioned in section 5.4.1 above, several findings were somewhat surprising based on the 
literature review and the practitioner’s expectations.  These findings are briefly mentioned 
here and will be discussed in Chapter 6: 
1. Constructs related to risk reduction represent only 3.3% of all constructs but were 
mentioned by 9 different individuals. 
2. While the topic of metrics was mentioned by 13 respondents, there were only 3 
constructs that mentioned user traction metrics – these being key to exploratory 
project measurement.   
3. One area seems not to be well represented in the sample of constructs – 
experimentation, which is key to successful development of exploratory innovation 
projects.  This is related to the fact that only four respondents mentioned validation 




could be somewhat mapped to approaches related to Lean Startup – most appearing 
under the ‘Methodologies’ category.  This can possibly indicate a low level of 
familiarity with the Lean Startup approaches or lack of knowledge about how to apply 
those approaches in practice.  These findings will be further explored in key informant 
interviews (see section 5.7).   
 
5.4.3. Analysis of Sub-Groups 
This section will describe the differential analysis (see section 3.4.1.3) of how sub-groups of 
respondents (see Table 14 for a reminder of the sampling structure) construe certain issues 
represented by categories of meaning.   
There are four groups that will be compared: Company (Company A vs. Company B), Level 
(Strategic vs. Tactical), Function (Product Management vs. Engineering), and Experience 
(More experience with Exploratory projects vs. More experience with Exploitative projects).  
The ‘Level’ group is of most interest to answer the main research question (see section 2.6.2) 
and test the associated belief statement (see section 4.5.2).    
Each group analysis starts with a table with the relevant differential analysis based on the 15 
categories (setting aside the ‘Miscellaneous’ category).  Appendix 10 can be referenced for 
the additional level of details.  Once the analysis is completed based on the 15 categories, an 
additional insight is sought by looking back at the intermediate categories: categories with 
statistically significant differences are presented in a table, with the detailed significance 
values being shown in Appendix 11. 
 
5.4.3.1. Stance Towards Statistical Tests 
The analysis will focus on comparing two proportions in a sample, therefore allowing for a 
two-tailed z-statistic test at 95% level of confidence, unless stated otherwise.  It should be 
noted, that z-test is not used here for hypothesis testing in order to generalize to a population 
(as would be more appropriate in positivist research), but merely as an indication of where 
the results are worth noting.  Therefore, without wishing to overgeneralize when it comes to 
issues of statistical significance, in the discussion that follows attention is drawn to categories 




5.4.3.2. The ‘Company’ Group Analysis 
As described in section 3.5.1, there was no intent to design a comparator case study, and the 
main reason for having two case companies in this study was to collect a sufficient number of 
constructs.  As described in section 5.2 above, the data collection resulted in 13 interviewees 
from company A with a total of 166 constructs, and 12 interviewees from Company B with a 
total of 141 constructs. 
Table 19. The ‘Company’ group – differential analysis 
(*indicates z significant at <0.05 and >0.01 level; ** indicates z significant at <= 0.01) 
  
Company 
Category A B z(n) 
n H f(H) n H f(H) 
Methodologies 36 
(22%) 
18 50% 19 
(13%) 
7 37% 1.87 
Team Organization 23 
(14%) 
11 48% 26 
(18%) 
4 15% -1.09 
Customer Focus 24 
(14%) 
5 21% 13 
(9%) 
2 15% 1.40 
Market Focus 8 
(5%) 
3 38% 22 
(16%) 
6 27% -3.17** 
Metrics 13 
(8%) 
4 31% 4 
(3%) 






3 50% 11 
(8%) 





7 78% 6 
(4%) 
3 50% 0.47 
Clarity of Vision 7 
(4%) 
4 57% 7 
(5%) 





2 33% 7 
(5%) 





1 20% 6 
(4%) 





4 44% 1 
(1%) 
1 100% 2.32* 
Project Constraints 7 
(4%) 
3 43% 3 
(2% 
0  0% 1.03 
Strong Leadership 6 
(4%) 
4 67% 3 
(2%) 
2 67% 0.77 
Ability to Execute 4 
(2%) 
1 25% 4 
(3%) 





0 0% 6 
(4%) 
2 33% -1.67 
Misc 1 
(1%) 
0 0% 3 
(2%) 
0  0% -1.17 





As can be observed from Table 19 above, there are several differences in how managers in 
the two case companies construe what makes for effective management of projects towards a 
successful outcome.  Managers from Company A gave significantly higher importance to 
issues of ‘Data Driven Decision Making’ (z=2.32), while managers from Company B gave 
significantly higher importance to ‘Market Focus’ (z=-3.17).  
The difference in ‘Market Focus’ can be explained by the fact that the developer community 
and partnerships play key role in Company B which operates based on the Open Source 
business model. 
Several additional differences can be observed, albeit significant only at 90% level of 
confidence. Managers from Company A gave higher importance to issues of ‘Methodologies’ 
(z=1.87) and ‘Metrics’ (z=1.91), while managers from Company B gave higher importance to 
‘Executive Sponsorship’ (z=-1.67). 
Honey’s technique (see section 3.4.1.3) offers additional insight into these findings.  As can 
be seen from this table, the proportion of high importance constructs in some categories 
differs between the two sub-groups.  For instance, when it comes to issues of ‘Team 
Organization’, respondents from Company A had more personally important constructs 
(48%) than respondents from company B (15%).  Similarly, respondents from Company A 
had more personally important constructs (78%) than respondents from company B (50%) on 
issues of ‘Organizational Alignment’. 
 
5.4.3.3. The ‘Level’ Group Analysis 
The Strategic sub-group consists of VPs and Senior Directors, while the Tactical sub-group 
consists of Managers, Senior Managers, and Directors from both the Product Management 
and Engineering functions in each case company (see section 3.5.2).The importance of 
comparing these two groups stems from the principal-agent problem as described in sections 
2.3.4.3, 2.3.4.4, and 2.3.5 (i.e. the managers in the Tactical sub-group may not be acting in 
the best interest of the managers in the Strategic group).  This analysis helps answer the main 






Table 20. The ‘Level’ group – differential analysis 
(*indicates z significant at <0.05 and >0.01 level; ** indicates z significant at <= 0.01) 
  
Level 
Category Strategic Tactical z(n) 
n H f(H) n H f(H) 
Methodologies 29 
(19%) 
14 48% 26 
(17%) 
11 42% 0.47 
Team Organization 25 
(16%) 
12 48% 24 
(16%) 
3 13% 0.18 
Customer Focus 18 
(12%) 
3 17% 19 
(12%) 
4 21% -0.15 
Market Focus 17 
(11%) 
4 24% 13 
(8%) 
5 38% 0.79 
Metrics 7 
(5%) 
3 43% 10 
(6%) 






5 50% 7 
(5%) 





5 63% 7 
(5%) 
5 71% 0.28 
Clarity of Vision 8 
(5%) 
3 38% 6 
(4%) 





0 0% 8 
(5%) 





2 29% 4 
(3%) 





0 0% 8 
(5%) 
5 63% -1.92 
Project Constraints 3 
(2%) 
1 33% 7 
(5%) 
2 29% -1.28 
Strong Leadership 6 
(4%) 
4 67% 3 
(2%) 
2 67% 1.02 
Ability to Execute 1 
(1%) 
1 100% 7 
(5%) 





1 20% 3 
(2%) 
1 33% 0.73 
Misc 2 
(1%) 
0 0% 2 
(1%) 
0 0% 0.01 
Total 153 58 38% 154 57 37%  
 
At first glance (see Table 19 above), there is no major difference in proportion of constructs 
between the Tactical and Strategic sub-groups in most categories. 
The only category that shows a statistically significant difference between the two sub-groups 




managers from the Tactical sub-group consider the team’s ability to execute on the project a 
more important issue for project success than managers from the Strategic sub-group.  At first 
glance, this finding makes sense, as the Tactical managers are the ones organizing the teams 
for project execution.  On the other hand, this disparity may lead to agency issues (see 
sections 2.3.4.3 and 2.3.4.4). 
Another category that comes close is ‘Data Driven Decision Making’, indicating that 
managers from the Tactical sub-group consider the ability to make decisions based on data 
more important for project success than managers from the Strategic sub-group.  As 
mentioned in section 5.3.1, this is consistent with the author’s observations in Company A.  
With a z value of -1.92, the difference is significant at 90% confidence only, which is not 
considered a strong test. 
Looking at the proportion of high importance constructs, respondents from the ‘Strategic’ 
level have more personally important constructs about ‘Team Organization’ (48%) than 
respondents from the ‘Tactical’ level (13%). 
These findings will be summarized in section 5.4.4 below and discussed further in Chapter 6. 
 
5.4.3.4. The ‘Function’ Group Analysis 
Focusing on the Product Management and Engineering functions in the company the author 
sought to extend on the findings of Pankratz and Basten (2014) to shed light on the 
construing of key decision makers in software companies, as opposed to project managers in 
IT departments, which was the focus of Pankratz and Basten’s research, as described in 











Table 21. The ‘Function’ group – differential analysis 
(*indicates z significant at <0.05 and >0.01 level; ** indicates z significant at <= 0.01) 
  
Function 
Category Product Engineering z(n) 
n H f(H) n H f(H) 
Methodologies 25 
(16%) 
12 48% 30 
(20%) 





8 42% 30 
(20%) 
7 23% -1.99* 
Customer Focus 26 
(16%) 
4 15% 11 
(7%) 
3 27% 2.40* 
Market Focus 16 
(10%) 
8 50% 14 
(9%) 
1 7% 0.18 
Metrics 10 
(6%) 
3 30% 7 
(5%) 






5 50% 7 
(5%) 





8 67% 3 
(2%) 
2 67% 2.24* 
Clarity of Vision 9 
(6%) 
5 56% 5 
(3%) 





4 50% 5 
(3%) 





0 0% 7 
(5%) 





3 60% 5 
(3%) 





2 67% 7 
(5%) 
1 14% -1.40 
Strong Leadership 2 
(1%) 
1 50% 7 
(5%) 
5 71% -1.80 
Ability to Execute 3 
(2%) 
3 100% 5 
(3%) 





0 0% 2 
(1%) 
2 100% 1.33 
Misc 1 
(1%) 
0 0% 3 
(2%) 
0 0% -1.08 
Total 159 66 42% 148 49 33%  
 
As can be seen from Table 21, there are several categories with statistically significant 
differences between the two sub-groups as described below. 
Engineering managers tend to think of team organization related topics significantly more 




big part of an Engineering manager’s role in a software company is organizing their team for 
successful delivery. 
Product Management managers tend to think of customer related topics (‘Customer Focus’ 
category) significantly more than managers from the Engineering function (z=2.40).  This is 
expected, because the role of a product manager is externally (customer) focused by 
definition in a software company. 
Product Management managers also tend to give higher importance to the topic of 
‘Organizational Alignment’ than their counterparts from the Engineering function (z=2.24).  
This also makes sense, as product managers are the ones who typically navigate the 
organization to secure buy-in and budgets for their ideas and priorities.   
A somewhat surprising, albeit very positive finding is that both Product Management and 
Engineering managers give similar importance to the Market Focus considerations.   
Looking at the proportion of high importance constructs: 
1. respondents from the Product Management function have more personally important 
constructs about ‘Team Organization’ (42%) than respondents from the Engineering 
function (23%); 
2. mentioned equally by both groups, the issue of market focus matters a lot to the 
Product Management managers but not the Engineering mangers, as respondents from 
the Product Management function have more personally important constructs about 
‘Market Focus’ (50%) than respondents from the Engineering function (7%).   
As expected, focusing on managers from the Engineering and Product Management functions 
– who are actually responsible for defining and releasing products to market (see section 
3.5.2) – has yielded a wider range of topics of importance as compared to the Pankratz & 
Basten (2014) study, where the focus was on project managers. 
 
5.4.3.5. The ‘Experience’ Group Analysis 
The question of experience was incorporated into the interviews after the pilot study was 
completed and was meant to shed additional light on the findings.  Two sub-groups of 
respondents are those with more experience with exploratory innovation projects, and those 




Table 22. The ‘Experience’ group – differential analysis 
(*indicates z significant at <0.05 and >0.01 level; ** indicates z significant at <= 0.01) 
  
Experience 
Category Exploratory Exploitative ns(n) 
n H f(H) n H f(H) 
Methodologies 36 
(18%) 
16 44% 19 
(17%) 





13 38% 15 
(14%) 
2 13% 0.88 
Customer Focus 22 
(11%) 
4 18% 15 
(14%) 
3 20% -0.59 
Market Focus 22 
(11%) 
5 23% 8 
(7%) 
4 50% 1.14 
Metrics 6 
(3%) 
3 50% 11 
(10%) 






6 50% 5 
(5%) 





5 56% 6 
(5%) 
5 83% -0.32 
Clarity of Vision 10 
(5%) 
4 40% 4 
(4%) 





0 0% 7 
(6%) 





2 22% 2 
(2%) 





2 67% 7 
(6%) 





1 25% 6 
(5%) 
2 33% -1.60 
Strong Leadership 9 
(5%) 
6 67% 0 
(0%) 
0 0% 2.29* 
Ability to Execute 4 
(2%) 
4 100% 4 
(4%) 





2 33% 2 
(2%) 
0 0% 0.67 
Misc 4 
(2%) 
0 0% 0 
(0%) 
0 0% 1.51 
Total 196 73 37% 111 42 38%  
 
As can be seen from Table 22, there are several categories with statistically significant 
differences between the two sub-groups as described below. 
Participants from the Exploratory sub-group gave significantly higher importance to issues in 




Exploitative category gave significantly higher importance to issues of ‘Metrics’ (z=-2.52) 
and ‘Data Driven Decision Making’ (z=-2.26).  Looking at the actual constructs, the 
difference in metrics comes mainly from the fact that managers with more exploitative 
experience consider revenue-based metrics to be of higher importance.  This makes sense for 
more exploitative projects, as discussed in section 2.4.3.   
Looking at the proportion of high importance constructs: 
1. respondents with more exploratory experience have more personally important 
constructs about ‘Team Organization’ (38%) than respondents with more exploitative 
experience (13%).   
2. respondents with more exploratory experience have more personally important 
constructs about ‘Metrics’ (50%) than respondents with more exploitative experience 
(18%).   
3. respondents with more exploitative experience have more personally important 
constructs about ‘Market Focus’ (50%) than respondents with more exploratory 
experience (23%). 
With the increase in familiarity with Lean Startup approaches (see Innovation Leader, 2016; 
McClure, 2007; Ries, 2017) one of the more surprising findings is that user and customer 
traction metrics have not been mentioned by the respondents from the Exploratory sub-group. 
 
5.4.4. Analysis of Sub-Groups Summary 
Four groups were reviewed, each with two sub-groups.  While the Level group was initially 
the focus of this study, three additional groups were analysed: Company, Function, and 
Experience.  While not many differences between the levels were observed, experience with 
exploratory vs. exploitative innovation projects as well as the function (Product Management 
vs. Engineering) shaped out as leading indicators of differences in construing of issues of 







Several findings are worth mentioning: 
1. The Company Group 
a. Differences in focus on market can be attributed to the different ways these 
companies operate with respect to the product development lifecycle. 
Company A mostly relies on in-house product development, while Company 
B heavily relies on the partner and developer community to develop and 
release their offerings (in addition to in-house development).  
2. The Level Group 
a. Ability to execute was the only topic with statistically significant difference in 
between the Strategic and Tactical sub-groups.  
b. Data-driven decision making may not be as important to the Strategic sub-
group. 
c. The lack of differences in construing across most of the categories is 
promising in the context of the Agency problem: alignment between the 
managers in strategic and tactical levels is critical to a company’s success.  
Yet, a misalignment on the topic of team’s ability to execute may lead to a 
potential agency issue.   
3. The Function Group 
a. Several differences in construing were found between managers from the 
Product Management and Engineering functions.  All differences made sense 
to the researcher as a practitioner, as these reflected the focus areas for 
managers in these roles. 
b. A surprising, yet positive finding was that Market Focus considerations were 
equally important to managers from both functions.  An additional insight 
from applying the Honey’s technique shows that managers from the Product 
Management function had more constructs of personal importance when it 
came to market focus (50%) as opposed to their counterparts from 
Engineering (7%).   
c. Focusing on managers from these two functions has allowed to provide a 




example, topics such as ‘Methodologies’, ‘Team Organization’, ‘Ability to 
Execute’, and ‘Market Focus’ have not come up in their interviews, which is 
expected given their focus on project managers.   
4. The Experience Group 
a. Three significant differences were found in this group, which ties it with the 
‘Function’ group in terms of the number of most significant differences. 
b. Customer and user traction metrics were not mentioned by the respondents 
from the Exploratory sub-group.  This finding is both surprising and alarming 
and may be a result of the existing metrics schemes that are entrenched in the 
case companies (e.g. metrics focused on revenue might be expected for any 
project).   
 
5.4.5. Cognitive Complexity Analysis 
Cognitive complexity is of interest in the context of research on innovation and 
entrepreneurship, in relation to cognitive ambidexterity as argued in sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.4.  
Further, cognitive complexity may influence the flexibility with which issues are construed 
and re-construed and may indicate propensity for creativity and innovative problem solving 
(see section 2.5.5.3).  According to Xu (2011) entrepreneurs have more complex cognitive 
structures than non-entrepreneurs.  It could be sensible to assume that managers with more 
experience in new product development (those in ‘Exploratory’ category) would exhibit 
similar characteristics as entrepreneurs in the above-mentioned studies, as compared to 
managers with more experience in incremental innovation (those in ‘Exploitative’ category).  
That said, a mere experience with exploratory project does not make one an entrepreneur.  
For example, Xu (2011) specifically focused on startup organizations in his research, rather 
than on managers engaged in corporate entrepreneurship, and Taylor (2017) makes a clear 
distinction between senior managers and entrepreneurs, the latter following Schumpeter’s 
definition of an entrepreneur as an innovator who founded a business (see Taylor, 2017).  As 
a result, drawing any parallels between expectations from entrepreneurs and from the 
corporate managers with more experience with exploratory projects may not be plausible.   
Following the procedure outlined in section 3.4.1.3, a measure of cognitive complexity was 




Table 23. Cognitive Complexity by Experience Type 
Experience Type % Variance Accounted for by the First 2 Principal Components 








Projects,  n=9 
61.3 86.0 74.7 
 
 
The lowest % variance was 57.9%, indicating the highest cognitive complexity on this issue 
across the sample, while the highest % variance was 86.0%, indicating the lowest cognitive 
complexity on this issue across the sample.  Additionally, 21 out of 25 respondents have % 
variance accounted for by the first two components lower than 80%, indicating that the 
majority of the respondents have relatively high cognitive complexity.  
Contrary to the assumption made above, Xu’s findings didn’t translate to higher cognitive 
complexity of managers with more experience with exploratory projects in this study’s 
sample.  
 
5.5. Element Analysis 
Section 5.3 has focused on findings that help answer the main research question.  The main 
question was focused on the overall construing: what issues are important to the respondents 
as they think of all their projects – both exploratory and exploitative.  Consequently, the main 
construct analysis was done without differentiating between the types of project and looked at 
construing holistically. 
This section focuses on findings that will help answer the following supporting question: 
“What issues do they construe as more important in achieving success of exploitative as 






5.5.1. Ideal Elements as a Proxy for Preferred Individual Projects 
A typical approach for addressing this kind of question, would involve supplying an ‘ideal’ 
element and comparing ratings of other elements to the ratings of the ‘ideal’ element, in that 
identifying elements most similar to the ‘ideal’ (see Jankowicz, 2004).  However, aggregating 
the outcomes across the sample to indicate which elements represent most successful 
exploitative and exploratory projects for the sample as a whole was not possible in this 
research, since each respondent has proposed 6 unique projects from their own past or current 
experiences and these may be different across different respondents (see section 3.4.1.1).   
An alternative procedure, based on difference in ratings between the two ‘ideal’ elements on 
each of the constructs, following the generic approach advocated by Fransella et al. (2003, 
pp. 99-100), was adopted as described in section 5.5.2. below.  
As a good practice in Repertory Grid interviewing, at the end of each interview, the 
researcher reviewed the ratings across the grid, and identified one exploitative project that 
was the closest in ratings to an ideal exploitative project, and one that was the furthest from 
an ideal exploitative project.  A similar exercise was repeated for exploratory projects.  Next, 
the interviewee was asked to assess whether the claim of a particular project being the closest 
or furthest to/from an ideal resonated with them.  In all instances the interviewees have 
confirmed the assessment.  This in itself offers one of several forms of triangulation ‘built-in’ 
into the Repertory Grid technique.   
 
5.5.2. Differences Between Ideal Element Ratings 
With the rating scale of 1 to 5 (see section 3.4.1.1) differences of 2 points or more between 









Table 24. Examples of Constructs with Two or More Points Difference 
Construct 
ID 




ATEI12-4 Fixed scope, non-
negotiable 
Flexibility in scope, in 
terms of ability to 
move items in and out 
of scope throughout 
development 
2 4 
BSEX8-4 A deep technological 
and market expertise 
Not a lot of depth of 
product specific 
knowledge with 




The analysis then proceeded as follows: 
1. For each of the definitive content analysis categories, the total number of constructs, 
N, and the number of constructs, f, which had a difference of 2 or more rating scale 
points between the two ‘Ideal’ elements were identified.  
2. A proportion, f/N, was calculated to provide an indication of the relative importance 
of the categories in differentiating between ideal exploitative and exploratory projects. 
For example, the ‘Methodologies’ category had f=20 constructs with two or more points 
difference out of N=55 constructs in all, giving an  f/N of 36.4% (see Table 25 below) In 
contrast, the ‘Technology Considerations’ category had f=8 and N=11 giving f/N as 72.7%.  
The f/N value indicates something that the simple f count does not: that it might be more 
important to the respondents to differentiate between technology considerations rather than 
methodologies, when they think about differences between the two project types – 
















Proportion of all 
constructs in a category 
Category f N f/N 
Methodologies 20 55 36.4%  
Team Organization 18 49 36.7% 
Market Focus 13 30 43.3% 
Customer Focus 12 37 32.4% 
Metrics 11 17 64.7% 
Technology Considerations 8 11 72.7% 
Motivation and Empowerment 5 13 38.5% 
Clarity of Objectives and 
Outcomes 
5 17 29.4% 
Strong Leadership 4 9 44.4% 
Executive Sponsorship 3 8 37.5% 
Project Constraints 3 10 30.0% 
Ability to Execute 3 8 37.5% 
Clarity of Vision 3 14 21.4% 
Data Driven Decision Making 2 10 20.0% 
Organisational Alignment 2 15 13.3% 







Appendix 4 displays ratings for ‘ideal exploratory’ and ‘ideal exploitative’ across all 
constructs. 
When considering the proportion of constructs with 2+ points differences in an overall 
number of constructs in a given category (see the last column in Table 25), several 
observations can be made.  The issues of technology and metrics have noticeably higher 
representation, with 72.7% and 64.7% respectively, indicating that managers may be giving 
higher importance to differences in approaches in these two categories.  At the same time, the 
issues of clarity of vision, data driven decision making, and organizational alignment have 
noticeably lower representation with 21.4%, 20.0%, and 13.3% respectively, indicating that 




Overall, this finding is positive, and is aligned with the recommendations made by multiple 
scholars and practitioners to apply different approaches to managing exploratory innovation 
projects (see Baghai et al., 2000; Blank, 2015; Ries, 2011; Teece, 2016), as discussed in 
section 2.4.2.2. 
 
5.5.3. Analysis of Sub-Groups 
To shed more light on the findings described in section 5.5.2, this section will focus on the 
differential analysis across the four groups (‘Company’, ‘Level’, ‘Function’, and 
‘Experience’).   
The analysis will provide insight into differences in the extent to which the sub-groups 
differentiate between approaches for ideal exploratory and ideal exploitative projects.  As 
discussed in section 5.4.3.1, the focus will be on categories with the most constructs. 
To continue with the approach taken in section 5.5.2, each ‘f/N’ ratio will be calculated for 
each sub-group, where f is the number of constructs with 2+ points rating difference between 
the ideal projects, and N is the total number of constructs.    
Additional insight will be provided by offering examples of constructs of high personal 
importance (those rated as H following Honey’s technique) with the respective ratings of 
ideal projects for those categories where substantial differences between the ‘f/N’ ratios are 














5.5.3.1. The ‘Company’ Group Analysis 




N f f/N N f f/N 
Methodologies 36 9 25% 19 11 55% 
Team Organization 23 7 30% 26 11 61% 
Customer Focus 24 8 33% 13 4 31% 
Market Focus 8 5 63% 22 8 36% 




6 2 33% 11 3 27% 
Organisational 
Alignment 
9 1 11% 6 1 17% 
Clarity of Vision 7 1 14% 7 2 29% 
Motivation and 
Empowerment 
6 3 50% 7 2 29% 
Technology 
Considerations 
5 4 80% 6 4 67% 
Data Driven 
Decision Making 
9 1 11% 1 1 100% 
Project Constraints 7 2 29% 3 1 33% 
Strong Leadership 6 3 50% 3 1 33% 
Ability to Execute 4 2 50% 4 1 25% 
Executive 
Sponsorship 
2 2 100% 6 1 17% 
Misc 1 0 0% 3 2 67% 
Total 166 58 35% 141 56 40% 
 
As can be seen in Table 26 above, managers from Company B differentiate more often (55%) 
in the extent to which methodologies apply for ideal exploratory and ideal exploitative 
projects than managers from Company A (25%).  The following are examples of constructs 












Assigned smaller more 
concrete coding tasks 
More elaborate project 
management and overall 
project strategy 
1 5 
Improving quality and 
usability, minimizing defects 




Released very infrequently 
without a set cadence (once a 
year or less) 
Released more frequently on 
a set schedule (twice year) 
3 5 
 
Managers from Company B differentiate more often (61%) in the extent to which concerns of 
team organization apply for ideal exploratory and ideal exploitative projects than managers 
from Company A (30%).  The following is an example of constructs of high personal 
importance with 2+ points difference in ratings of ideal projects in this category. 




Small and highly qualified 
self-directed team 
Ad-hoc team, more junior, 
less domain knowledge 
3 1 
 
Despite the fact that managers from Company B did give higher importance to issues of 
market focus (see section 5.4.3.2), managers from Company A differentiate more often (63%) 
in the extent to which concerns of market focus apply for ideal exploratory and ideal 
exploitative projects than managers from Company B (36%).  The following are examples of 
constructs with 2+ points difference in ratings of ideal projects in this category.  None of 
these constructs were of high personal importance. 




Solution that addresses a 
market need 
Solution has no target 
market, done for the sake of 
being done 
1 3 
Follow existing Go To Market 
motion 
Changing the Go To Market 
Approach 
1 3 
A clear vision about what 
market we are going after 









5.5.3.2. The ‘Level’ Group Analysis 
 




N f f/N N f f/N 
Methodologies 29 10 34% 26 10 38% 
Team Organization 25 9 36% 24 9 38% 
Customer Focus 18 8 44% 19 4 21% 
Market Focus 17 8 47% 13 5 38% 




10 2 20% 7 3 43% 
Organisational 
Alignment 
8 1 13% 7 1 14% 
Clarity of Vision 8 2 25% 6 1 17% 
Motivation and 
Empowerment 
5 3 60% 8 2 25% 
Technology 
Considerations 
7 5 71% 4 3 75% 
Data Driven 
Decision Making 
2 0 0% 8 2 25% 
Project Constraints 3 1 33% 7 2 29% 
Strong Leadership 6 3 50% 3 1 33% 
Ability to Execute 1 1 100% 7 2 29% 
Executive 
Sponsorship 
5 2 40% 3 1 33% 
Misc 2 0 0% 2 2 100% 
Total 153 58 38% 154 56 36% 
 
As can be seen in Table 27 above, strategic managers differentiate more often (44%) in the 
extent to which concerns of customer focus apply for ideal exploratory and ideal exploitative 
projects than tactical managers (21%).  The following are examples of constructs of high 











Customer partnership and 
commitment from day 0 
(customer got stock) 
Solution developed in-house 
then looked for a market 
3 1 
In person customer discovery Aggregate customer data 4 1 






Tactical managers differentiate more often (80%) in the extent to which metrics apply for 
ideal exploratory and ideal exploitative projects than strategic managers (43%).  The 
following are examples of constructs with 2+ points difference in ratings of ideal projects in 
this category.  None of these constructs were of high personal importance, and they are low in 
number for both groups.   






Did not focus on revenue as 
a metric 
2 4 
Came as a ground up initiative 
from the team 
Driven by management / 
execs 
2 4 
Sales driven, targeted on 
opportunity 
Greenfield development 

















5.5.3.3. The ‘Function’ Group Analysis 
 




N f f/N N f f/N 
Methodologies 25 9 36% 30 11 37% 
Team 
Organization 
19 9 47% 30 9 30% 
Customer Focus 26 7 27% 11 5 45% 
Market Focus 16 5 31% 14 8 57% 




10 4 40% 7 1 14% 
Organisational 
Alignment 
12 1 8% 3 1 33% 
Clarity of Vision 9 2 22% 5 1 20% 
Motivation and 
Empowerment 
8 1 13% 5 4 80% 
Technology 
Considerations 
4 4 100% 7 4 57% 
Data Driven 
Decision Making 
5 0 0% 5 2 40% 
Project 
Constraints 
3 1 33% 7 2 29% 
Strong Leadership 2 0 0% 7 4 57% 
Ability to Execute 3 1 33% 5 2 40% 
Executive 
Sponsorship 
6 3 50% 2 0 0% 
Misc 1 0 0% 3 2 67% 
Total 159 53 33% 148 61 41% 
 
Even though Engineering managers gave more importance to concerns of team organization 
(see section 5.4.3.4), as can be seen in Table 28 above, Product Management managers 
differentiate more often (47%) in the extent to which issues of team organization apply for 
ideal exploratory and ideal exploitative projects than Engineering managers (30%).  The 
following are examples of constructs with 2+ points difference in ratings of ideal projects in 









Harder to make changes on 
the fly due to large amount of 
communication 
Easier to make changes on 
the fly 
3 5 
Small cross-functional teams 
were formed to explore 
Existing teams executed 5 1 
 
Even though Product Management managers gave more importance to concerns of customer 
focus (see section 5.4.3.4), Engineering managers differentiate more often (45%) in the extent 
to which issues of customer focus apply for ideal exploratory and ideal exploitative projects 
than Product Management managers (27%).  The following are examples of constructs with 
2+ points difference in ratings of ideal projects in this category.  None of these constructs 
were of high personal importance. 
 




Frequent customer feedback 
throughout development 
Customer feedback after 
launch 
5 1 
Responses to existing 
customer requests 




Engineering managers differentiate more often (57%) in the extent to which issues of market 
focus apply for ideal exploratory and ideal exploitative projects than Product Management 
managers (31%).  The following are examples of constructs of high personal importance with 
2+ points difference in ratings of ideal projects in this category. 
 




Requirements were driven by 
market analysis 
Requirements were fairly 
specific 
4 2 
Solution that addresses a 
market need 
Solution has no target 







5.5.3.4. The ‘Experience’ Group Analysis 
 





N f f/N N f f/N 
Methodologies 36 14 39% 19 6 32% 
Team 
Organization 
34 11 32% 15 7 47% 
Customer Focus 22 10 45% 15 2 13% 
Market Focus 22 11 50% 8 2 25% 




12 2 17% 5 3 60% 
Organisational 
Alignment 
9 2 22% 6 0 0% 
Clarity of Vision 10 3 30% 4 0 0% 
Motivation and 
Empowerment 
6 4 67% 7 1 14% 
Technology 
Considerations 
9 6 67% 2 2 100% 
Data Driven 
Decision Making 
3 1 33% 7 1 14% 
Project 
Constraints 
4 1 25% 6 2 33% 
Strong Leadership 9 4 44% - 0 0% 
Ability to Execute 4 2 50% 4 1 25% 
Executive 
Sponsorship 
6 2 33% 2 1 50% 
Misc 4 2 50% - 0 0% 
Total 196 78 40% 111 36 32% 
 
As can be seen in Table 29 above, managers with more exploratory experience differentiate 
more often (45%) in the extent to which concerns of customer focus apply for ideal 
exploratory and ideal exploitative projects than managers with more exploitative experience 
managers (13%).  The following are examples of constructs of high personal importance with 









Customer partnership and 
commitment from day 0 
(customer got stock) 
Solution developed in-house 
then looked for a market 
3 1 
In person customer discovery Aggregate customer data 4 1 






Managers with more exploratory experience differentiate more often (50%) in the extent to 
which issues of market focus apply for ideal exploratory and ideal exploitative projects than 
managers with more exploitative experience managers (25%).  The following are examples of 
constructs with 2+ points difference in ratings of ideal projects in this category.  None of 
these constructs were of high personal importance. 




Thorough market analysis was 
done 
No market analysis 4 2 
Market was not ready for the 
product 




Managers with more exploitative experience differentiate more often (60%) in the extent to 
which issues of clarity of objectives and outcomes apply for ideal exploratory and ideal 
exploitative projects than managers with more exploratory experience managers (17%).  The 
following are examples of constructs of high personal importance with 2+ points difference 
in ratings of ideal projects in this category. 
 




Had clear business problems 
to be solved 
Open scope, no boundaries, 
business problem too broad 
1 3 
Had clear goals about project 
outcome, definition of success 
Did not have clear goals or 








5.5.3.5. Differential Analysis Summary 
In this section a differential analysis was performed across the four groups of interest, to shed 
light on the initial element analysis and help answer the supporting research question.  
Expanding on the finding that managers differentiate in the extent to which the approaches 
apply to exploratory and exploitative projects, it was further observed that sub-groups 
(Company A vs. Company B; ‘Strategic’ vs ‘Tactical’; ‘Product Management’ vs. 
‘Engineering’; ‘Exploratory’ vs. ‘Exploitative’) exhibit differences in how often various 
issues of importance apply to the different types of project.  The implication is, that faced 
with a similar situation in the future, these sub-groups of managers will tend to differ in the 
extent to which they apply various approaches.   
With alignment between levels being the focus of this study, it is worth exemplifying this 
difference between the ‘Strategic’ and ‘Tactical’ sub-groups in particular.  While both 
strategic and tactical managers agree on what is important for project success (with ‘Ability 
to Execute’ being the only category with difference in construing – see Table 20), they may 
disagree on the extent to which approaches differ between the ideal exploratory and ideal 
exploitative project (with categories of ‘Customer Focus’ and ‘Metrics’ showing difference in 
construing – see Table 27). 
 
5.6. Analysis Summary 
Several interesting findings emerge from the analysis so far: 
1. Looking at construing of success of both the exploratory and exploitative projects 
holistically with respect to answering the main research question “How do middle 
managers at different levels construe exploitative and exploratory innovation 
projects?”: 
a. There are minor differences in how managers from the Tactical and Strategic 
sub-groups construe issues related to successful outcomes of exploitative and 
exploratory projects.  This finding is a very positive for the case companies, as 





b. ‘Function’ and ‘Experience’ are two groups with most (3) differences in 
construing with statistical significance at 95% significance.   
c. There are no major differences in how managers construe metrics with respect 
to exploitative and exploratory projects, except for the managers with more 
exploitative innovation experience, who mentioned revenue-based metrics 
more often.  Few people have mentioned traction-based metrics that would 
typically be important for exploratory projects.    
d. It is surprising to see the proportion of constructs dealing with Risk 
Management being low and being mentioned by fewer than half the 
respondents.   
2. Looking at the construing of success of exploratory projects versus exploitative 
projects with respect to answering the supporting research question: “What issues do 
they construe as more important in achieving success of exploitative as opposed to 
exploratory innovation projects?”: 
a. Almost all the respondents have differentiated between the success of 
exploratory projects and success of exploitative projects. 
b. The differences can be observed across all the 15 categories, indicating that 
the entire spectrum of issues concerning project success is considered as 
managers construe exploratory projects versus exploitative projects.   
c. With respect to the issue of alignment, it was observed that while both 
strategic and tactical managers mostly agree on what is important for project 
success, they may disagree on the extent to which some approaches differ 
between the ideal exploratory and ideal exploitative projects. 
d. The difference in construing between the two project types mainly comes from 
the difference in function and experience. 
e. Although there are clear differences in how managers construe exploitative 
versus exploratory projects, it is surprising to see that those differences rarely 






And so, it appears that:  
1. there is mostly alignment throughout the hierarchy on issues of importance for a 
successful project outcome; 
2. managers do differentiate between approaches used for exploratory innovation 
projects vs. approaches used for exploitative innovation projects; 
3. managers from different sub-groups may disagree in the extent to which some 
approaches apply for exploratory innovation projects vs. exploitative innovation 
projects; 
4. there is little to no consideration given to exploratory-innovation specific metrics or 
management approaches; 
5. experience and function are leading indicators for differences in managers’ 
sensemaking. 
These emergent findings will provide a basis for stage 2 of the study (see section 3.4.2), 





The importance of triangulation in case study research stems from the need to achieve rigour 
and was discussed in sections 3.4.1 and 3.3.2.  As reviewed in section 3.4.2, Key Informant 
Interviews (KII) technique was chosen to examine the findings from stage 1 of the main 
study.   
Findings summarized in section 5.6 can be expressed with the following areas of focus: 
1. Alignment across levels.  The initial indication is that there is an alignment 
throughout the hierarchy on issues of importance for setting projects (both exploratory 
and exploitative) for a successful outcome.  The implication of this finding is 
generally positive and should lead to fewer agency issues.  The KII technique was 





2. Differentiation between approaches used for the two types of innovation.  At first 
glance this finding seems very positive, as managers recognize the differences 
between the project types, and apply different approaches to them.  The KII technique 
would be used to examine whether different approaches are being applied in practice.   
3. Prominence of exploratory innovation-specific approaches.  Managers 
differentiate between the type of approaches to be used for exploratory vs. 
exploitative innovation projects, and that differentiation can be observed in 
differences of ratings (see section 5.5.2).  However, looking closer at the constructs 
themselves, the exploratory innovation-specific metrics and techniques don’t seem to 
be used often.  The KII technique will focus on why this might be the case, and the 
impact managers expect on project outcomes.   
4. Experience and function as the leading indicators for differences in construing.  
The KII technique will be used to examine the reasons for this, and what the 
implications might be.   
Sections 5.7.3 and 5.7.4 describe the informant characteristics and interview questions chosen 
to examine these areas of focus further.   
 
5.7.2. Informant Selection 
According to Tremblay (1957), the key criterion for informant selection and eligibility to 
participate in the interviews is exposure to the kind of information being sought.   
Homburg et al. (2012) argue that tenure at the company leads to higher reliability of key 
informants.  They also argue that the higher is the position in a company’s hierarchy, the 
higher is the reliability of the informant. 
To explore the areas of focus (see section 5.7.1) further, managers with the following 
minimum required characteristics were chosen from the original sample: 
1. At least 2 years in the current company.  These managers would have observed how 
multiple projects have been approached across the company and have interacted with 
other managers across the company.   
2. Strategic level (Sr. Directors and VPs).  These managers typically have visibility into 




3. Managers with more experience with exploratory projects.  These managers would be 
able to comment on specific experiences with exploratory projects that shaped their 
view of what makes exploratory projects successful.  They would also be able to 
comment on the lack of use of exploratory innovation techniques and metrics. 
Additionally, due to the nature of the preliminary findings, it was important to select some 
informants that have had startup experiences prior to their career in a large established 
company; who have, ideally, held leadership positions when they released brand new 
products; who have had wide exposure to the various teams and business units in their current 
companies; and people with both Product Management and Engineering experience.    
Table 31 in section 5.7.4 below lists the informants and characteristics they have been 
selected for (in addition to the minimum criteria listed above). 
 
5.7.3. Interview Questions 
Table 30 below maps questions to each of the findings given in the Analysis Summary shown 















Table 30. Focus Areas and Questions for Key Informant Interviews 
Focus Area Questions 
Alignment 
across levels 
It appears that both strategic and tactical managers think about 
similar issues of importance when it comes to setting up a project for 
a successful outcome.  
– Is this surprising? 
– Does it get reflected in outcomes? 




used for the 
two types of 
innovation 
Almost all the respondents have differentiated between the type of 
issues that are important to the success of exploratory innovation 
projects vs. success of exploitative innovation projects.  
– Why do you think that is? 
– Is it surprising? 
– Does it matter to the work they do? 






It doesn’t seem like managers leading exploratory innovation 
projects apply exploratory innovation-specific approaches.  
For example, I noticed was that people were using traditional 
revenue-based metrics– the sort you’d associate with exploitative 
innovation projects– rather than customer and user traction-focused 
metrics.  
– Why do you think this might be the case? 
– Is that an issue? 
– (If so), what might we be doing about it? 
 
Additionally, very few Lean Startup approaches (e.g. hypothesis-
based experimentation) were mentioned. 
– Why do you think this might be the case?. 
– Is that an issue? 
– (If so), what might we be doing about it? 
Experience 





It appears that people whose experience has been largely with 
Exploratory projects tend to think differently from people whose 
experience has been largely incremental. 
– Do the differences make sense? 
– Can you recall a particular experience you had with an 
exploratory project that changed how you approach 
setting up a project for success? 
 
After answering these questions, the informants were asked to review the results of the 
differential analysis (a simplified version of the table in Appendix 9) and comment on any 
surprises, such as missing categories, or differences between sub-groups.  Appendix 12 





5.7.4. Procedure and Sample Overview 
Informants were contacted via e-mail with a request to conduct a follow-up interview, and the 
reason for the follow-up was explained.  A preliminary findings report (see Appendix 13) 
was shared with all the respondents.  All interviews were recorded using GoToMeeting 
(https://www.gotomeeting.com/).  This approach was used with both the remote and in-
person attendees, since GoToMeeting produces an automatic transcript of the entire 
interview.  This aided the researcher in saving time to transcribe these sessions.  All 
informants were asked for consent prior to the recording and were promised that the 
recording would be deleted after the transcript was obtained. 
As mentioned in section 5.7.2, all informants are from the strategic level and with more 
experience with exploratory innovation projects.  Out of 10 managers contacted, 9 responded 
and participated in this round. 
 
Table 31. Key Informant Interviews – Informants 
ID Company Function Position Additional Characteristics 
ASPX-2 A Product VP 
Long tenure at the current company; 
Exposure to multiple Business Units; Recent 
experience bringing a new product to 
market. 
ASPX-5 A Product VP 
Long tenure at the current company; 
Exposure to multiple Business Units; Recent 
experience bringing a new product to 
market; Held both Product and Engineering 
positions. 
ASEX-6 A Engineering VP 
Serial entrepreneur prior to the current 
company; Long tenure at the current 
company. 
ASEX-7 A Engineering Sr. Director 
Multiple startups and large corporations 
experience. 
ASPX-9 A Product  VP 
Track record of innovation in large 
corporations; Recent experience bringing a 
new product to market. 
BSEX-1 B Engineering VP 
Experience bringing new products to market 
in startups and large corporations.  
BSEX-8 B Engineering Sr. Director 
Experience bringing new products to market 
in startups and large corporations. 
BSPX-11 B Product  Sr. Director 
Long tenure at the current company; 
Exposure to multiple Business Units; 
BSPX-12 B Product  Sr. Director 
Long tenure at the current company; 





5.7.5. Focus Areas – Key Points from Key Informants 
This section presents key points raised for each of the focus areas (see section 5.7.1 and Table 
30) reviewed with the key informants.  
 
5.7.5.1. Focus Area 1 – Alignment Across Levels 
Table 32. KII Focus Area 1 (‘Alignment Across Levels’) Summary 
 




 Overall, alignment between the levels is not surprising. 
 It is surprising to see that Data Driven Decision Making (DDDM) not as important to the ‘Strategic’ 





 Not surprised to see the alignment, although that depends on a group in our company. 
 ‘Ability to Execute’ is low likely because strategic people might be taking it for granted. 
 ‘DDDM’ is low for the ‘Strategic’ sub-group because we are not good in this area, and it’s harder to 




 Overall, alignment between the levels is surprising 
 Didn’t observe tactical level managers giving importance to market focus, metrics, organizational 
alignment. 
 DDDM disparity makes sense: strategic level people do a poor job of communicating the rationale 




 Overall, alignment between the levels is not surprising, and is a good sign.  
 DDDM & ‘Ability to Execute’ may not have come up high because ‘Strategic’ sub-group managers 
take these for granted.  




 Overall, alignment make sense. 




 Overall, the findings make sense.   
 ‘Ability to execute’ being low for ‘Strategic’ sub-group may make sense, because a strategic person 
may expect that considerations of ability to execute would be left to tactical managers to figure out. 




 Overall, the alignment is there; some smaller bits is what people argue over. 
 It is surprising to see that ‘Ability to Execute’ is low for the ‘Strategic’ sub-group.  DDDM should be 




 Not surprised with the finding, do observe this in the company.  





 Expected consistency in how managers across the levels think about project success.  






Focus area 1 (alignment across levels) was centred around the following preliminary finding: 
both strategic and tactical managers think about similar issues of importance when it comes 
to setting up a project for a successful outcome. 
Based on responses from key informants (see Table 32), with one exception (respondent 
ASEX-6) there is consensus that the alignment across levels indeed exists.  
An interesting observation was offered by respondent ASEX-7: 
"I think we are aligned on whether it is important... we just not aligned on whether it 
is happening: tactical level may think the objectives are unclear, strategic level might 
think they are perfectly clear. They both think these are important... For example, we 
agree that it is important to align Engineering and DevOps (Team Organization) but 
this still hasn't happened." (ASEX-7) 
Respondent ASPX-5 made a similar comment with respect to what is happening in reality.  
Similarly, almost all informants were surprised that ‘Ability to Execute’ and ‘Data Driven 
Decision Making’ (DDDM) were less important to managers from the ‘Strategic’ sub-group: 
“Because strategic have to process large amounts of information, and you have to 
make strong data driven decisions.” (ASPX-2) 
A possible explanation to the disparity in ‘DDDM’ was suggested: 
“I feel like data driven decision making disparity makes sense: strategic level people 
do a poor job of communicating the rationale behind the decisions.  We need to be 
much crisper on how these projects align to the vision.” (ASEX-6) 
Respondent ASPX-5 offered a similar explanation. 
Another possible explanation to the disparity in both ‘Ability to Execute’ and ‘DDDM’: 
“Strategic level people do care about data driven decision making and the ability to 
execute, so the fact this didn't come up high, is likely because strategic people take 
these for granted”.  (ASEX-7) 
Informants ASPX-5 and BSEX-1 offered a similar explanation for ‘Ability to Execute’. 
One possible implication of ‘Ability to Execute’ and ‘DDDM’ being less important to 




“If that's the case, then the tactical managers would not learn the proper behaviours 
from the strategic managers.” (BXES-8) 
And so, it’s safe to conclude that this preliminary finding is acceptable to the key informants.  




5.7.5.2. Focus Area 2 – Differentiation Between Approaches 
 
Table 33. KII Focus Area 2 (‘Differentiation Between Approaches’) Summary 
 




 Overall, the finding makes sense 
 Decisions on exploratory projects have a longer lasting impact. 
 Metrics need to be very different, while DDDM is important for both.  
 It is surprising that clarity of vision is equal for both. On exploratory project the clarity of vision is so 




 Overall, the finding makes sense.  
 ‘Metrics’ and ‘Technology Considerations’ - right on the money with respect to differences, while 
‘Clarity of Vision’, ‘DDDM’, and ‘Organizational Alignment’ are equally important. 









 Overall, the finding makes sense 
 It's easier to know what to measure with exploitative projects 
 The technology considerations are way more important to exploratory projects 
 On categories with fewer differences: these are considered equally important because these are basics 




 Overall, the finding makes sense 
 Technology in exploitative projects technology doesn't change that much, so considerations would 
apply differently.  




 Overall, the finding makes sense 
 Would expect that clarity of objectives and outcomes would be very different between the two. When 













 Overall, the finding makes sense  







Focus area 2 (Differentiation between approaches used for the two types of innovation) was 
centred around the following preliminary finding: Almost all the respondents have 
differentiated between the type of issues that are important to the success of exploratory 
innovation projects vs. success of exploitative innovation projects. 
Based on responses from key informants (see Table 33), there is consensus that the finding 
makes sense.  Most informants agreed that more of ‘Metrics’ and ‘Technology 
Considerations’ issues and fewer of ‘ Clarity of Vision’, ‘DDDM’, and ‘Organizational 
Alignment’ issues would be different between the two project types. 
As one respondent puts it: 
“Makes sense that clarity of vision, DDDM, and org alignment had fewer constructs 
with different ratings, because these are 'motherhood and apple pie' so they have 
likely been considered equally important for both types of projects.” (ASEX-7) 
One of the respondents found it surprising that ‘Clarity of Vision’ was ranked similar for both 
types of project: 
“Interesting that clarity of vision is equal for both. Would expect to see a larger 
difference because on exploratory project the clarity of vision is so much more 
important, and a small deviation in a vision would have a bigger impact on 
exploratory project.” (ASPX-2) 
A similar observation was made regarding ‘Clarity of Objectives and Outcomes’:  
“Would expect that clarity of objectives and outcomes would be very different between 
the two. When you are doing something new people are asking for clarity more”. 
(BSEX-1) 
And so, it’s safe to conclude that this preliminary finding is acceptable to the key informants.  
This finding will be further analysed in conjunction with finding 3 (presented in the next 
section) and will be discussed more in section 5.8 The implications will be further discussed 









5.7.5.3. Focus Area 3 - Exploratory Innovation Approaches 
 
Table 34. KII Focus Area 3 (‘Exploratory Innovation Approaches’) Summary 
 




 On Metrics:  
o Revenue is an easy metric to go after 
o For exploratory projects, need to have a hypothesis before you look at the data.  
 On Lean Startup: 
o People may know about the Lean Starup approaches, but it's easier to fall back to what you 
already know. 




 On Metrics:  
o It's a mistake to tie an exploratory project in early stages to revenue.  
o We do have a history of supporting non-revenue metrics for exploratory projects.  
 On Lean Startup: 
o Not running experiments is not healthy. Unfortunately, we do not run experiments often. 
o The implication is that you are late to the market.  
o To address this, we need to change culture around exploratory projects, with specific 
exploratory metrics, and have ways to reduce scope and release often. Need to think more 




  On Metrics & Lean Startup:  
o People don't consciously segment exploratory vs. exploitative innovation.  
o This is due to lack of awareness. Need an oversight to help identify the right type of the 




  On Metrics:  
o Exploitative projects are easier to measure. With exploratory you may not know how to 
measure yet.  
o Some projects might be technology focused, so people might not be thinking in terms of 
customer and user traction.  
 On Lean Startup: 
o People understand the concepts of Lean Startup but are not applying. It's not engrained in our 
culture. Companies try to be predictable in costs and results and are more conservative.  
o A lack of recognition that these techniques can apply to a corporate innovation project.  
o The problem with not applying these approaches is that we are going into a project with 
untested assumptions. We should call exploratory projects for what they are explicitly and 






  On Metrics:  
o People in startups know that the only way to drive interest from VCs is to show traction. As 
you mature, the revenue becomes important. 
o This maybe a representation of a culture - we are asked to drive revenue pretty quickly - we 
don't have a luxury of incubating for several years. The expectation for bookings trumps other 
metrics. We are using active use, but it's a secondary metric. This is how we are measured.   
o This culture of what metrics are important cascades down to lower levels. 
o A company that is committing to the market to deliver margins will be driven by financial 
metrics no matter the type of a project.  




o In Enterprise software, the expectations are to create long term roadmaps and commit a year 
out. That leads to less flexibility to pivot. You can navigate this, but it is harder. There is 
inertia in the way the Enterprise software works.  
o Experimentation is difficult in the Enterprise market - harder to rip and change after release, 
not the same level of flexibility as with the consumer world.  The way to address it is to have 
good Beta programs and tech previews.  
o When you have a dried-up innovation pipeline, there is a huge pressure to deliver once you 
are working on an innovative project. We need to improve our discovery process to front load 




 On Metrics: 
o The approach would be based on the business of the company.  
 On Lean Startup: 
o I see that people are approaching both types of projects similarly. A large company might not 




  On Metrics:  
o Just went through an OKR process and had several non-financial metrics. We all have a 
revenue goal, but then we track non-financial metrics separately.   
 On Lean Startup: 
o It is an issue that people don't apply exploration specific methods on exploratory projects.  
o You have to either encourage people to attempt new methodologies through incentives and 





  On Metrics:  
o Regardless of the type of a project there is still some profit and loss calculation involved.  
o The user behaviour metrics are more subtle, and no one is going to ask you to report on these 
metrics.  
 On Lean Startup: 
o This is an expression of culture: it's difficult to conduct according to Lean Startup in a 




 On Metrics: 
o At some point everything needs to be tied to financials, but not everything can be measured 
financially early on.  
o Even if you are not using financial metrics you need to find a way to tie it back to financials.  
o The metrics chosen are typically match what the business unit is measured on.  
 On Lean Startup:  
o Real startups have constraints: time, money. In a corporate world it is easy to procrastinate. 
Leadership has to create artificial constraints, and in that recreate the startup-like conditions. 




Focus area 3 (Prominence of exploratory innovation-specific approaches) was centred around 
the following preliminary finding: managers leading exploratory innovation projects do not 
apply exploratory innovation-specific approaches. 
Based on responses from key informants (see Table 34), there is consensus that the finding 
makes sense.  Several important interpretations (well exemplified by informant ASPX-9) 




1. Managers do not explicitly distinguish between types of a project (exploitative vs. 
exploratory).   
2. Managers may not be aware of Lean Startup approaches and fall back to “what they 
know”.  
3. Cultural norms and extant expectations may lead to a choice of techniques and 
metrics more appropriate for exploitative projects.  
Most participants recognized that this finding is problematic for their organization, and the 
following suggestions were made to improve the situation: 
1. Have a process for validating hypotheses and celebrate failures (ASPX-2). 
2. Introduce a clear process for exploratory innovation (ASEX-6). 
3. Call exploratory projects out explicitly (ASEX-7). 
4. Improve the discovery and validation processes (ASEX-9). 
5. Bring “outside views” – people from outside of organization (BSEX-8). 
6. Tactical managers need to ask their managers (strategic managers) to hold them 
accountable to both financial and non-financial metrics (BSPX-11). 
7. Introduce artificial constraints to resemble the startup environment (BSPX-12, ASPX-
5). 
And so, it’s safe to conclude that this preliminary finding is acceptable to the key informants.  
This finding will be further analysed in conjunction with finding 2 (presented in the previous 
section) and will be discussed more in section 5.8.  The implications will be further discussed 
















5.7.5.4. Focus Area 4 – Experience as a Leading Indicator 
 
Table 35. KII Focus Area 4 (‘Experience as one of the leading indicators’) Summary 
 




 Overall, the finding makes sense 
 On ‘Clarity of vision’ being more important to the ‘Exploratory’ sub-group: having strong principles 










 Successful startup companies have strong methodologies, tight team, laser focus on market, novel 
technology, strong leader at the helm – so seeing these categories with most differences makes sense.   




 Makes sense that people with different experiences think differently.  
 When we have an argument, it does come down to the differences in experience, with considerations 




 On differences in ‘Methodologies: exploitative projects are simpler and more predictable, while 
exploratory require more tools in the toolbox.  
 On differences in ‘Team Organization’: it is easier to deal with organizational project topologies for 
exploitative projects.  
 Does not make sense that Metrics and Data driven decision making are less important to the Exploratory 
group, because you need to make decisions on data from validations. In fact, that may contradict the 




 Overall, completely makes sense. 













 Interesting that ‘Market Focus’ is that far apart. Even for an incremental project you want to have focus 
on market.  
 Interesting that ‘Strong leadership’ is not important to managers with incremental experience.  
 
Focus area 4 (Experience as one of the leading indicators for differences in construing) was 
centred around the following preliminary finding: people whose experience has been largely 
with Exploratory projects tend to think differently from people whose experience has been 
largely exploitative. 
Based on responses from key informants (see Table 35), there is consensus that the finding 




“You just defined a successful startup: successful startup companies have strong 
methodologies, tight team, laser focus on market, novel technology, strong leader at 
the helm - so seeing these categories with most differences makes total sense.” 
(ASEX-6) 
One possible explanation was offered: 
“Makes sense that people with different experiences think differently.  Some people 
spent all their lives in big companies with engrained habits, vs. others may have a 
startup experience.” (ASEX-7) 
And so, it’s safe to conclude that this preliminary finding is acceptable to the key informants.  
This finding will be further analysed in conjunction with finding 3 (presented in the previous 
section) and will be discussed more in section 5.8.  The implications will be further discussed 
in Chapter 6.   
 
5.7.6. Key Informant Interviews Summary 
Key Informant Interview technique was used in stage 2 of the study to examine four focus 
areas: (1) Alignment across levels, (2) Differentiation between approaches used for the two 
types of innovation, (3) Prominence of exploratory innovation-specific approaches, and (4) 
Experience and function as the leading indicator for differences in construing. 
Ten informants from the ‘Strategic’ sub-group were selected from the original sample of 25 
respondents.  Nine of them responded and agreed to participate in the second stage of the 
study. 
While all four findings made sense to most of the informants, a consistent surprise was that 
‘Ability to Execute’ and ‘Data Driven Decision Making’ categories were less important to 
managers from the ‘Strategic’ sub-group.   
The most interesting interpretations were offered for finding 3.  Key informants suggested 
that exploratory innovation specific metrics and techniques are not being used because 
managers do not recognize the differences between projects and may not know what 
exploration specific approaches are.  More importantly, following known approaches, and 
following the expectations of extant corporate culture and inertia may prevent managers from 




extant culture and inertia came up more strongly from informants ASEX-7, ASPX-9, BSEX-
1, BSPX-11, and BSPX-12, and more subtly from informants ASPX-2 and ASPX-5 (see 
Table 34).  Specifically, when a business as a whole, or a particular business unit is being 
measured with financial metrics, the expectation throughout the hierarchy is that projects 
(regardless of type) need to be measured with financial metrics too.  Some informants (e.g. 
ASPX-5, BSEX-8) indicated that non-financial metrics are used at times in addition to 
financial ones.  With respect to exploration specific approaches, a perceived intolerance of 
failure (ASPX-2), lack of a “startup mindset” (ASPX-5, BSPX-12), expectations of 
predictability of delivery and outcomes (ASEX-7, ASPX-9), industry expectations (ASPX-9), 
intolerance to experimentation (BSEX-1), lack of incentives (BSEX-8), lack of outside views 
(BSEX-8), different operational context (BSPX-11) – are some of the cultural antecedents 
leading to this reality.   
Several interpretations and implications were offered and will be discussed further in section 
5.8 and Chapter 6, in the context of the research questions.   
 
5.8. Summary of Main Study Findings and Analysis 
5.8.1. The Sequence 
The main study of this thesis consisted of two stages.  In stage 1 of the study 25 managers 
from two participating companies were interviewed and a total of 307 constructs were 
collected with Repertory Grid technique.  These constructs were coded into 15 categories of 
meaning after three rounds of categorization and reliability checks.   
Two levels of analysis were performed.  Initially, a construct analysis was performed to 
answer the main research question: How do middle managers at different levels construe 
exploitative and exploratory innovation projects? Next, element analysis was performed to 
answer the supporting question:  What issues do they construe as more important in 
achieving success of exploitative as opposed to exploratory innovation projects?  
Once the preliminary findings were identified, a stage 2 of the study commenced.  A subset 
of participants was identified as ‘key informants’, and asked to help examine the findings, 





5.8.2. The Findings 
5.8.2.1. The Main Research Question 
The intent of this question (How do middle managers at different levels construe exploitative 
and exploratory innovation projects?) was to examine construing of projects holistically, 
without comparison between projects types (exploratory and exploitative).  The emphasis was 
on differences in construing between levels (‘Strategic’ vs ‘Tactical’).  Construct analysis 
was the main technique used to answer this research question.   
Several findings help answer this research question: 
1. The top three sets of considerations of high importance were found to be 
‘Methodologies’, ‘Team Organization’, and ‘Customer Focus’, between them 
accounting for almost half of all constructs.   
2. There is mostly alignment throughout the hierarchy on issues of importance for 
setting up projects (both exploratory and exploitative) for a successful outcome. 
3. Experience and Function are the leading indicators for differences in construing.   
In stage 2 of the study few surprises were found with these findings, and overall key 
informants agreed with the findings.   
 
5.8.2.2. The Supporting Research Question 
The intent of the question (What issues do they construe as more important in achieving 
success of exploitative as opposed to exploratory innovation projects?) was to look at how 
managers differentiate between the two types of project (exploratory vs. exploitative) in their 
construing.  Element analysis was the main technique used to answer this research question.   
Several findings help answer this research question: 
1. Managers recognize that issues of importance for project success apply differently to 
the two project types.  In essence, there is a difference in the extent to which, in the 
managers minds, various approaches apply to these two types of project. 
2. While both strategic and tactical managers mostly agree on what is important for 
project success, they may disagree on the extent to which some approaches differ 




3. Managers involved in exploratory projects rarely apply exploratory innovation 
specific approaches, such as setting exploration specific metrics and using Lean 
Startup approaches such as experimentation. 
In stage 2 of the study these findings were examined in detail.  All respondents agreed with 
these findings, and several interpretations were offered.   
 
5.8.2.3. Propositions 
Upon examination of these findings with key informants, the following propositions can be 
developed: 
Proposition 1: Both ‘Strategic’ and ‘Tactical’ managers agree on what is important for 
project success, yet they may disagree on the extent to which some approaches differ between 
the types of project. 
Proposition 2: While there is alignment on what is important, this may not be what is 
happening in practice.   
Proposition 3: Managers with more exploratory innovation experience think differently about 
project success than managers with more exploitative innovation experience.   
Proposition 4: Managers from the Engineering function think differently about project 
success than managers from the Product Management function. 
Proposition 5: Managers think differently about the extent to which various considerations 
apply to the two project types (exploratory and exploitative).   
Proposition 6: Inertia and extant corporate culture are key antecedents of managers applying 
exploitative approaches on exploratory projects.   






6. Discussion and Conclusions 
6.1. Discussion of Findings 
The findings presented in this research and the six propositions derived in the previous 
section are a result of construct analysis at their root, followed by element analysis and 
interview-based triangulation.  It’s important to remember that this research is grounded in 
Personal Construct Theory (PCT), which stresses that it is much more important to 
understand the usefulness of a construct than to prove it is correct (see Butt & Burr, 2004).  
The anticipatory aspect of PCT is of key importance too: the way people construe a particular 
issue will indicate factors which they feel are important for successful outcomes, and hence 
the action they may likely take faced with a particular choice.  Moreover, it is by 
understanding how the person construes their intentions that we understand the reasons for 
their departure from pure statistical rationality as outlined in the discussion of Prospect 
Theory in section 2.3.4.2. 
As discussed in section 3.3.2, the form of generalisation sought in a case study is called 
‘analytic generalisation’ (Yin, 2017, p. 37).  It is based on purposive sampling (see section 
3.5.2) and its aim is to generalise from the study (not the case) to a variety of situations, in 
which the same theoretical concept or principles apply.   
In essence, the propositions described in section 5.8.2.3 can be generalized to other 
companies with exploratory and exploitative product development, where managers in the 
Product Management and Engineering functions seem to be in alignment throughout the 
hierarchy on how to drive a project to a successful outcome, yet still need to make 
appropriate choices of metrics and techniques and therefore need to differentiate between the 
project types first.  Therefore, the findings may be applicable not only for B2B technology 
companies similar to the ones the research was performed in but also in other technology or 
product companies in similar circumstances. 
With that clarification in mind, and without wishing to overgeneralize, the author offers his 
interpretations as he construes the respondents, their responses, and their interpretations of 
the findings, consistent with the epistemological stance of this research (see Denicolo et al., 






6.1.1. Alignment on Issues of Importance 
As presented in section 5.8, overall, both ‘Strategic’ and ‘Tactical’ managers agree on what is 
important for project success - for successful outcomes of exploitative and exploratory 
projects, they may disagree on the extent to which some approaches differ between the ideal 
exploratory and ideal exploitative project.  Several aspects of this finding warrant further 
discussion. 
First, most informants were surprised to see that considerations of ‘Ability to Execute’ and 
‘Data Driven Decision Making’ (DDDM) appeared to be less important to the ‘Strategic’ 
sub-group than to the ‘Tactical’ sub-group.  The finding seems to be alarming, since relying 
on data to make decisions, especially with the exploratory projects, is key to exploratory 
project success (see Ries, 2011, 2017) at all levels.  Similarly, Dyer, Gregersen, & 
Christensen (2019) indicate that ability to execute is key to any innovation’s success.  
Mintzberg (1989) claims that strategic managers should not be detached from operations.  
Some informants suggested the reason to be a case, where the ‘Strategic’ sub-group might be 
taking these considerations for granted, hence these considerations didn’t come up as high 
from that group.   
One of the categories where strategic managers and tactical managers didn’t align in the 
extent to which the approaches differ between the ideal exploratory and ideal exploitative 
projects was ‘Metrics’.  As discussed in section 2.4.3.2, exploratory projects are more 
appropriately measured by customer and user traction metrics rather than by metrics such as 
revenue or meeting a date.  A misalignment on how to apply metrics to different types of 
project may lead to agency issues (see section 2.3.4.3, esp. Eisenhardt, 1989; Freeman & 
Engel, 2007). 
While the fact that there is mostly alignment is positive from the agency standpoint, the 
alignment may not be on the right aspects.  If foundational elements such as structures, 
processes, and culture do not foster exploratory innovation approaches, then, from an 
exploratory innovation standpoint it may not matter that the alignment exists.   
And finally, several informants indicated that while there is an alignment on what is 
important for project success, this may not be what, in fact, is happening in practice as 





6.1.2. Experience and Function as Leading Indicators for Differences in Construing 
As presented in section 5.8, managers with more exploratory innovation experience think 
differently about project success than managers with more exploitative innovation 
experience.  Additionally, managers from the Product Management function tend to think 
differently about project success than managers from the Engineering function.  In a sense, 
managers’ experience is also shaped by the function they are in.  Past experiences are known 
to impact decision making (Markowska et al., 2018).  Differences in these experiences lead to 
differences in construing (Nooteboom 2009) especially due to differences in backgrounds 
(Maitlis & Christianson, 2014).  Additionally, differences in experience lead to differences in 
dealing with personal ambidexterity tensions (Papachroni, 2013).   
The first of these findings (with regards to the type of experience – exploitative vs. 
exploratory) is very positive for the case companies and other companies in the industry, 
because they could augment their hiring with managers with entrepreneurial experience, a 
topic that will be discussed in more detail in section 6.3.  Conversely, this finding may spell 
trouble for a company, if managers with many years of service do not learn entrepreneurial 
techniques.  In essence, they learn and develop heuristics (see Busenitz and Barney 1997) that 
may not be appropriate for the project at hand.  In fact, McKenzie et al. (2009) claim that as 
managers advance in their careers and strategic decision making is required in conditions of 
uncertainty, the reliance on past experiences becomes detrimental, and more non-
conventional thinking is required for these managers to succeed.  As one of the key 
informants noted, tactical managers learn from strategic managers, so if the appropriate 
behaviours are not enacted by the strategic managers, these behaviours perpetuate throughout 
the hierarchy. 
 
6.1.3. Lack of Application of Approaches Appropriate for Exploratory Innovation 
As presented in section 5.8, while managers think differently about the extent to which 
various considerations apply to the two project types (see Proposition 5), inertia and extant 
corporate culture are viewed as key antecedents of managers applying exploitative 
approaches on exploratory projects (see Proposition 6).   
As it stands, this finding is perhaps the most problematic for the case companies, because, if 
managers resort to the project toolkit used for traditional projects, they may deliver 




project’s failure (Cagan 2017; Baghai et al., 2000; Leifer et al., 2000; Quinn, 1985; Teece, 
Peteraf, & Leih, 2016).  Additionally, as outlined in the Cynefin framework (see section 
2.4.1, esp.  Snowden & Boone, 2007), most exploratory innovation projects fall into the 
‘Complex’ domain, and experimentation (‘probing’ in the Cynefin terminology) is required to 
bring projects from the ‘Complex’ domain to the ‘Complicated’ domain, where more 
traditional approaches could apply. 
For the most part, this finding is supported by the literature.  Organisational inertia leads to 
perpetuation of the old ways of doing things (see Assink, 2006; Blindenbach-Driessen et al., 
2010; Büschgens et al., 2013; Kristiansen & Ritala, 2018; Sharma, 1999; Tushman, 1997).  
Experimentation is key to innovation (Dyer, Gregersen & Christensen, 2019; Ries, 2011, 
2017), yet adoption of Lean Startup method in companies is challenging when executives are 
looking for financial metrics and for a fast ROI (Innovation Leader, 2016), and innovation 
teams are under pressure to predict revenues from disruptive innovation in early stages 
(Assinnk, 2006).  The latter has also been indicated by several key informants as the reason 
for why exploration-appropriate approaches are not being used.    
A study by Karhu (2017) seems at odds with these findings.  Karhu looked at the cognitive 
processes that occur as managers make sense of their situation and choose the optimal choice 
alternative required to resolve a problem, bearing in mind the context involved.   One 
possible reason for the discrepancy with the above findings is that Karhu’s study focused 
only on the idea generation stage of new product development and did not cover the entire 
product lifecycle. 
As discussed in section 5.7.6, several cultural norms (see section 2.2.1.3) can be viewed as 
antecedents of application of exploitation-appropriate techniques and metrics on exploratory 
projects: 
1. Expectation to align metrics of a project to metrics the business is measured on; 
2. a perceived intolerance of failure; 
3. a lack of the “startup mindset”; 
4. expectations of predictable delivery and outcomes;  
5. perceived industry expectations; 




7. lack of incentives; 
8. lack of outside views; 
9. different operational context at a broader organizational level. 
The above findings align with inhibitors of innovation discussed in section 2.2.1.3. 
Ultimately, the inability to detect the relevant context (see section 2.4.1), and the choice of 
metrics and techniques that are not appropriate in particular circumstances may lead to 
suboptimal performance (see Locke et al., 2002; McGrath, 2013; Mumford & Licuanan, 
2004).  
 
6.2. Implications for Theory 
This research makes contributions to the fields of ambidexterity, project management, 
managerial sensemaking, and Repertory Grid Technique, as described below.  
 
6.2.1. Ambidexterity 
This study reported the perceived factors inhibiting exploratory innovation (see section 
6.1.3).  These factors align with findings of Antoncic (2003), Büschgens et al. (2013), Deal & 
Kennedy (1982), Naranjo-Valencia et al. (2011), Tian et al. (2018), and adds to them, by 
offering several additional inhibitors, namely: lack of outside views, a lack of the “startup 
mindset”, and perceived industry expectations.  
Organizational ambidexterity has been researched by various scholars at three different 
levels: firm, project, and individual (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009).  Most extant research 
focuses on the firm level, and relatively little is known on ambidexterity on the individual 
level.  This research answers calls of multiple researchers to examine issues related to 
individual ambidexterity (see Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Bonesso et al., 2014; Papachroni, 
2013; Raisch et al., 2009; Schnellbächer, Heidenreich, & Wald, 2019; Xiang et al., 2019).   
Andriopoulos & Lewis (2009) argue that ambidexterity needs to be managed throughout the 
hierarchy, at each level, leading to reinforcement of ambidexterity in a company.  The present 
research illuminates how managers at each level (strategic vs. tactical – a categorization 




exploitative innovation projects.  Proposition 1 indicates a high degree of agreement 
throughout the hierarchy on issues of importance with some differences on the extent to 
which the approaches differ between the types of project, while Proposition 2 suggests that 
what is implemented in reality may not align with the manager’s sensemaking.   
Bonesso et al. (2014) focused on the issue of enactment of ambidexterity as opposed to 
perceived ambidextrous behaviour by the individuals.  They concluded that full personal 
ambidexterity – where behaviours and perceptions are fully aligned – is not easily achieved 
due to a cognitive dissonance between employees’ expectations from their role and their 
enacted behaviours with respect to exploration and exploitation.  Bonesso et al. (2014) 
suggested that one reason might be a lack of clarity in setting the employees’ role 
expectations.  The present study, especially propositions 4 and 5, offers additional insight into 
this topic: while multiple participants seemed to be aware about the need to apply 
exploration-specific metrics and techniques on exploratory innovation projects, they didn’t 
seem to be applying them in practice, likely due to extant corporate culture and inertia.  
Instead, they may be applying the exploitative-appropriate approaches to a different extent on 
various types of project (see sections 5.7.6 and 5.8). 
Karhu (2017) concluded that managers recognise the dualities involved in a given context 
and make decisions appropriately.  This study offers a different view (see propositions 4 and 
5).  As discussed in section 2.5.4, Karhu’s study was conducted in a different industry, and so 
it is unclear whether managers in her study operated in the same level of complexity (as per 
the Cynefin framework), as the managers in the high-tech industry this study is concerned 
with. 
And so, while individual ambidexterity was clearly the focus of this research, the 
propositions (see section 5.8) have implications to both the project and firm level, answering 
a call by Raisch et al. (2009) to examine how individual factors impact ambidexterity at 
organizational level. 
 
6.2.1.1. Implications for Leadership 
With transformational leadership being a key antecedent in fostering ambidexterity in general 
and innovation in particular (see section 2.3.3), it is important to review the findings of the 




section 5.3.4, constructs that fall in categories most closely aligned with the transformational 
leadership competencies (‘Clarity of objectives and outcomes’, ‘Clarity of vision’, 
‘Organizational alignment’, ‘Motivation and empowerment’, ‘Strong leadership’, and 
‘Executive sponsorship’) have accounted together for less than 25% of all constructs, while 
the other categories relating to the planning, deciding, and resourcing functions of 
management were mentioned more frequently.  However, when these issues were mentioned, 
they were seen as highly important, in Honey’s sense.  As presented in section 5.4.3.2, there 
was no difference between the extent to which the importance was given to these categories 
by the two different levels (tactical and strategic). 
 
6.2.2. Managerial Sensemaking 
Managerial cognitive activities such as perception and interpretation are key to an 
organisation’s success (Ambrosini & Altintas, 2019; Wrona, Ladwig, & Gunnesch, 2013). 
As discussed in section 2.5.3, people construct meaning differently because of their different 
backgrounds, interests and positions (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014) among other reasons.  
This study has shown (see section 5.4.4) that, with respect to project success, there are few 
differences between construing by managers from different levels; most differences in 
construing stem from different functions and from the type of experience managers have.   
This study offers a slightly different angle to findings by Lisboa et al. (2011), who found that, 
while both customer and competitor market orientations are related to exploitative 
capabilities, as a firm tries to strengthen its position in the market, only the customer 
orientation is associated with the exploratory capability.  Managers with both types of 
experiences in this study (see Table 22) gave similar importance to both customer focus and 
market focus.  
Contrary to the author’s expectations from the prior findings by Xu (2011), managers with 
more exploratory experiences did not exhibit higher cognitive complexity.  This may be due 
to the fact that a parallel cannot be fully drawn between entrepreneurs (who were the focus of 
Xu’s study) and managers with exploratory innovation experience (see section 5.4.5).  
And so, this study contributes to the field of managerial sensemaking by exploring how 
managers at different levels (strategic vs. tactical), functions (Product Management vs. 




success in the context of ambidexterity, and in doing so extends and adds to the extant 
research.  It should be noted that ‘sensemaking’ is being used as a more generic term, not 
specifically in Weickian terms.  
 
6.2.3. Project Management, and a Modified Model 
Davis (2014) invited researchers to explore how different stakeholder groups perceive 
success of projects.  She indicated the focus of the extant literature on the role of Project 
Manager and advised to consider additional stakeholders in future research. 
This study attempted to extend the findings of Pankratz & Basten (2014), who focused on 
construing of project success by Information Systems Project Managers in IT departments.  
This study resulted in richer findings by focusing on Product Management managers and 
Engineering managers, and by studying companies in the high-tech industry.  Two major 
differences in results were observed: 
1. Focusing on managers from the Product Management and Engineering functions has 
resulted in a much richer picture with respect to the categories, as compared to the 
Pankratz & Basten (2014) study.  This study’s 15 categories have very little overlap 
with categories resulting from their study.  This finding also aligns with Mcleod & 
Macdonell (2010) who claimed that there is more to the definition of project success 
and failure than the ‘iron triangle’ of cost, schedule, and scope.  They postulated that 
project outcomes may vary based on the perspectives of participants and are 
constructed based on participants’ sensemaking. 
2. The topic of project constraints has a fairly low proportion of 3.3%, being category 
number 12 out of 15 in the order of frequency.  This is a major difference as 
compared to what Pankratz & Basten (2014) report, where the top two categories (that 
in essence comprise the ‘Project Constrains’ category in this study) account for 49.5% 
of all constructs.  As mentioned above, this makes sense as their study focused on a 
different role in the organization.  Additionally, their focus was on information 
systems development in an IT organization, which is a different business environment 
from an R&D organization in a software development company like Company A and 




Additionally as discussed in section 2.4.2, and as presented in Figure 5 (see section 2.4.4) 
based on Baghai et al. (2000) and Moore (2015), exploratory innovation projects go through a 
lifecycle, where, as the time passes, they gradually move from exploration to exploitation, 
hereby requiring a change of techniques and metrics to be applied.  Figure 10 below shows 
the expected behaviour vs. actual behaviour throughout the lifecycle of an exploratory 
project, by overlaying Proposition 5 (see section 5.8) on the model represented in Figure 5 as 
the “actual behaviour”.  
 
 
Figure 10. The Reality of Exploratory Innovation Project Lifecycle.  
Source: Author. 
This revision of the model presented in Figure 5 (see section 2.4.4) indicates a discrepancy 
between what is Expected and what is Actual.  This discrepancy between the expected and 
actual behaviours will be discussed in section 6.3, where the model will be refined to address 
the discrepancy (see Figure 12, section 6.3.6). 
 
6.2.4. Methodological Contribution 
This study has contributed to research on individual ambidexterity using the RGT technique 
to explore how managers construe exploratory and exploitative projects – something that 
does not seem to have been done before.  Repertory Grid Technique is well documented and 






There seems to be little indication in the literature on application of RGT remotely by means 
of virtual conference (c.f. Magni, 2010).  In the current research the present author was not 
able to meet with all respondents face to face; nevertheless, the elicited constructs were fairly 
specific and of high quality as compared with constructs elicited in-person  (as validated in 
the Pilot study, see section 4.5.1).  As discussed in section 3.4.1.2, the author used the 
GoToMeeting virtual conferencing software to conduct the RGT interview.  However, unlike 
Magni (2010), the author did not capture the constructs directly into the grid analysis 
software.  Instead, the data was captured in a single Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, to simplify 
the overall experience.  Additionally, Magni (2010) reported the interviews to take about 30 
minutes, while in this research both the in-person and remote interviews took on average 
about 50 minutes.  And so, the present research contributes to the remote elicitation technique 
by adding to a scarce body of knowledge available on the subject. 
This research has shown that RGT continues to be a viable approach in business and 
corporate context and offered an insight into less documented elicitation techniques.   
 
6.3. Implications for Practice 
Effective management of ambidexterity is an issue of high importance for incumbent 
organizations, especially in the Technology industry, because new entrants introduce their 
products to market continuously, and it is highly likely that the incumbents will get disrupted 
by the new entrants.  Yet, true ambidexterity is hard to achieve.  
It can be argued that Lean Startup techniques offer a more rigorous approach to the 
management of a new venture, whether in a corporate environment or a new startup, than the 
approaches that characterised the ‘dot-com era’ of 20 years ago.  Approaches associated with 
Lean Startup have proven themselves well when applied rigorously and continue to be 
regarded as indispensable for exploratory innovation (Cagan, 2017). 
With this in mind, the findings from this research suggest some issues of concern for project 
management practice in the two participating companies.  If the managers are not evaluating 




and techniques to be applied to drive it to a successful outcome, the consequences for the 
projects in question can be dire (see Cagan 2017; Baghai et al., 2000; Leifer et al., 2000; 
Teece, Peteraf, & Leih, 2016). As one informant put it:  
“In most recent startup we pivoted couple times, and in retrospect we were clearly too 
slow to test hypotheses. Instead, we argued a lot. The startup died because we were 
too slow to find the product-market fit.” (ASEX-7)  
While this reference was to the informant’s prior startup experience, the same holds true for 
exploratory innovation projects in the corporate setting. 
Several recommendations can be made to improve upon this situation.  These 
recommendations are built on the literature review, six propositions arising from the grid 
interviews (see section 5.8), and specific suggestions made by key informants (see section 
5.7.5.3). 
 
6.3.1. Approaches to Change Management 
Cummings & Worley (2008) evaluate several change models: the ‘Levin’s Planned Change 
Model’, the ‘Action Research Model’, and the ‘Positive Model’, and develop what they call 
the ‘General Model of Planned Change’ that draws on the earlier mentioned three models.  
Figure 11 below shows the steps involved in this model. 
 
 
Figure 11. General Model of Planned Change.  
Source: Cummings & Worley (2008, p. 30). 
The last two stages (‘Planning and Implementation’ and ‘Evaluating and Institutionalizing’) 




 Awareness “represents a person’s understanding of the nature of the change, why the 
change is being made and the risk of not changing” (Hiatt, 2006, p.2). 
 Desire “represents the [personal] willingness to support and engage in a change” 
(Hiatt, 2006, p.2). 
 Knowledge “represents the information, training and education necessary to know 
how to change” (Hiatt, 2006, p.2). 
 Ability “represents the realization or execution of the change” (Hiatt, 2006, p.2). 
 Reinforcement “represents those internal and external factors that sustain a change” 
(Hiatt, 2006, p.3). 
Managers in Company A are being proactively trained in the ‘ADKAR’ framework and it is 
sensible to assume that recommendations made in alignment with this framework will be 
easier to absorb, and map to how they already think about change.  
Sections 6.3.2 through 6.3.4 offer recommendations in alignment with ‘ADKAR’, and section 
6.3.5 discusses organizational design considerations in support of the change.  
 
6.3.2. Awareness and Desire 
First, organizations need to ensure that managers are aware of the issue and understand that 
neglecting to recognize the nature of the project and subsequently choosing an inappropriate 
approach may lead to sub-optimal outcomes.  Chermack (2003) argues that not only should 
decision makers understand their mental models, they should also seek to alter them if those 
models are found inadequate for the situation at hand.  Daft & Weick (1984) claim that 
managers should revisit their perceptions about the external environment that may not be as 
analysable as they may have assumed, and therefore they should seek to modify their 
approaches for the interpretation of that environment.   
The revision of mental models is in line with Kelly’s Personal Construct Theory (see section 
2.5.5) which emphasizes that people act as scientists trying to understand the world around 
them, reviewing the lessons of experience (the ‘Experience Corollary’) in a search for 




This form of perceptual awareness and amendment can be achieved by awareness campaigns 
jointly led by senior Product Management and Engineering leaders.  These leaders may need 
to attend a training or partner with one of the companies specialising in Lean Startup 
consulting.   
 
6.3.2.1. Implications for Senior Managers 
Senior managers should ensure that managers develop an intrinsic motivation to succeed (see 
Cummings & Worley, 2008), by developing an understanding of how they might best lead: 
that they can achieve success at work through recognition of exploratory projects and 
application of exploration-specific approaches on these projects.  With leaders being 
propagators of change, an executive coaching strategy can be adopted for senior leaders in 
the organization to improve their ability to lead change, improve support for innovation, and 
develop ability to recognize different types of circumstances (see Dyson et al., 2019).  
Executive coaching was found to be an effective technique in leadership development 
(Kombarakaran et al., 2008), increasing the development of the managers (Rekalde et al., 
2017; Thach, 2002) and more effective than other methods in sustaining change in managers’ 
behaviour (Rekalde et al., 2017).  In particular, executive coaching was found to have a 
significant impact on personal competencies of project managers’ behaviour related to coping 
with uncertainty (Ballesteros-Sánchez et al., 2019), which can be related to uncertainty 
inherent in exploratory innovation.  As was discussed in section 2.3.3.1, it is recommended 
for managers to adjust their leadership style if circumstances demand that, keeping in mind 
that such a change might prove a challenge to a manager.   
 
6.3.3. Knowledge and Ability 
Managers need to possess exploratory innovation competencies to succeed with radical 
innovation (see March, 1991; Raisch et al., 2009).  Thornberry (2003) found that managers in 
corporations can be trained to act as entrepreneurs and drive new value creation for these 
companies.  There are multiple ways to learn entrepreneurial approaches, and one of the best 
is – by doing (Byrne et al., 2016).  Workshops, partnerships with incubators, and accelerators 
are different ways companies can get hands-on experience with the methodology (Innovation 
Leader, 2016).  Dyson et al. (2019) indicate that for learnings to stick in the workplace, 




Any knowledge training would have a higher chance to stick and see an application in 
practice in an organization that is supportive of change and incorporates Organizational 
Development (see Cummings & Worley, 2008) approaches (see section 6.3.5).  Additionally, 
training that is tied to business goals has a higher likelihood to see implementation in the 
workplace (De Smet et al., 2012). 
Byrne et al. (2016) describe a successful application of the ‘Action Learning’ approach (see 
Revans, 1998) to acquiring multi-disciplinary knowledge associated with entrepreneurship.  
They show evidence of participants’ intent to become more self-aware, behave proactively in 
their organization, and laying the ground for knowledge exchange through networking (yet 
another skill acquired in training).   
While the full-scale ‘Action Learning’ approach could be expensive (see Byrne et al., 2016), 
the basic provision of relevant knowledge components could be feasible in the form of a two-
day workshop targeting around 25 participants at a cost of between $25,000 and $50,000 
depending on provider and topic. 
Investing in internal training has shown to lead to higher organizational effectiveness in terms 
of outcomes (Obi-Anike & Ekwe, 2014; Savery & Luks, 2004; Shah & Gupta, 2018) and 
higher effectiveness in employee innovative performance (see Sung & Choi, 2014). 
For managers, the most important step in the process is to actually stop and think about the 
project, classify it as either exploitative or exploratory, and deliberately choose metrics and 
techniques appropriate for the situation.  Incorrect classification of issues as simple in the 
context of Cynefin framework (see Kurtz & Snowden, 2003) is one of the dangers leaders 
face (Snowden & Boone, 2007).  Moreover, it is key to continue and re-evaluate projects as 
they go through their lifecycle and move from exploration to exploitation (see Figures 5, 10, 
and 12). 
Several recommendations made by informants (see section 5.7.5.3) are relevant in this 
context: 
1. Call exploratory projects out explicitly (ASEX-7). 
2. Tactical managers need to ask their managers (strategic managers) to hold them 




Leaders can use Moore’s ‘Zone-To-Win’ framework, which offers concrete practical means 
of identifying projects belonging to each of the three horizons, and follow recommendations 
of Cagan (2017), McClure (2007), Owens & Fernandez (2014) , and Ries (2017) to identify 
the exploration-appropriate techniques (experimentation, proving desirability, feasibility, and 
viability of ideas) and metrics (customer and user traction metrics) to increase the chances of 
success with exploratory innovation projects (see sections 2.4.2.2 and 2.4.3.2).  Figure 12 in 
section 6.3.6 will summarize this and other recommendations in a way of a model.  
 
6.3.3.1. Implications for Learning 
Organizational learning takes place at multiple levels: organizational, leadership, team, and 
individual level, and is shown to create a sustained advantage reflected in such outcomes as 
increase in financial and knowledge performance (see Reese & Hunter, 2016).  In times of 
uncertainty, typically associated with exploratory innovation, middle managers have shown 
propensity to take on additional ownership and were motivated to learn (Reese & Hunter, 
2016).  Middle-managers mindset prior to attending a training program has shown to be a 
moderator of the type of change undertaken by them upon completion of training (Spreitzer 
& Quinn, 1996).  Pulling on the transformational leadership theory, leaders possessing and 
exhibiting the ‘Individualized consideration’ capability (see section 2.3.3) such as coaching, 
are likely to see a positive impact on innovation outcomes (see Rouseau, 2012) and in that 
influence the organizational learning and outcomes.  It’s important to remember, that 
coaching requires leaders to acquire a ‘coaching mindset’ which needs to be a deliberate 
decision on a leader’s part (Bianchi & Steele, 2014).  The approach to coaching may need to 
be adjusted based on the context, such as the national culture (see Dodds & Grajfoner, 2018).  
While Cultural Values expressed at a national level were one of 3 superordinate themes, (the 
other two being ‘Business Environment’ and ‘Approach and Methods)’, organisational 
culture was seen as important, under the ‘Business Environment’ theme (Dodds & Grajfoner, 
2018, p. 97). 
 
6.3.4. Reinforcement 
Companies might make use of assessment models and innovation capability maturity models 
(e.g Gatignon et al., 2002; Saunila & Ukko, 2012; Sun et al., 2012) to understand their 




Frameworks like BSC (Decoene & Bruggeman, 2006; Ivanov & Avasilcăi, 2013; Kasie & 
Belay, 2013; Montgomery & Perry, 2011) were mentioned in section 2.3.4.4 in the context of 
addressing the agency issues.  BSC is widely used by large companies and can be leveraged 
for introduction and enforcement of the right Key Performance Indicators (KPIs).  Innovation 
projects thrive on trial and error, and experimentation and learning should be measured 
(McGrath, 2013).  Muller et al., (2005) suggest tracking the number of ongoing experiments 
as one of the key metrics of a company’s performance.  Innovation Accounting (IA) should 
be introduced for projects identified as exploratory (Ries, 2017). 
Additionally, companies may need to revisit their processes that have to do with the new 
product development lifecycle.  Several recommendations were made by key informants in 
this regard (see section 5.7.5.3): 
 Have a process for validating hypotheses and celebrate failures (ASPX-2). 
 Introduce a clear process for exploratory innovation (ASEX-6). 
 Improve the discovery and validation processes (ASEX-9). 
 Introduce artificial constraints to resemble the startup environment (BSPX-12, ASPX-
5). 
Section 6.3.5 will discuss in more detail how Organizational Design approaches can help the 
change persist. 
 
6.3.5. Organizational Design and Support 
The suggestions outlined above rest on an Organizational Development (OD) approach (see 




As was discussed in section 5.8, one of the antecedents of the issue at hand is the presence of 
a culture that fosters a focus on revenue-based metrics and undervalues the approaches of 
hypothesis-based experimentation.  Many scholars argue for innovation and ambidexterity to 




2008; Pisano, 2015; Ries, 2017; Saleh & Wang, 1993); Autonomy and experimentation in 
particular are some key innovation capabilities corroborated by other authors (e.g. Cagan, 
2017; Edison et al., 2018; Owens & Fernandez, 2014; Ries, 2017). 
To be successful, companies will need to deliberately reassess the sets of metrics they use to 
track execution of exploratory projects (especially in the early phases of these projects) and 
balance the revenue-based with non-revenue-based metrics (see Cagan, 2017; Ries, 2017).  
Lean Startup approaches need to be promoted throughout.  These, perhaps, are the hardest 
changes that the company needs to undergo to make their exploratory projects successful, and 
the complexity of implementing this recommendation should not be underestimated.  As 
there seems to be an alignment between the ‘Strategic’ and ‘Tactical’ sub-groups on the topic 
of ‘Methodologies’, ‘Customer Focus’, and ‘Market Focus’ (see section 5.4.3.2), it is 
reasonable to suggest that once the awareness of Lean Startup approaches increases, the 
alignment can be achieved on this topic as well, since many of this method’s considerations 
would map to these categories.  Companies that will be successful at challenging their 
policies and confronting their basic assumptions will achieve what Argyris (1977) calls 
‘double-loop-learning’ (see section 2.5.2).  Figure 12 in section 6.3.6 will summarize this and 
other recommendations in a way of a model.   
 
6.3.5.2. Structure  
Case companies may need to go through what Covin & Miles (1999) call organisational 
rejuvenation – modifications an organisation applies to its structure, processes or capabilities 
to improve its competitive standing.  Companies switching to ambidextrous designs saw 
more positive innovation outcomes (Tushman et al., 2010).   
Several options are available to companies:  
1. Separate exploratory projects into a deliberately created structure optimized for 
exploratory innovation.  Naranjo-Valencia et al. (2011) have found that hierarchical 
cultures promote imitation, while adhocracies (cultures emphasizing grows, learning, 
and flexibility) promote innovation.  Their findings are corroborated by Tian et al. 
(2018).  O’Reilly & Tushman (2008) argue that separately aligned organisational 




exploration and exploitation subunits, and targeted integration increase the likelihood 
of ambidexterity. 
2. Ries (2017) proposes for organisations to instantiate the entrepreneurial function to 
facilitate the exploration-specific approaches where appropriate throughout the 
company.   
In the present author’s opinion, the likelihood of instantiating the entrepreneurial function 
would be relatively low, as the idea is relatively new, and it is not a common practice in the 
industry the case companies operate in.   
The act of separating exploratory innovation projects into a separate structure can be 
challenging if major changes that impact roles and reporting relationships are involved.  
However, separating teams working on exploratory innovation projects into a separate group 
with exploration-specific rules without making significant changes to the structure itself 
would be a relatively straightforward change.  As an example, a company may have 10 teams 
working on a particular product.  Once an exploratory project is pulled from the product 
backlog requiring 3 of these teams to implement it, the approach would be to call these 3 
teams out and set expectations with them in terms of type of metrics to use, type of 
approaches to leverage, while providing the necessary training and support.  At times, this 
may require shifting personnel between different teams, but should not require changing 
reporting.   
 
6.3.5.3. Experience 
As the findings indicate, experience is one of the leading indicators of differences in how 
managers think about project success.  Moreover, experience with actual startups (not within 
the corporate walls), operating within real constraints of time and money, leads to a very 
different sensemaking process that managers learn from and take with themselves to the 
corporate world.  Prior startup experience (especially one developed through multiple 
startups) leads to development of an entrepreneurial mindset (Burke et al., 2018; Dahl & 
Reichstein, 2007; Politis, 2008).  Entrepreneurial experience results in development and 
subsequent use of entrepreneurial heuristics (Busenitz and Barney 1997).   




1. Augment the hiring strategy for management positions in the Product Management 
and Engineering functions with candidates with prior startup experience. 
2. Hire ‘Entrepreneur-in-Residence’ (see George, 2010) – an executive with prior startup 
experience, who would help evaluate the projects, help classify them, and help the 
project teams and managers choose appropriate metrics and techniques.   
One particular recommendation made by informants (see section 5.7.5.3) is relevant in this 
context: 
 Bring “outside views” – people from outside of organization (BSEX-8). 
Introduction of a change agent is considered to be one of the OD techniques (see Cummings 
& Worley, 2008).  However, the question often arises whether to bring an external 
management consultant or  a member of the top management team (see Ginsberg & 
Abrahamson, 1991).  In fact, Ginsberg & Abrahamson (1991) found that external 
management consultants are more effective in influencing the executive mindset, rather than 
in driving a strategic change.  It is sensible to offer a hybrid approach, where an external 
consultant is used in early stages of change management, followed by a change agent on 
staff, to continuously drive the strategic change.   
 
6.3.6. Summary, and a Recommended Model 
This section has discussed implications of findings for practice and offered multiple 
recommendations that companies A and B, and similar companies in similar circumstances 
could apply to improve chances of success of their exploratory projects.  The author has built 
on recommendations offered by key informants, who hold senior positions in the 
participating companies, increasing the likelihood to receive support for the 
recommendations made in this section.   
The ‘ADKAR’ change management framework was used as the basis for this chapter’s 
outline, and OD principles were leveraged to indicate how the change can persist and 
succeed.   
To summarize how the findings and recommendations made so far influence the managerial 
decision-making process in the context of ambidexterity, a conceptual model can be 




‘Double-Loop Learning’ (see sections 2.2.2.1, 2.5.2), the author’s own model developed in 
section 2.4.4 (Figure 5), and the recommendations presented in section 6.3. 
 
 
Figure 12. Recommended Model for Change 
Source: Author. 
In this model, a project is examined to determine the appropriate type (exploitative or 
exploratory).  Once the evaluation is complete and the project is classified appropriately, a 
decision would be made about which of Moore’s ‘Zones’ it belongs to, and appropriate 
techniques and metrics chosen to drive this project to a successful outcome.  As discussed in 
section 2.4.2.1, Moore (2015) mapped the three horizons of innovation to four zones, three of 
them relevant to new products a company creates.  In his model, Horizon 1 (H1) projects map 
to the ‘Performance Zone’ (core product and services contributing 10% or more to the bottom 
line); Horizon 2 (H2) maps to the ‘Transformation Zone’ (these projects are being accelerated 
to become Horizon 1 projects in near future); and Horizon 3 (H3) maps to the ‘Incubation 
Zone‘ (where most early stage innovation projects are).  Over time, the project needs to be re-
evaluated, and if it is determined that it moved from exploration to exploitation –the approach 
would be adjusted.  
It may be observed, that the flow described in the recommendation above resembles Kelly’s 




recognition that the project at hand needs to be evaluated to determine a project type; Pre-
emption to the decision on whether the project is exploratory or exploitative; and finally, 
Choice to a series of decisions about metrics and techniques to be applied to the project at 
hand.  Of course, the recommendation discussed in this section goes beyond the construct-
level CPC Decision Cycle and may lead to replacement of some of the previously existing 
constructs with fresh ones, as well as to a possible shift in values.   
The recommended decision-making process described above would need to be supported by a 
company’s organizational design, the leadership team’s behaviours (see section 6.5.3.1), as 
well as management awareness, knowledge, and ability to make the appropriate choice of 
approaches, according to the recommendations made in sections 6.3.2 to 6.3.5. 
 
6.3.6.1. Shaping Culture for Successful Change 
Any major change in the management process will likely involve a culture change (see 
Schein, 2004).  A company’s culture is shaped by leaders’ behaviour and the values, rules, 
and norms that are being communicated, fostered, and enacted (Schein, 2004).  This is where 
the transformational leadership competencies, in particular those associated with ‘idealized 
leadership’, ‘inspirational motivation’, and ‘intellectual stimulation’ (see section 2.3.3) 
become critical in shaping the culture fostering behaviours associated with successful 
exploratory innovation.  Additionally, leaders whose identity is more collective (as opposed 
to individual) may increase their effectiveness in shaping culture, when combined with 
exhibiting transformational behaviours (see Johnson et al., 2012).   
 
6.3.7. Reflections: Some Immediate Implications for the Author’s Practice 
The tension between exploitation and exploration is not a mere theory, but a constant reality, 
which is also being experienced in the author’s own practice.  It often happens that a project 
with exploratory characteristics is treated as exploitative, with some unremarkable 
modifications: a greater emphasis on customer communication, and prototyping, for example.  
However, since no deliberate effort is being made to evaluate and classify these projects and 
choose the appropriate approaches and metrics accordingly, many aspects remain in an 




Through RGT interviews with the managers from various levels and functions, the author 
learned not only how these managers think about project success, but why they think the way 
they do.  It was somewhat positively surprising to hear that most managers do indeed 
recognize the value of Lean Startup techniques and realize the need to measure exploratory 
projects differently, and it was eye opening to realize that even though this knowledge exists 
to various degrees, the application of it in practice is not as straight forward as might be 
expected.  This is where the author came to truly realize the power of RGT technique, which 
helps translate tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge – a result that would have been harder 
to achieve with a more traditional semi-structured interview.    
Coincidentally, as the work on this thesis was coming to an end, the author’s product 
development organization became involved in a new product investment.  Armed with the 
knowledge gained from the thesis so far, the author was able to educate the various 
stakeholders in the Engineering and Product functions on the need to evaluate and classify the 
project, and then choose appropriate approaches and metrics that are very different from an 
exploitative project.   
A more recent example is particularly interesting.  A charismatic senior manager in the 
author’s organization has recently reviewed some of the practices that we used to follow 
without regard to the fact that the company is changing from a traditional on-premises 
deployment model of our software to a cloud-based deployment.  He emphasized that our 
approaches to date have not accounted for the fact that cloud software business has different 
characteristics and requires different approaches and metrics.  His presentation and message 
have resonated well with the Engineering and Product Management teams, and his 
recommendations were immediately reflected on several projects, without any call to action 
on his part.  This exemplifies the power of transformational leadership discussed in sections 
2.3.3.1, 6.3.5.1, 6.3.6.1, and makes the current author more confident in the success of the 
recommendations made above. 
 
6.4. Research Limitations 
The case study method requires rigour to ensure validity and reliability of the research (Yin, 
2017).  Sections 3.3.2, 3.4.1, and 3.4.2 discuss how this research approaches the case study 
method, the Repertory Grid Technique (RGT) with its built-in reliability procedures, and the 




As discussed in sections 3.3.2 and 6.1, ‘analytic generalisation’ aims to generalise from the 
study to a variety of situations, in which shared theoretical assumptions apply.  In the case of 
this study, the findings may be applicable to other established high-tech companies, 
especially in the Enterprise Software market who try to pursue ambidexterity whether as part 
of a deliberate or an emergent strategy (see Glossary).   
Additionally, interview techniques have been criticized due to a possible researcher bias 
(Patton, 2002).  Researcher bias was addressed in section 3.3.2, where the emphasis is given 
to the fact that RGT is known to address the researcher bias.  Additionally, in the 
constructivist paradigm relying on PCT, a researcher’s analysis is not given a privileged 
epistemological status with respect to the understanding displayed by the person being 
researched; both are engaged in sensemaking, and a positive value is attached to collaboration 
in this activity (see Denicolo et al., 2016).  And finally, reliability checks (see sections 
3.4.1.3, 5.3) were performed to make sure the categories of meaning were agreed upon 
between the researcher and a colleague.   
Nevertheless, several limitations should be noted: 
1. This research has focused on middle managers only.  However, individual Product 
Managers, Architects, and Distinguished Engineers – all have major impact on vision, 
product roadmap, and tactical execution.  Alignment with these individual 
contributors may also be interesting to explore, especially in context of the Agency 
theory. 
2. While both participating companies were multi-national, the majority of the 
respondents (24 out of 25) where based in the US.  A broader net could have been cast 
to include respondents from other regions.  This would have also presented an 
opportunity for ‘embedded multiple-case study’ design (see Yin, 2017).   
3. While the respondents provided six projects from their own experience, no 
information about these projects has been collected.  Such information could have 
provided additional insight into the projects and could have provided an additional 
avenue for interpretation and triangulation.  However, this might need a major and 
separate study given the complexity involved in such projects, with a design allowing, 
for example, a comparison of exploratory projects with more market uncertainty vs. 




4. This study assumed a matrixed organization typical for a Software company and 
didn’t take into consideration whether respondents from the tactical level had any 
reporting relationship with any other respondents from the strategic level, especially 
since the focus of the study was on the question of alignment throughout the 
hierarchy. 
 
6.5. Areas for Further Research 
This case study research has helped identify patterns and themes in the way middle managers 
in two high-tech companies construe exploratory and exploitative projects.  The 
generalizability of this study could be further improved by expanding the research to other 
geographies where these companies operate, and to other similar companies in the industry. 
Additional areas of research could expand on and add to the findings of this research: 
1. A similar research in smaller organizations: from early stage to late stage startups, and 
mid-size high-tech companies.  This research would focus on cultural antecedents 
fostering or impeding the application of exploration specific metrics and techniques to 
exploratory innovation projects.   
2. A longitudinal study of managers from Product Management and Engineering 
functions throughout an exploratory innovation project in a large high-tech company, 
to learn more details of their construing and decision making on a project at hand.  
This study could explore their construing as opposed to the enacted behaviours on 
projects.   
3. As indicated in the previous section, individual contributors in the Product 
Management and Engineering functions drive many decisions in a high-tech 
company.  A similar study of individual contributors in these functions could increase 
the generalizability of the findings. 
4. In organizations where more formal reporting relationships are preserved on projects 
(as opposed to a matrix organization for project execution), it might be interesting to 
evaluate how managers in a given reporting structure construe exploratory and 
exploitative project success.  Conversely, a further analysis of matrixed organizations 




themselves with different organizational structures (functional vs. project) at the same 
time (see Arvidsson, 2009). 
5. A similar study could be conducted with a significant emphasis on characteristics of 
projects being discussed with the participants.  Such information could provide an 
additional avenue for interpretation and triangulation and allow to compare these 
projects across various characteristics, such as: 
a. Exploratory projects with more market uncertainty vs. exploratory projects 
with more technology uncertainty; 
b. Exploratory projects aimed at introducing a new product vs. exploratory 
projects aimed at introducing an existing product to a new market; 
c. Projects that utilized appropriate techniques and metrics vs. projects that 
didn’t; 
d. Projects that achieved stated outcomes vs. projects that didn’t. 
6. Several of the informants indicated that while there is an alignment in how managers 
throughout the hierarchy think about project success, it may not be what is happening 
in practice.  Research on correlation between the alignment in how managers think vs. 
what is happening in reality could shed more light on the phenomenon.  
7. One possible avenue for further research could be to explore how managers perceive 
their managers.  For example, it might be interesting to explore whether the tactical 
managers’ perceptions of the strategic managers match that of the strategic managers 
themselves, and what role do behaviours associated with transactional and 
transformational leadership styles play in shaping these perceptions.   
8. An ‘Action Research’ method-based study (see Cummings & Worley, 2008; Ritchie 
et al., 2014) could usefully be undertaken to explore the impact of cultural change in 
general, and transformational leadership in particular, as the result of incorporating 








This chapter has reviewed the findings of this research in light of the literature, and clarified 
contributions to theory and implications for business practice.  Recommendations were made 
on how to approach the challenges surfaced by the findings, and a model of recommended 
behaviour was developed.  Limitations of this research were discussed, and areas of further 
research were offered. 
In conclusion, the author believes that for achieving success with exploratory innovation 
projects in the context of ambidexterity, clear distinction is required between the types of 
project a company undertakes, and appropriate techniques and metrics need to be tailored 
accordingly.  This is only possible if managers are not only aware of the differences between 
the project types, but routinely recognize these differences, and deliberately apply the 
appropriate approaches.  The pre-requisite is a culture that fosters such approach to 
exploratory innovation and does not enforce uniform behaviours irrespective of a project’s 
type.  The author is under no illusion that some of the changes proposed in section 6.3 may 
not be feasible for the case companies, or at least may require significant effort to implement.  









Appendix 1 – Grid Examples 
Appendix 1a – Pilot Study In-Person Interview Example 
 
  
In this interview we will use a technique called Repertory Grid. With this 
technique, we will be capturing how you think about exploratory (novel) and 
exploitative (incremental) projects.
These will be a series of opposites which are called constructs. Example: 
"more successful" vs. "less successful" is a construct. 
Our focus is on factors that make a project successful in terms of techniques 
and metrics associated with projects.
Your confidentiality and privacy is guaranteed, and this grid will be coded for 
anonymity.
This form will be sent back to you for review and signature to make sure you 






























































































In what follows, I will be asking you to compare 3 projects at a time, and will 
ask you to tell me in what way are two of them are similar, and different from 
the third. 
You're thinking of particular projects now or in the past, at this company. 
Bear in mind that each project has it's own nuances, and that the business 
environment and circumstances vary, so that different constraints impact how 
you approach setting the project up for success. What sort if things happened 
with these projects, that made a difference between a successful and a less 
successful outcome? 
In your response please consider things like approach used to drive the 
project, or the way the project success was measured.
Emergent Pole E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E9 E10 Implicit Pole
Overall, approaches used were more effective for project 
success 2 1 5 2 4 2 1 1
Overall, approaches used were less effective for project 
success
Business-minded value outcome
1 3 5 2 4 1 2 1
Technology in a search of a solution
Clear KPIs established at the outset
2 1 5 3 5 2 2 2
No clear KPIs established at the outset
Customer-driven input early in the project
1 1 3 2 4 3 3 1
Customer input/validation before shipping
Product managers not co-located with Engineering
4 5 1 3 5 4 4 4
Product managers co-located with engineering
Had no financial KPIs associated with outcomes
4 4 2 5 1 4 3 4
Clear financial metrics associated with outcomes
Strong Design & User Research teams collaboration 
1 2 1 4 3 2 3 1
Little to no Design and User Research involvement
Design team deeply understands the problem space
1 1 3 2 4 2 3 1
Design team's involvement is limited to basic UI design
Rigorous backlog management with respect to 
prioritization and grooming 1 2 4 1 5 2 2 2
No rigorous backlog management process
Objective way to prioritize based on prioritization 
frameowrk like RICE 2 4 5 4 4 2 4 1
No clear prioritization framework
Clear executive sponsorship to protect resources
1 3 4 3 5 3 4 2
No clear executive sponsorship
Strong cross-company buy-in
1 3 3 1 4 2 3 2
Most teams were indifferent
Get to a shippable increment/MVP as soon as possibvle 
to have people experience the product 3 2 4 2 5 2 3 1
Wait too long to ship
Have empathy with personas you are trying to 
impact/serve 1 2 4 2 5 2 4 1








































ASP2-12- Get to a shippable increment/MVP as soon as possible to have people 
experience the product –  Wait too long to ship; 
 ASP2-3- Customer driven input early in the project – Customer input/validation before 
shipping;  
ASP2-13- Have empathy with personas you are trying to impact/serve – Not connecting 
with the persona you are trying to impact/serve; 
BTER2-9- One way feedback from customer on a quarter delay – Fast feedback loop 
responding to customer;  
BSE1-2- No community engagement – Community driven product; 
ASP2-7- Design team deeply understands the problem space – Design team’s 
involvement is limited to basic UI design;  
ATE1-5- Development relied on data (telemetry) – No data available to help make 
decisions;  
ASP2-1- Business-minded value outcome – Technology in search of a solution;  
BSE1-10- Market was not ready for the product – Market was ready for the market 
Agile 
Approaches 
ATE1-1- Agile spikes were needed to reduce uncertainty – Spikes were not needed as 
there was less uncertainty; 
ATE1-6- Followed Agile practices more closely – Did not follow Agile practices (more 
disorganized); 
ATE1-11- Followed good practices for quality controls (unit testing, automation) – 
Quality control was an afterthought; 
ASP2-8- Rigorous backlog management with respect to prioritization and grooming – No 
rigorous backlog management process; 
ASP2-9- Objective way to prioritize based on prioritization framework like RICE – No 
clear prioritization framework; 
BSE1-3- Moving teams towards iterative development – Leaving the process alone; 
BSE1-6- Good definition of done – No good definition of done; 




BTE2-3- Minimize time and effort spent – Achieve feature milestones; 
BTE2-5- Assigned to the team – Assigned to me; 
BTE2-4- Improving quality and usability, minimizing defects and Supports escalations – 
Optimizing ongoing operations; 
BTE2-1- Assigned smaller more concreate coding tasks – More elaborate project 
management and overall project strategy; 
BTE2-11- Coarse grained tracking (Epics, stories) with road-mapping tools like Aha!; 




BTE2-8- Customer expectation is for issues and new features to be addressed on a 




ASP2-2- Clear KPIs established at the outset – No clear KPIs established at the outset; 
ASP2-5- Had no financial KPIs associated with outcomes – Clear financial metrics 
associated with outcomes; 
BSE1-5- Did not have well defined leading indicators – Well defined leading indicators to 
project success 9work burndown); 
BTE2-7- Easily trackable metrics (bug reports) – Have not been able to define good 
metrics yet; 
BTE2-6- Had deadlines – Did not have deadlines; 
BTE2-10- Starting out with well-defined milestones – Starting out with no or ill-defined 
milestones 
Resourcing ATE1-3- Shared Resources – Dedicated resources; 
ATE1-7- Dedicated Product Owner with regular engagement – Less PO guidance; 
ATE1-10- Dedicated Scrum Master – No dedicated Scrum Master; 
BSE1-9- Dedicated Project Manager – No dedicated Project Manager 
Executive 
Sponsorship 
ASP2-10- Clear executive sponsorship to protect resources – No clear executive 
sponsorship; 
BSE1-4- Had strong executive commitment – Marginal executive support; 
ASP2-11- Strong cross-company buy-in – Most teams were indifferent 
Collaboration BTE2-2- Cross Team collaboration and coordination – Personnel management within a 
single team; 
ASP2-6- Strong Design & User Research teams’ collaboration – Little to no Design and 
User Research involvement; 
BTE2-12- Authority is required to direct the team – Influence other teams 
Team 
Location 
ATE1-2- Co-location led to smoother planning and execution – Lack of co-location led to 
more coordination and planning; 
ASP2-4- Product managers not co-located with engineering – Product managers co-
located with engineering 
Project 
Uncertainty 
ATE1-4- Vision of how to achieve the end result was clear – Vision of ow to achieve the 
end result was ambiguous; 
BSE1-7- Really clear product definition – No clear product definition 
Team 
Structure 
ATE1-9- Teams were sized appropriately for easier communication and coordination – 
Teams were not sized appropriately leading to less efficient communication and 
coordination; 



















Appendix 4 – Constructs by Respondents 
This appendix presents all 307 constructs grouped by and sorted by respondents. 
Construct ID is coded according to the following key: 
[Company A|B][Level Strategic=S |Tactical=T][Function Product 
Management=P|Engineering=E][Experience Exploratory=X|Exploitative=I][interviewee 
number within a company]-[construct number for an interviewee] 
For example, ATPI3-4 means: Company A, Tactical, Product Management, Experience with 
Exploitative projects, 3rd interviewee from the Company A, construct number 4. 
%SIM stands for Similarity Score, as described in section 3.4.1.3. 
H-I-L stands for High, Intermediate, Low score calculated as part of Honey’s Analysis, as 
described in section 3.4.1.3. 
Emergent Pole is the first part of the construct elicited, indicating in what way two projects I 
a triad were similar. 
Implicit Pole is the second (contrasting aspect) of the construct elicited, indicating in what 
way the third project in a triad was different.  
Ideal Exploitative and Ideal Exploratory projects are the two supplied elements as 













ASEI8-1 Used modern development practices Used old school development practices 84.4% H 1 1 
ASEI8-10 An imposed deadline A negotiated deadline 78.1% I 5 5 
ASEI8-11 Teams were co-located Teams were geo-distributed 81.3% I 1 1 
ASEI8-12 Non-negotiable operating principles 
known to all 
Did not have clear operating principles 87.5% H 1 1 
ASEI8-13 Success criteria was known to all Success criteria was not clear 84.4% H 1 1 
ASEI8-14 Risks were visible and transparent Risks were not visible 87.5% H 1 1 
ASEI8-15 Project planning was a community 
exercise 
Project planning was not jointly done 87.5% H 1 1 
ASEI8-16 The "why" was clear The "why" was not clear 78.1% I 1 1 
ASEI8-2 Iterated on requirements Set requirements ahead of time 
(requirements locked) 
81.3% I 1 2 
ASEI8-3 Closely collaborated with product design Design was an afterthought 78.1% I 1 2 
ASEI8-4 Had data to make data-driven decisions Did not have data for making decisions 81.3% I 2 1 
ASEI8-5 Were willing to make changes based on 
data 
Unwilling to make changes based on data 93.8% H 2 1 
ASEI8-6 Cross-team coordination for delivery Work was self-contained in a single team 81.3% I 5 5 
ASEI8-7 Tactical need, driven by Sales team Strategic, driven by product leadership 68.8% L 5 3 
ASEI8-8 Product had a clear customer value Enabler feature / capability 65.6% L 3 2 
ASEI8-9 Success defined by mere delivery of a 
feature 
Success defined with KPIs beyond delivery 
of a feature 
81.3% I 5 5 
ASEX6-1 A combination of Hardware and Software Hardware only or Software only 71.9% I 5 5 
ASEX6-10 Customer partnership and commitment 
from day 0 (customer got stock) 
Solution developed in-house then looked 
for a market 
84.4% H 1 3 
ASEX6-11 A well-defined methodology agreed upon 
across teams 




ASEX6-12 Early prototypes, mock-ups, demonstrable 
product 
Big Bang delivery 78.1% I 1 1 
ASEX6-13 Heavy reliance on automated verification Manual testing 81.3% H 1 3 
ASEX6-2 Small and highly qualified self-directed 
team 
Ad-hoc team, more junior, less domain 
knowledge 
90.6% H 1 3 
ASEX6-3 A clear vision about what market we are 
going after 
Less clarity about target market 78.1% I 3 1 
ASEX6-4 Driven by a passionate engineer PM driven requirements without clear 
purpose 
81.3% H 1 3 
ASEX6-5 Rigorous development methodology to 
deal with cutting edge technology 
Managing technological evolution, a 
derivative of existing technology 
56.3% L 2 5 
ASEX6-6 Follow the open-source practices, 
constrained by existing technology 
Proprietary technology- had full freedom to 
innovate 
59.4% L 3 5 
ASEX6-7 Heavy experimentation & technology 
investigation 
Less experimentation due to higher 
certainty 
62.5% L 3 5 
ASEX6-8 Managing 3rd parties All in-house, full control 62.5% L 3 5 
ASEX6-9 Everyone on the team had team-level 
incentive (fail or succeed together) 
Individual level incentives and 
consequences 
62.5% L 3 5 
ASEX7-1 A small visionary team An army of engineers and managers 78.1% H 1 4 
ASEX7-10 Had team efficiency/productivity metrics 
in place 
Team productivity was not measured 81.3% H 5 1 
ASEX7-11 Had flexibility in direction The direction was set in stone 68.8% I 1 3 
ASEX7-12 Had exceptional performers on the team Had average performers on the team 84.4% H 1 3 
ASEX7-13 Frequent cadence of customer facing 
releases 
Big Bang releases 68.8% I 2 1 
ASEX7-2 Projects had a realistic deadline The deadline was not realistic 75.0% H 4 1 
ASEX7-3 Had a benevolent dictator at the helm Had a committee in charge 75.0% H 2 4 
ASEX7-4 Had a big legacy market to deal with Started fresh with a new customer base 56.3% L 5 2 




ASEX7-6 Fully expected to build entirely in house Fully expected to buy technology or 
product 
84.4% H 3 1 
ASEX7-7 Highly resource constrained High budget available 71.9% I 4 4 
ASEX7-8 Internally facing product Externally facing product 53.1% L 5 5 
ASEX7-9 In person customer discovery Aggregate customer data 75.0% H 1 4 
ASPX10-1 Co-located resources Distributed resources 81.3% L 1 1 
ASPX10-
10 
Had true believers, champions (SEs, 
Sales) in the field 
No interest from the field 78.1% L 1 1 
ASPX10-
11 
Ability to measure success (DAU) in 
terms of having the right metrics, and data 
Not being able to measure success 78.1% L 1 1 
ASPX10-
12 
Ability to leverage the organization in 
terms of drawing attention from outside 
the product team, and show what's in it for 
them 
Inability to leverage the organization 
outside of the product team  
90.6% H 1 2 
ASPX10-2 More rigorous project management with 
meetings, milestones, and action items 
Less rigorous, more unstructured project 
management 
96.9% H 1 2 
ASPX10-3 Involved prototyping (POC) to reduce 
feasibility risk 
Prototyping was not required as risk was 
low 
84.4% I 1 2 
ASPX10-4 Strong Engineering management Lack of strong Eng management 87.5% I 1 2 
ASPX10-5 Had a strong stakeholder buy-in Did not have a strong stakeholder buy-in 81.3% L 1 1 
ASPX10-6 Had clear goals, objectives Did not have clear goals and objectives 87.5% I 1 1 
ASPX10-7 The "why" was clearly articulated The "why" was not clear 87.5% I 1 1 
ASPX10-8 The team was very motivated The team was not highly motivated 87.5% I 1 2 
ASPX10-9 Had a clear customer demand for the new 
capability 
Driven by internal vision 75.0% L 2 2 
ASPX2-1 Business-minded value outcome Technology in a search of a solution 84.4% H 1 2 
ASPX2-10 Clear executive sponsorship to protect 
resources 
No clear executive sponsorship 65.6% L 2 4 




ASPX2-12 Get to a shippable increment/MVP as soon 
as possible to have people experience the 
product 
Wait too long to ship 81.3% H 1 3 
ASPX2-13 Have empathy with personas you are 
trying to impact/serve 
Not connecting with the persona you are 
trying to impact/serve 
78.1% I 1 4 
ASPX2-2 Clear KPIs established at the outset No clear KPIs established at the outset 87.5% H 2 2 
ASPX2-3 Customer-driven input early in the project Customer input/validation before shipping 81.3% H 1 3 
ASPX2-4 Product managers not co-located with 
Engineering 
Product managers co-located with 
engineering 
81.3% H 4 4 
ASPX2-5 Had no financial KPIs associated with 
outcomes 
Clear financial metrics associated with 
outcomes 
78.1% I 4 3 
ASPX2-6 Strong Design & User Research teams 
collaboration  
Little to no Design and User Research 
involvement 
65.6% L 1 3 
ASPX2-7 Design team deeply understands the 
problem space 
Design team's involvement is limited to 
basic UI design 
84.4% H 1 3 
ASPX2-8 Rigorous backlog management with 
respect to prioritization and grooming 
No rigorous backlog management process 78.1% I 2 2 
ASPX2-9 Objective way to prioritize based on 
prioritization framework like RICE 
No clear prioritization framework 75.0% I 1 4 
ASPX5-1 Feasibility had a high risk Tech feasibility was a low risk 75.0% I 3 4 
ASPX5-10 Project coordination was more complex Project coordination was less complex 84.4% H 5 5 
ASPX5-11 Vision, requirements, target audience were 
clear 
Vision, requirements, target audience were 
NOT clear 
81.3% H 2 1 
ASPX5-12 Had a measurable success criteria Did not have success criteria 75.0% I 2 3 
ASPX5-13 Stakeholders (Engineering, Product, 
Design) were on the same page 
Stakeholders were not aligned 84.4% H 2 1 
ASPX5-14 Had a clear understanding of dependencies Did not have a good grasp of dependencies 87.5% H 2 1 
ASPX5-15 Had a clear understanding of risk Risks were not clearly identified 87.5% H 2 1 
ASPX5-16 Iterative development approach Waterfall-like approach 81.3% H 2 1 




ASPX5-3 Feedback is coming directly from a proxy 
user 
Feedback is coming from the actual user 71.9% I 2 2 
ASPX5-4 Invest based on success Upfront capital investment 78.1% I 2 1 
ASPX5-5 Solution paradigm completely novel Similar solutions paradigms exist in 
adjacent market 
68.8% L 2 4 
ASPX5-6 Design paradigm was developed ground 
up 
Design was influenced by existing 
paradigms 
62.5% L 2 3 
ASPX5-7 More rigorous in defining and tracking 
KPIs 
Less rigorous in defining and tracking KPIs 84.4% H 2 3 
ASPX5-8 Metrics that quantify benefits to the 
customer (ROI, cost) 
Metrics that indicate benefits (Active Use) 75.0% I 1 3 
ASPX5-9 Release process more rigorous Release process less rigorous 68.8% L 5 3 
ASPX9-1 Dependencies were self-contained Dependencies were not managed properly 81.3% H 1 1 
ASPX9-10 Consistency of vision and goals Frequent change in vision and goals, no 
clarity 
87.5% H 1 3 
ASPX9-11 Shorter, more frequent value delivery Long-running project, delayed value 
delivery 
78.1% H 3 2 
ASPX9-2 Multi-staged overengineered discovery Lean, prototype-driven discovery 81.3% H 5 4 
ASPX9-3 Redefining the market Following the market 59.4% L 1 4 
ASPX9-4 Customer requests drive requirements Solutions-centric definition of requirements 71.9% I 5 3 
ASPX9-5 Waterfall-like approaches Agile transformation happened during the 
project 
87.5% H 5 5 
ASPX9-6 Follow existing Go To Market motion Changing the Go To Market Approach 68.8% I 3 1 
ASPX9-7 Risk-driven planning Schedule-driven planning 62.5% L 1 4 
ASPX9-8 Traditional app development (static) Declarative application building 65.6% L 4 3 
ASPX9-9 Stakeholders were aligned Stakeholders were not aligned 78.1% H 1 3 
ATEI12-1 High degree of focus, small co-located 
team 
Globally distributed team, personnel issues, 
communications overhead 
84.4% H 1 1 
ATEI12-
10 






Success measured as an impact on the 
target market  
No significant impact on target market 84.4% H 2 2 
ATEI12-2 Managed with Agile methodology Managed in Waterfall manner 65.6% L 1 2 
ATEI12-3 Hard ship-date Flexibility in ship date 68.8% L 3 4 
ATEI12-4 Fixed scope, non-negotiable Flexibility in scope, in terms of ability to 
move items in and out of scope throughout 
development 
68.8% L 4 2 
ATEI12-5 Focused on external customers Focused on internal company customers 62.5% L 3 3 
ATEI12-6 Sales driven, targeted on opportunity Greenfield development through customer 
discovery 
75.0% I 5 2 
ATEI12-7 Solution that addresses a market need Solution has no target market, done for the 
sake of being done 
68.8% L 3 1 
ATEI12-8 Right skills set, right individuals Dysfunctional product team (cross-business 
delivery team) 
71.9% I 3 2 
ATEI12-9 Right scope identified given the market 
conditions (MVP) 
Scope is not matched to market conditions 
or vice versa 
78.1% H 3 2 
ATEI13-1 Teams were organized around technology 
components 
A full stack feature team 75.0% I 5 4 
ATEI13-
10 
Had health of product metrics (e.g. 
availability) in place 
Did not have health of product metrics in 
place 
78.1% I 3 1 
ATEI13-
11 
Came as a ground up initiative from the 
team 
Driven by management / execs 75.0% I 4 2 
ATEI13-2 Had a well-defined objective, business 
value, scope 
Did not have a well-defined objective, 
business value, scope 
71.9% I 3 5 
ATEI13-3 Team had expertise in technology required 
in the project 
Team needed ramp up on technology 
required 
59.4% L 3 1 
ATEI13-4 Single phase, small scope Phased approach to delivery because the 
scope was large 
81.3% I 5 5 
ATEI13-5 Frequent customer feedback throughout 
development 
Customer feedback after launch 65.6% L 1 5 
ATEI13-6 Had multiple and frequent internal 
milestones 
A big-bang delivery 93.8% H 1 1 




ATEI13-8 High degree of UI Design team 
involvement  
Minimal input from UI Design team 75.0% I 1 1 
ATEI13-9 Had adoption tracking implemented as 
part of product development 
No adoption tracking implemented 81.3% I 1 1 
ATEX1-1 Agile spikes were needed to reduce 
uncertainty 
Spikes were not needed as there was less 
uncertainty 
75.0% L 2 3 
ATEX1-10 Dedicated Scrum Master No dedicated Scrum Master 87.5% H 1 2 
ATEX1-11 Followed good practices for quality 
controls (unit testing, automation) 
Quality control was an afterthought 81.3% I 1 1 
ATEX1-2 Co-location led to smoother planning and 
execution 
Lack of co-location led to more 
coordination and planning 
81.3% I 1 1 
ATEX1-3 Shared Resources Dedicated resources 81.3% I 4 4 
ATEX1-4 Vision of how to achieve the end result 
was clear  
Vision of how to achieve the end result was 
ambiguous  
78.1% L 2 2 
ATEX1-5 Development relied on data (telemetry) No data available to help make decisions 87.5% H 1 1 
ATEX1-6 Followed Agile practices more closely Did not follow Agile practices (more 
disorganized) 
90.6% H 1 1 
ATEX1-7 Dedicated Product Owner with regular 
engagement 
Less PO guidance 87.5% H 1 2 
ATEX1-8 Unpredictable release cadence (frequency) More predictable release cadence 87.5% H 4 5 
ATEX1-9 Teams sized appropriately for easier 
communication and coordination 
Teams not sized appropriately leading to 
less efficient communication and 
coordination 
75.0% L 1 1 
ATPI11-1 Driven by customer need through direct 
customer interaction 
Top-down approach driven by the 
leadership team 
65.6% I 1 2 
ATPI11-10 Alignment across various functions in the 
company 
Siloed functions, no alignment across 
company 
78.1% H 1 1 
ATPI11-11 Predictable delivery based on past 
performance 
Imposed deadlines 78.1% H 1 1 
ATPI11-12 Empower teams to build solutions based 
on a clearly articulated "Why" 
Spelled out requirements and top-down 
project plans 




ATPI11-13 Solution was designed cross-functionally 
(Eng, Design) 
Solution was designed without 
collaboration by a single function 
75.0% H 1 1 
ATPI11-14 Short iterations with incremental delivery Big Bang releases 81.3% H 1 1 
ATPI11-2 Based on the need to solve an architectural 
problem 
Based on a clear user need 56.3% L 5 3 
ATPI11-3 Small cross-functional teams were formed 
to explore 
Existing teams executed 59.4% L 1 5 
ATPI11-4 Active discovery with customers Forced change based on business need 65.6% I 1 2 
ATPI11-5 Significant number of interviews to 
address major unknowns 
Small number of interviews to validate 
some assumptions with some unknowns 
62.5% L 1 3 
ATPI11-6 Data driven during Beta and after release 
to track adoption 
Not able to collect data for adoption 
tracking 
71.9% I 1 1 
ATPI11-7 High revenue goals for the first year after 
release 
No revenue goals attached 68.8% I 5 3 
ATPI11-8 Traditional metrics like revenue and active 
use were used to track success 
User engagement and user behaviour 
metrics were used to track success 
71.9% I 5 3 
ATPI11-9 Beta approach to get feedback and 
improve the offering 
Gradual release rollout to control for risk 
and quality 
68.8% I 1 3 
ATPI3-1 No telemetry to measure usage Good usage telemetry 90.6% H 5 5 
ATPI3-10 Had a business model defined ahead of 
project start 
Did not have a business model defined 78.1% I 1 2 
ATPI3-11 Aligned with the company's strategy Did not align with company's strategy 87.5% H 1 2 
ATPI3-12 Understood the various personas (buyer, 
user) 
Made assumptions about personas 78.1% I 1 1 
ATPI3-13 Had a growth mindset Had a content mindset 90.6% H 1 2 
ATPI3-14 Sales teams were incentivized to sell Sales teams were not incentivized to sell 81.3% H 1 3 
ATPI3-2 No visibility into customer behaviour Full awareness of behaviour and experience 
patterns 
87.5% H 5 5 
ATPI3-3 Had a clear business case No business case defined 71.9% I 5 5 




ATPI3-5 Customer driven Internal push by company strategy / execs 59.4% L 2 1 
ATPI3-6 Agile development process Waterfall development process 90.6% H 1 1 
ATPI3-7 Co-located Engineering teams Distributed Engineering teams 53.1% L 1 3 
ATPI3-8 High focus on revenue and sales Low focus on revenue or sales 90.6% H 1 2 
ATPI3-9 Team was motivated & engaged Team was not motivated or engaged 93.8% H 1 2 
ATPI4-1 Had clear business problems to be solved Open scope, no boundaries, business 
problem too broad 
81.3% H 3 1 
ATPI4-10 Had executive sponsorship Did not have executive sponsorship 65.6% L 2 4 
ATPI4-11 Well defined success outcomes Did not have clear definition of success 84.4% H 2 1 
ATPI4-2 Requirements driven by customer 
validation 
Requirements are not driven by customer 
validation 
84.4% H 1 2 
ATPI4-3 Iterated on a released product Shipped and didn't iterate 71.9% L 1 4 
ATPI4-4 Short development cycle (a quarter) Long development cycle (over a year) 75.0% I 3 2 
ATPI4-5 Requirements scope has changed often Minor alterations to scope 87.5% H 4 5 
ATPI4-6 Full usability into the usage data No visibility into usage data 87.5% H 1 1 
ATPI4-7 Multiple indicators of usage Few indicators of usage 87.5% H 1 1 
ATPI4-8 Success measured in terms of purchase Success measured in terms of usage 65.6% L 3 5 
ATPI4-9 Diverse set of stakeholders aligned and 
partnered to achieve goals 
Stakeholders were not aligned on mutual 
goals 
87.5% H 1 2 
BSEX1-1 Was able to build a group from scratch Inherited the group 75.0% I 1 3 
BSEX1-10 Market was not ready for the product Market was ready for the product 75.0% I 3 5 
BSEX1-2 No community engagement Community driven product 59.4% L 5 5 
BSEX1-3 Moving teams towards iterative 
development 
Leaving the process alone 56.3% L 1 2 
BSEX1-4 Had a strong executive commitment Marginal executive support 90.6% H 1 1 
BSEX1-5 Did not have a well-defined leading 
indicators 
Well defined leading indicators to project 
success (work burndown) 
81.3% H 5 5 




BSEX1-7 Really clear product definition No clear product definition 96.9% H 1 1 
BSEX1-8 Strong Product Manager engagement No strong Product Management 
engagement 
84.4% H 1 1 
BSEX1-9 Dedicated Project Manager No dedicated project Manager 50.0% L 1 1 
BSPX11-1 Had several intended outcomes  Had one specific outcome  81.3% H 3 5 
BSPX11-
10 
Was a relatively small team Required a large team 90.6% H 1 1 
BSPX11-
11 
Clearly defined outcomes Unclear outcomes 75.0% I 3 1 
BSPX11-
12 
Well defined responsibilities for each 
member of the team 
Responsibilities loosely defined or 
undefined 
90.6% H 1 1 
BSPX11-
13 
A well-defined system that everyone is 
using regardless of a particular 
methodology 
No well-defined system to follow 75.0% I 3 1 
BSPX11-
14 
Dedicated resources No dedicated resources - split attention 
(allocating 25% to one thing and 25% to 
another) 
68.8% I 4 2 
BSPX11-
15 
Dependencies and contingencies were not 
fully understood in advance 
Dependencies and contingencies were fully 
understood in advance 
78.1% I 3 5 
BSPX11-2 Required market understanding Required technical understanding 59.4% L 1 4 
BSPX11-3 Fell into a single product line in terms of 
teams working on it 
Fell into multiple product lines 71.9% I 3 1 
BSPX11-4 Had to focus on customers Had many internal stakeholders 71.9% I 3 3 
BSPX11-5 Followed Agile methodology No meaningful methodology followed 71.9% I 1 1 
BSPX11-6 Required exec sponsorship Did not require exec sponsorship 71.9% I 1 5 
BSPX11-7 Required infrastructure changes Did not require infrastructure changes 62.5% L 3 5 
BSPX11-8 Required UX design Did not require UX design 56.3% L 4 2 




BSPX12-1 Solving high impact and high urgency 
(time to market) problems for the business 
The problem was not as urgent or as 
impactful 
93.8% H 1 1 
BSPX12-
10 
A robust tracking methodology for success 
(clear definition of success, and a way to 
track and measure it) 
Poor definition of success, inability to track 
and measure 
90.6% H 1 1 
BSPX12-2 Executive acknowledgement of the need 
and a buy in for a solution and the relative 
priority 
Only some aspects had buy in, but not all 
(the need, the solution, the priority) 
81.3% I 1 2 
BSPX12-3 Were not grounded in a market need, 
included many untested assumptions 
Thoroughly understood the market need 90.6% H 5 5 
BSPX12-4 Could be executed in a single organization Was executed in a cross-functional manner 62.5% L 1 1 
BSPX12-5 Aiming at building a market position 
created by a new innovative technology 
trend 
The technology was not really innovative, 
even if it was new 
71.9% L 1 3 
BSPX12-6 Executing what customers ask for Extrapolating what the customers will ask 
for (anticipating the customers' needs)  
65.6% L 3 1 
BSPX12-7 Ability to reach the market and activate a 
Sales force and partners 
Inability to reach the market and activate a 
Sales force and partners (due to lack of 
funds, capabilities in Sales or Marketing) 
78.1% I 1 1 
BSPX12-8 Clarity inside the org around the product 
vision (who is the buyer, what is the 
problem, etc) 
Lack of vision clarity / understanding 75.0% I 1 1 
BSPX12-9 Clarity of roles and responsibilities Lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities 84.4% H 1 1 
BSPX4-1 Self-contained within the company Had dependency on external stakeholders 71.9% I 4 1 
BSPX4-10 Strong executive sponsorship No exec sponsorship 71.9% I 1 2 
BSPX4-11 Aligned with existing routes to market No alignment with existing routes to market 87.5% H 1 2 
BSPX4-12 Defining a clear market opportunity with 
differentiation in mind 
No clear opportunity or differentiation 
defined 
71.9% I 1 2 




BSPX4-3 Required large number of stakeholders 
(product owners) 
Fewer stakeholders involved 68.8% L 5 5 
BSPX4-4 Thorough market analysis was done No market analysis 71.9% I 2 4 
BSPX4-5 Frequent feedback loop with stakeholders 
internal and external 
No incremental feedback with stakeholders 81.3% H 1 1 
BSPX4-6 Close community (developers, users) 
collaboration 
No community collaboration 71.9% I 3 2 
BSPX4-7 Well defined business objectives Loosely defined business objectives 62.5% L 1 3 
BSPX4-8 Well defined the window of opportunity  Window of opportunity is unclear 75.0% I 1 1 
BSPX4-9 Alignment with strategic goals No alignment with strategic goals 90.6% H 1 1 
BSEX8-1 Followed more agile approaches Followed more waterfall approaches 68.8% L 3 1 
BSEX8-10 Had thought leadership and expertise in a 
vertical 
No expertise in a vertical 81.3% I 1 1 
BSEX8-11 Organizational leadership: ability to build 
a team that works well together 
Weak organizational leadership 81.3% I 1 1 
BSEX8-12 Having a perception of being a leader in 
the market (external perspective) 
Not being seen as a leader in the market 81.3% I 1 1 
BSEX8-2 Unity of command, one goal, one person 
in charge of that goal 
Diffused command - multiple people, 
multiple goals 
84.4% H 2 1 
BSEX8-3 Organically run by experts in teams 
themselves 
A lot of cooks in the kitchen 90.6% H 1 1 
BSEX8-4 A deep technological and market expertise Not a lot of depth of product specific 
knowledge with respect to tech and market 
75.0% L 4 1 
BSEX8-5 Well established, known market spaces A completely new market 68.8% L 3 3 
BSEX8-6 Had a singular deliverable, singular goal Objective was to solve goals of different 
constituents 
81.3% I 1 1 
BSEX8-7 Solved only one technical problem Needed to solve a myriad of technical 
problems 
87.5% H 1 1 
BSEX8-8 Had clear objectives and clear leadership Lack of solid objectives and good 
leadership 




BSEX8-9 Had metrics that incentivized the desired 
behaviour 
Metrics that incentivized bad outcomes, bad 
behaviour 
78.1% I 3 1 
BTEI7-1 New Business Opportunity, new market Rethink, reimplement existing product 62.5% L 1 3 
BTEI7-10 Lowest level engineers knew the short 
term goals and were empowered to make 
decisions 
Engineers were not able to make decisions 
due to lack of empowerment or knowledge 
87.5% H 1 1 
BTEI7-11 Quality Engineering was embedded with 
the team from the beginning 
Quality Engineering team started after 
Engineering work was done 
75.0% I 1 2 
BTEI7-12 Quick iterations of delivery to the end-
user 
Slow iterations of delivery to the end user 75.0% I 1 2 
BTEI7-13 Dedicated, focused team Team had other areas of responsibility 
(maintenance, legacy) 
71.9% I 1 3 
BTEI7-14 Practiced code ownership (specialization) Did not practice code ownership 
(generalization) 
75.0% I 2 4 
BTEI7-2 Cross-department, within org boundaries A spinoff out of the core org structure 68.8% L 5 2 
BTEI7-3 Larger teams Small team 62.5% L 4 3 
BTEI7-4 Focused on new personas Focused on personas we knew well 78.1% I 2 5 
BTEI7-5 Project contributing to a larger program A stand-alone program (project is the 
program) 
65.6% L 5 3 
BTEI7-6 No community at all Strong community participation 71.9% I 5 5 
BTEI7-7 Driven by Eng with no PM guidance Had a strong PM support 62.5% L 2 4 
BTEI7-8 Quick increments, designing for next 
increment 
Upfront design for the entire project 71.9% I 2 2 
BTEI7-9 Revenue-based success metrics Did not focus on revenue as a metric 75.0% I 4 2 
BTEX2-1 Assigned smaller more concrete coding 
tasks 
More elaborate project management and 
overall project strategy 
75.0% H 5 1 
BTEX2-10 Starting out with well-defined milestones Starting out with no or ill-defined 
milestones 
81.3% H 2 1 
BTEX2-11 Coarse grained tracking (Epics, stories) 
with roadmaping tools like Aha! 
Fine grained tracking (tasks) with tools like 
Jira 
71.9% I 2 5 




BTEX2-2 Cross Team collaboration and 
coordination 
Personnel management within a single team 59.4% L 1 5 
BTEX2-3 Minimize time and effort spent Achieve feature milestones 59.4% L 5 1 
BTEX2-4 Improving quality and usability, 
minimizing defects and Support 
escalations 
Optimizing ongoing operations 75.0% H 3 1 
BTEX2-5 Assigned to the team Assigned to myself 71.9% I 2 3 
BTEX2-6 Had deadlines Did not have deadlines 65.6% L 3 3 
BTEX2-7 Easily trackable metrics (bug reports) Have not been able to define good metrics 
yet 
75.0% H 3 1 
BTEX2-8 Customer expectation is for issues and 
new features to be addressed on a 
quarterly cadence 
Customer's expectation is for ongoing 
delivery of fixes and new features (SaaS) 
59.4% L 3 5 
BTEX2-9 One way feedback from customer on a 
quarter delay 
Fast feedback loop responding to customer 81.3% H 5 4 
BTEX3-1 Agile methodology used for development More traditional / waterfall methodology 90.6% H 1 2 
BTEX3-10 Success was clearly defined and agreed by 
all stakeholders 
Different stakeholders had different 
outcomes in mind (wasn't agreement what 
was the most important factor for success) 
71.9% I 2 1 
BTEX3-11 Had a stable project leadership team Had churn in project leadership throughout 
the project 
68.8% L 1 2 
BTEX3-12 Teams had longevity before the project 
started 
Teams were newly formed around the 
project 
68.8% L 2 3 
BTEX3-2 Responses to existing customer requests Due to prospect or potential customer 
request 
68.8% L 4 2 
BTEX3-3 Requirements were driven by market 
analysis 
Requirements were fairly specific 65.6% L 2 4 
BTEX3-4 Small number of large customers 
(Enterprise) 
Had large number of small customers 
(SMB) 
65.6% L 2 4 
BTEX3-5 Requirements driven by Product Managers Requirements driven by the field 
organization 
62.5% L 4 2 




BTEX3-7 Had to integrate with the wider product 
portfolio 
Individual/standalone product 68.8% L 2 4 
BTEX3-8 A single Eng Mgr responsible for the 
project 
Multiple Eng Mgrs responsible for the 
project 
78.1% I 2 4 
BTEX3-9 Roadmap was well defined Vision was well defined 75.0% I 4 2 
BTEX9-1 A very long exploration phase A short exploration phase 68.8% L 2 3 
BTEX9-10 Had a shared vision of what we are trying 
to accomplish 
Did not have a shared vision 84.4% H 1 1 
BTEX9-11 Had executive buy in Did not have executive buy in 87.5% H 1 2 
BTEX9-12 Teams with a complete skill set (had skill 
diversity) 
Homogenic skills, no diversity 87.5% H 1 1 
BTEX9-13 Several smaller deliverables with 
milestones  
One large deliverable at the end 71.9% I 2 2 
BTEX9-2 Low to no funding Significant funding allocated 65.6% L 3 3 
BTEX9-3 Had very little oversight in the first 1-2 
years  
Moderate to higher level of oversight 
(program management, cross-functional) 
71.9% I 2 4 
BTEX9-4 Outside market influences with respect to 
tech to be used for the project 
Largely internally focused with respect to 
tech to be used 
75.0% I 2 2 
BTEX9-5 Existing dependencies that required more 
coordination over deliverables that we 
didn't have a direct control over 
More self-contained, less dependencies 65.6% L 3 4 
BTEX9-6 Had a newly developed specific Go To 
Market strategy 
Leveraged the existing go to market 59.4% L 2 4 
BTEX9-7 Small to medium number of people 
involved (tens) 
Large number of people involved 
(hundreds) 
68.8% L 4 3 
BTEX9-8 Strategic alignment led to success Strategic misalignment led to failure of a 
project 
90.6% H 2 1 
BTEX9-9 Had a strong champion to drive the project 
forward, involved in day to day 
Did not have a strong champion 81.3% H 1 1 
BTPI10-1 Harder to make changes on the fly due to 
large amount of communication 




BTPI10-2 Multiple teams, a lot of cross group 
coordination 
Small focused group, little coordination 62.5% L 4 3 
BTPI10-3 Tasks were delegated as far down as 
possible (to domain experts). Was more 
agile in a way. 
More "command and control" style 62.5% L 1 3 
BTPI10-4 Released very infrequently without a set 
cadence (once a year or less) 
Released more frequently on a set schedule 
(twice year) 
71.9% H 5 3 
BTPI10-5 Empowered team members  Micromanaged team members 62.5% L 2 2 
BTPI10-6 Narrow scope Broad, vague scope 56.3% L 2 3 
BTPI10-7 Clearly communicated mission Unclear mission 78.1% H 2 1 
BTPI10-8 Had a good understanding of the target 
market 
Did not have a good understanding of target 
market 
78.1% H 2 1 
BTPI10-9 Had a good go to market plan and 
execution 
Poor go to market plan and execution 71.9% H 1 1 
BTPI6-1 Driven by clear user need Driven by an anticipated opportunity 81.3% H 1 1 
BTPI6-10 Right compensation and incentives for the 
team 
Underpaid, no rewards for success 87.5% H 2 1 
BTPI6-11 The technical challenges were interesting Few technical challenges 71.9% L 1 5 
BTPI6-2 The target user was well known The context for the product use was less 
known 
75.0% I 1 1 
BTPI6-3 Driven by clear product metrics (cost of 
the product, performance) 
Driven by value to the customer 65.6% L 5 1 
BTPI6-4 High budget, longer schedules Limited time and resources 71.9% L 1 4 
BTPI6-5 Had clear goals about project outcome, 
definition of success 
Did not have clear goals or definition of 
success 
81.3% H 3 1 
BTPI6-6 Appropriate resources (right skills, 
adequate number of resources) 
Resources not appropriate for the project 81.3% H 1 1 
BTPI6-7 Strong executive commitment Weak or no exec commitment 78.1% I 2 1 




BTPI6-9 Team motivated to drive project to 
successful outcome 
Unmotivated, burnt-out team members 87.5% H 1 2 
BTPX5-1 A project was for a market with a clear 
leader 
A project was for a market with no 
established leader 
65.6% L 5 2 
BTPX5-10 Had core competencies required for 
development 
Did not have core competencies required 
for development 
81.3% H 2 1 
BTPX5-11 Had ability to execute on the vision Did not have an ability to execute on the 
vision 
75.0% H 1 3 
BTPX5-2 Partner-led  with defined market 
opportunities 
Partners are asking for help to establish a 
position in an existing market 
65.6% L 1 2 
BTPX5-3 Driven using Agile methodologies More driven by Waterfall-like 
methodologies 
68.8% I 1 2 
BTPX5-4 Proactive in defining the vision ahead of 
the market 
Built-in exit strategy from the beginning 75.0% H 1 2 
BTPX5-5 Partner is a big part of strategy A solo act without partner involvement 68.8% I 2 2 
BTPX5-6 Observe-Orient-Decide-Act Loop used in 
managing the project 
Situation-Core Competencies-Obstacles-
Prospects-Expectations approach was used 
75.0% H 1 2 
BTPX5-7 Led by strong established vendors 
(partners) 
Net new offering / new category, no 
competitors  
62.5% L 2 2 
BTPX5-8 Clear definition of success No clear definition of success 78.1% H 1 1 
BTPX5-9 Metrics are about mindshare and market 
share 
Metrics are about market relevance, 
revenue opportunity 



























Appendix 8 – Definitive Categories 
    
All Constructs High Importance Constructs 
Definitive 
Category 
Intermediate Categories Includes Construct Number Frequency Construct 
Number 
Frequency 









for project execution 
(Agile vs. Waterfall), 
cadence of releases, 
response to change, 
risk reduction 








































































User Experience Design 
Team Involvement 
Considerations about 
the team structure 
and organization 


















































Customer Focus Customer Engagement 
Partner and Community 
Involvement 
Validation Methods 






















Business Case / Model 
Considerations 
partners, and whether 
these interactions 


















Market Focus Market Alignment 
Market Understanding 
and Expertise 
The extent to which 
the leadership team 
of the project 
understands the 
market the product is 
being developed for; 
how well is the 
project aligned with 
the market needs, 































Metrics Clarity of Metrics 
Metrics focused on 
Presence of metrics, 





























Clarity of Objectives and 
Outcomes 
Importance of having 
clear objectives and 






























The extent to which 
the product in 
development is 
aligned with the rest 
of the organization 
and its strategy, had 
alignment and buy-in 
























Clarity of Vision Clarity of Vision How clear is the 





























The extent to which 
the teams were 
motivated, 
incentivized, and 
empowered to make 
decisions and 






















the technology and 

















Data Driven Decision 
Making 
Ability to track 
product health and 
usage and make 





















The extent to which 
the project had 

















Strong Leadership Importance of having 
strong leadership on 
the project. It may 
come from above or 
from within the team. 






















Ability to Execute How well is the team 
positioned to execute 
on the project, with 


















Executive Sponsorship Importance of having 
an executive sponsor 










































Appendix 9 – Differential Analysis  
  
Company Level Function Experience 
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Market Focus The extent to 
which the 
leadership team 
of the project 
understands the 
market the 
product is being 
developed for; 
how well is the 
project aligned 
with the market 






















Metrics Presence of 
metrics, ability to 
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product health 
and usage and 
make decisions 
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project. It may 
come from above 
or from within 
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team positioned 
to execute on the 
project, with 







































































Appendix 10 – Differential Analysis – Statistical Significance 










Appendix 11 – Differential Analysis of Intermediate Categories – Statistical Significance 






























Appendix 12 – Stage 2 Interview Guide 
This is an excerpt from an 8-page interview guide used for stage 2 interviews. It demonstrates type of cards that were shown to interviewees.  





Appendix 13 – Preliminary Findings Report 
This is an excerpt from a 12-page report shared with interviewees after the first stage of the study was completed.  
 





Appendix 14 – Detailed Findings Example from Stage 2 
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